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ABSTRACT
In the two decades prior to Cherokee Removal, Georgians discussed removal as a way for
the state to create and maintain order, a cluster of ideas that revolved around a social system that
championed white superiority, a political system that adhered to republican thinking, and a legal
system that prevented lawlessness. To create a well-ordered society, Georgia’s leaders believed
that authority flowed from white settlers to civil institutions, which benignly administered over
the idealized society. In the Cherokee-Georgia borderlands, no single political entity could claim
sovereignty, so the Cherokee Nation, federal government, and state of Georgia each sought to
impose its own laws over the territory. Instead of a peaceful settlement, Georgia’s leaders had to
regulate the social landscape of the borderlands, or impose social control through violence. A
multitude of groups, including a multiracial vigilante group, the Slicks, a state sponsored military
unit, the Georgia Guard, and a large-scale use of federal troops and state militiamen, all sought
to regulate the social landscape of the borderlands.
In the highly partisan world of the antebellum south, state politics and a democratic ethos
collided with the violent actions of local, state, and federal actors in the borderlands crucible.
Whiteness became less of a negotiated identity as state legislators sought to safeguard and codify
the rights of white citizens. The use of violence in the backcountry served political and social
ends, but it left ambivalent legacies. State-sponsored violence against “disorderly whites” showed
just how comfortable the state was with using violence in its pursuit of order. That state
militiamen showed restraint during Cherokee Removal in 1838 showed just the opposite. Still,
two decades of violence aimed at the expulsion of the Cherokee demonstrated the earnestness
white Georgians felt when they discussed the extension of the white republic.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1819, the United States entered into a treaty with the Cherokee Nation that
encouraged the peaceful withdrawal of the Indians from the confines of Georgia, Alabama,
Tennessee, and North Carolina to the “Arkansaw” territory. It also allowed for certain “heads of
Indian families” to remain in the east if they renounced their native connections and “choose to
become citizens of the United States.” Federal negotiators sweetened the deal by promising a
“lifetime reservation” of 640 acres for any of the Cherokee who renounced their heritage and
adopted American citizenship. More important for federal negotiators, the Cherokee, in the
course of the negotiations, ceded thousands of acres of land to the states and made it available to
white settlers. The Treaty of 1819 was the last the Cherokee living in the American South would
make for sixteen years.1
In Georgia, as settlers moved into the territory ceded by the treaty and carved out new
counties, local officials needed a guide to their duties and the laws they had to uphold. To meet
their needs, a Georgia jurist, Augustin Smith Clayton, compiled the legal duties of the civil
officers who comprised the bulk of local government. Those duties covered all manner of legal
classifications from apprentices to counterfeiters to smallpox sufferers. Clayton’s volume of state
laws made it easy for civil authorities to learn their duties and ensure a peaceful settlement of the
state’s newest counties. Of particular importance to backcountry officials were crimes that caused
a “great disturbance of the public tranquility,” called affrays. The state legal code delineated the
responsibilities of various classes of citizens to deal with such occurrences. Private citizens, for
example, could “lawfully part” combatants “till the heat be over,” whereas constables and
justices of the peace could use more force to part those engaged in fights. Clayton’s book of
Charles J. Kappler, ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 2: 177-181. http://digital.
library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/che0177.htm (Accessed November 18, 2011).
1

1

responsibilities for civil officers also showed the emphasis placed on civil law as a means of
preserving peace.2
The Treaty of 1819 and Clayton’s volume pointed to the path that national leaders
desired to take: treaties that would secure land for settlers and the implementation of state civil
law as a means of providing order. Civil authorities stayed busy dealing with a litany of panicked
rumors and rampant crimes that kept frontier inhabitants anxious over the prospects of a
peaceful settlement. Though no violent massacres marred the interactions between frontier
whites and Cherokee, a systemic and sustained application of violence over the span of two
decades had important ramifications on the development of the state and on the ability of the
Cherokee to maintain their homeland. Historians have overlooked the violence that reigned in
the borderlands in the two decades prior to removal for obvious reasons. First and foremost, the
act of removal itself, including the Trail of Tears, was incredibly brutal, resulting in the deaths of
some 4,000 Cherokee men, women, and children, if not more. Removal looms large not just in
Cherokee or state history but in the national consciousness, as well. One oft-quoted veteran of
the removal operation, John Burnett, looked back in horror on the tragedy of Cherokee removal:
“However, murder is murder whether committed by the villain skulking in the dark or by
uniformed men stepping to the strains of martial music.”3

Augustin S. Clayton, The office and duty of a justice of the peace and a guide to clerks, constables, coroners….
(Milledgeville, GA: S. Grantland, 1819), 5-7. Early American Imprints, Series II: Shaw-Shoemaker, 1801-1819, no.
47639.
2

3 “John Burnett’s Story of the Trail of Tears,” http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/History/
TrailofTears/24502/Information.aspx (Accessed February 12, 2012). At this point, the clarification of two terms,
frontier and borderlands, is necessary. The historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron have done much to lend
precision to two terms otherwise devoid of it. By frontier historians usually mean the place where peoples converged
and where no single group or political entity enjoyed sovereignty, whereas borderlands signifies the location where
colonial empires or nations collided and struggled over national boundaries. As was the case with most zones of
contact, the Cherokee-Georgia region was both a frontier and a borderland. To make matters more confusing,
contemporary observers often reversed the meaning of frontier, designating it as the firm and fixed boundary
between the Cherokee Nation and the state of Georgia—a border that was supposed to prevent intercultural contact.
On the differentiation between frontiers and borderlands, see Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From
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Second, much of the focus on Cherokee Removal has centered on the personality of
Andrew Jackson—from his paternalist attitude that inclined him to see removal as a way to
protect and preserve Native American cultures to his megalomaniacal determination to open up
living space for the democracy—or on his refusal to abide by Chief Justice John Marshall’s
rulings. The extensive literature describing the development of Jacksonian democracy necessarily
focus on Removal as not so much an outgrowth of local conditions that spawned violence as an
epic political struggle for political power, if not for the soul of the nation. That narrative, while
important, does little to show how much violent Georgians disrupted Cherokee society and
ignores borderlands social conditions.4
Finally, historians have tended to ignore the violence that targeted the Cherokee because
of the conclusions they must draw from it. The zeal with which many Georgians sought to use
violence as a way to intimidate, coerce, separate and, finally, remove the Cherokee, at its core,
was based on a philosophy of white superiority that spoke to the innate xenophobia of Georgia’s
yeomanry. The democratic expansion of the state’s electorate that began in 1825 fundamentally
altered state politics and required state politicians to call more vociferously for Indian removal. A
majority of Georgians not only wanted Indian land, but they also expected to maintain their
superiority over a minority population in that new territory. The state legislature obliged voters
by passing laws that prohibited Indians from testifying against whites in court and from
employing whites as field hands or laborers. Such legislation made manifest the desire of state
Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and Peoples in between in North American History,” American
Historical Review 104 (June 1999): 814-841; as well as Stephen Aron, American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from
Borderland to Border State (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), esp. xiv-xvi.
See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), who hardly
discusses Indian Removal at all. Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: From Jefferson to Lincoln (New York:
Norton, 2005) places Indian Removal within the context of the growing democratic polity, while Daniel Walker
Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007),
shows how controversial and important the Indian Removal Act was to Jackson’s first year in office. Howe also
focuses on the moral aspects of removal, as does Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
4
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leaders to ensure white superiority over the innately inferior natives.
The justification for removal offered by Jackson and his supporters, as well as by
historians who have defended him, portrayed removal as a humane alternative to the rampages
of frontier whites who would stop at nothing, not even extermination, to get at Cherokee gold
and land. The presence of Indians, according to this interpretation, incited poor whites into a
violent frenzy. Jackson’s approach to the problem of a potentially bloody Indian war fit in with
his focus on the liberty of white men. Rather than protect the Indians where they were, he would
remove them. He would not prevent whites from intruding on Cherokee land or otherwise curtail
their behavior. Though Jackson in early 1830 had watched with satisfaction as his Indian
Removal Bill passed through Congress, he had not indicated how he expected his policy to play
out.
Since 1802, Georgia had waited for the federal government to fulfill its end of the socalled Compact of 1802, when the state agreed to exchange its claim to western lands for the
promise of a timely removal of any Indian population within its boundaries. After the Treaty of
1819, Georgians moved onto land formerly in possession of the Cherokee Nation and clamored
for more. That cry reached fever pitch when a white hunter discovered gold on Cherokee land in
1828. By the following year, the news had spread nationwide and “intruders” flocked onto
Cherokee land in search of gold. State politicians charged the federal government with wavering
on the agreement and, after twenty-six years of waiting, they had a point. The larger trend of
federal Indian policy did not, however, advocate removal, stressing instead acculturation and
eventually the assimilation of native peoples into the American polity. Such enlightened thinking,
however, contradicted the prevailing mood of race relations in the antebellum South.
Jacksonian Indian policy encountered a major impediment in 1831 when the state of
Georgia requested federal aid to halt the intrusion. Jackson agreed, and a small detachment of
4

troops entered the Cherokee Nation that summer. By the onset of winter, the state saw the
federal presence as antithetical to its emboldened stance on the issue of state’s rights. It had
passed a series of acts that had, in effect, nullified federal statute. In 1828, the extension law had
expanded state law over the territory occupied by the Cherokee and, two years later, the
supremacy law voided the Cherokee Constitution from having any effect on native ground within
the bounds of Georgia. With these two laws, the state had abrogated treaties made between the
Cherokee Nation and the United States. Jackson effectively allowed the state to assume control of
Indian policy at the local level until federal negotiators could hammer out a treaty with Cherokee
leaders that would ensure removal.
When discussing the extension of state boundaries and the rights of white settlers to
displace Cherokee residents in the backcountry, state leaders talked about order. In their
pronouncements, order meant three interrelated things. First, state leaders saw order as a social
system in which white planters held power and authority, buttressed by the support of the
yeomanry and built upon the labor and legally binding condition of slavery prescribed for blacks.
Second, order signified a political system defined by its adherence to the common good and
virtuous self-sacrifice that, by the 1830s, encompassed egalitarianism and white male equality.
Finally, order reflected a society devoid of crime, lawlessness, and violence. Civil institutions that
maintained law, preserved property ownership, and prevented the outbreak of violence held
these three overlapping meanings together. In the Georgia lowcountry and piedmont, areas that
had a longer history of white settlement, implementing order had proved an easier task for civil
authorities than to their counterparts in the borderlands, where preserving the public peace
proved difficult. The problem, however, came not from the Cherokee—who had their own
competing system of civil authority—but from whites who committed acts of violence.
For state leaders, achieving a well-ordered society would ensure sovereignty and the
5

establishment and solidification of the white republic in a space previously inhabited by natives.
Sovereignty proved a thorny issue, however, because so many entities claimed supremacy over
the Cherokee territory. First, the Cherokee themselves did so when they created a national
constitution in 1827. Next, the federal government, through its treaties with the Cherokee and its
ability to regulate commerce with Indian nations, claimed sovereignty over the territory. Last, the
state argued that it had sovereignty because of the Compact of 1802 and the growth of a
southern radical strain of thought that championed the rights of the state.
Georgia’s politicians feared that unless they created an ordered social landscape and then
asserted the state’s sovereignty over it, Georgia’s politicians feared that the white republic, and all
of the concomitant privileges it conferred on whites, would suffer. Indeed, they had to look no
further than the backcountry to see what type of society would form without order and
sovereignty. While crime flourished there, so too did a high degree of cooperation between
frontier whites and Cherokee. Georgians traded, gambled, and worked alongside their native
neighbors. A startling amount of acculturation occurred that allowed men like John Burnett to
hunt with Cherokee men, learn their language, and court Cherokee women. Other white
Georgians did the same and interracial marriage, though infrequent, did occur. In spite of the
great deal of cooperation that flourished in the backcountry, theft of property, house-burnings,
and beatings persisted as whites and Cherokee competed with one another for space and
resources.
It quickly became apparent, especially after the gold rush in 1829, that civil authorities
alone could not maintain order. Violence became an important tool for authorities, who fretted
over the prospects of imposing civil law over such an unruly population. In order to halt the
activities of criminals, federal and state officials, as well as locals, acted in a variety of ways, but
their responses to crime and violence perpetrated by whites frequently involved violence. For
6

example, in 1829 a group of backcountry thieves, called the Pony Club, formed a crime ring that
eventually coopted much of the civil government in Carroll County. When the Club’s activities
became too egregious for settlers, they banded together with their Cherokee neighbors and
formed a vigilante group called the Slicks or the Regulators. Using a Cherokee form of
punishment—tying victims to a tree and whipping them with hickory switches—the Slicks
employed violence as a means of social control. Violence, they learned, could be used to create
order at the local level. The cooperation exhibited between white settlers and Cherokee
underscored the complexity of the borderlands and the intensity of their desire for order.
When federal troops attempted to regulate the borderlands in 1831, they had much less
success than the Slicks. The egalitarianism rampant in the frontier made violence directed at
whites problematic. Indeed, when Georgians learned that the federal government had expelled
whites at bayonet point from the gold region but had allowed young Cherokee men to remain
and take gold, they insisted that the troops had imposed an unnatural hierarchy in the
backcountry that placed whites below the Cherokee. Only a few short months after the troops
had been sent in, President Jackson recalled them at the request of the Georgia’s governor,
George R. Gilmer, a champion of the State’s Rights faction, who demanded that the state be
allowed to police its own territory.
The state also sanctioned the use of violence to quell disorderly whites. In 1830,
Governor Gilmer had urged the legislature to create a military force that would have wideranging authority to bring order to the gold mines. Between 1831 and 1835, four separate units
known as the Georgia Guard operated in Cherokee country. The Guard focused its attention on
two groups: white intruders and Cherokee who opposed removal. Both proved politically
sensitive. Because of the growing belief in white male equality, the Guard encountered problems
when it employed violence against whites, even if they did behave in a disorderly way. Over time,
7

the Guard shifted its focus away from intruders and focused most of its attention on the
Cherokee. It even isolated those Cherokee who opposed removal, thereby widening the political
schism developing within the Cherokee polity. According to historian William McLoughlin, the
Guard’s orders “instructed them to protect both Cherokees and whites,” but the Guard “rightly
understood its job to be one of harassing the Cherokees and siding with white intruders in any
dispute.” Over the next five years, the Guard “arrested missionaries who obstructed Georgia’s
will, arrested the Cherokee Principal Chief John Ross (and seized all his papers), arrested a
newspaper reporter who came to interview Ross (and seized all his papers), and confiscated the
Cherokees printing press and all its type.” More than any other force working to destabilize
Cherokee society, the Georgia Guard undermined Cherokee life because of its violent
propensities and the uncertainty it wrought.5
The Slicks, the federal government, and the Georgia Guard all used violence as a way to
control a white population that did not behave according to the tenets of republicanism. Rather
than citizens concerned about the public good, intruders represented a threat to order. Between
1830 and 1838, however, the state’s attitude toward unruly whites changed. In 1829, Governor
Gilmer saw backcountry disorder as a moral failing on the part of white inhabitants and
intruders. A firm response on the part of the state could reduce tensions and reform unruly
frontiersmen. Later, Governor Wilson Lumpkin adopted the Jacksonian stance that the presence
of the Cherokee—and not the moral failings of the white polity—caused the bulk of the
backcountry’s woes. After 1832 this view became more pronounced because the state raffled off
Cherokee land to prospective settlers. The shift in the settlement pattern after that date made it
difficult for state leaders to blame backcountry woes on poor farmers who had benefitted from
5 William G. McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), 432-433.
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the state’s munificence. It became apparent that state politicians had used the issue of violence
against whites to score political points with the expanded electorate. Politics in Georgia had long
revolved around dominant personalities, as the nascent Second Party System had not yet taken
hold in the state. Two factions existed: the Troup and Clark parties. The Troupites drew their
strength from the lowcountry and practiced a very paternal strain of politics, as exhibited by
Gilmer’s insistence on reforming the morals of poor whites. Beginning in the 1830s, they sought
to establish a series of schools for the poor and a statewide system of internal improvements paid
for public ownership of the gold mines. The proximity of the part’s base to southern radicals in
South Carolina also made the Troupites more concerned about the rights of the state, the
growing power of the federal government, and abolitionism. By the end of the 1830s, the
Troupites had changed their name to the State’s Rights Party, though their opponents derisively
labeled them Nullifiers. In a twist that demonstrated just how nebulous party formation was in its
early years, the State’s Rights Party ended up in opposition to Andrew Jackson and in support of
the Whig Party, in spite of its insistence on removal and the dangers of an expanded federal
government. In comparison, the Clark faction drew its most ardent supporters from the
backcountry. During the Nullification controversy, it changed its name to the Union Party to
show its solidarity with president Andrew Jackson. Its supporters, more than the State’s Righters,
supported an immediate and forceful removal of the Indians, demonstrated hostility towards the
national bank, and saw the Nullifiers as power-hungry aristocrats lording over the poor people of
the state.
Politics in Georgia only made the violence occurring in the backcountry more
contentious. When it became apparent that the Georgia Guard was employed for overtly
political purposes, especially in 1835 when its commander, William N. Bishop, used it as a way to
intimidate political opponents in Murray County, the legislature had no choice but to disband
9

the unit. In spite of its blatantly political nature, the Guard had effectively carried out its duties,
especially when it came to intimidating the Cherokee. Combined with the extension and
supremacy laws, the Guard made life for the Cherokee within the bounds of Georgia unbearable,
unpredictable, and unstable.
The factionalism already present within the Cherokee Nation widened as a result of two
decades of violence and uncertainty, a divide that proved too much of a gap for Cherokee
nationalism to bridge. One faction within the Cherokee Nation signed the 1835 Treaty of New
Echota with the federal government and began removal. To heed that call, state and federal
authorities worked in tandem to effect removal. They prepared for the forced exodus by building
a series of forts, stocking supplies, and stationing federal troops within the Cherokee Nation.
Concurrent with that buildup, the federal government called on nearly two thousand Georgia
militiamen to participate in Removal. By May 1838, Major General Winfield Scott had amassed
an army of 8,000 federal and state troops to begin the process. Troops entered the homes of
Cherokee families and forced them off their ancestral homeland and into stockades, where they
awaited transport to larger internment camps. The organized and efficient removal of the
Cherokee, designed to rid the backcountry of a small, minority population, proceeded rapidly.
Within a month, those troops had expelled more than 8,000 Cherokee from within the bounds of
Georgia.
Removal was not just the culmination of a removal policy inaugurated by Andrew
Jackson in 1830 with the Indian Removal Act. It was also the culmination of twenty years of
crime and violence that had fundamentally shaped the Cherokee-Georgia borderlands. From the
Treaty of 1819 to removal in 1838, white Georgians had used violence as a way to intimidate
and remove the “inferior” population within their midst. The uptick in violence after 1829,
especially the brand sponsored by the state, convinced some Cherokee that the way to preserve
10

their cultural heritage and traditions lay in acquiescence. Violence, ironically, had been used in
the name of order. To safeguard the expanding republic, state and federal leaders saw violence as
a way to preserve order and move a group of people who stood in the way of their progress.
Though it was not the first time Americans had used violence to eliminate a native population,
the cry for order was something new and it allowed American leaders a seemingly legitimate way
to use force to regulate the republic.

11

Map 1. The Cherokee Nation and Georgia’s Border Counties, 1830
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CHAPTER ONE: ORDER, HARMONY, AND SOVEREIGNTY, 1820-1835

In the wake of the American Revolution, Georgians looked covetously beyond their
borders. Teeming with promise, the backcountry beckoned as a land of opportunity where
landless whites and planters alike could make their way in the world. Far from unoccupied, the
land claimed by the state and clamored after by its white citizens contained thousands of natives
who clung tenaciously to their land and to a set of beliefs that granted them stewardship over it.
They did not just quarrel over land ownership, though. At stake for both was the perpetuation of
their respective belief systems, especially their conception of the well-ordered society. Interactions
on the margins between the two societies complicated the ideal social vision proffered by state
leaders. As Cherokee and Georgians argued over possession and sovereignty, they collided on the
frontier. As violence became an overriding concern, state and federal lawmakers sought ways of
removing the Cherokee and obtaining space for the growing republic. Undermining their efforts
were not just the interactions between members of the two nations, but fundamental shifts in
political and societal structures that exacerbated the tension over sovereignty.
As Georgians moved into the backcountry and encountered its native occupants, they
brought with them a mindset that shaped how they wanted to form new communities. To do so,
they sought to order the political and social world of the frontier. For most white Georgians, a
well-ordered society had two concurrent yet overlapping meanings, each reinforcing the other.
First, social order had a less tangible, more conjectural meaning that originated in the ferment of
the American Revolution. Social order touched on American political values and institutions, the
importance of land ownership, and a powerful racial hierarchy that combined to promote the
independence of white citizens. As new communities formed on the frontier, citizens worked
within their new environment to recreate a familiar social order. Second, order also meant an
13

absence of violence and crime because of a steadfast citizenry that obeyed and actively
participated in upholding the laws. Contemporaries usually referred to this aspect of order as the
common peace.1 The two meanings of order worked together to create an idealized political,
economic, and racial system. Therefore, the adherence to self-government by a sturdy, white
yeomanry would perpetuate the public peace, and vice versa. An editor in Milledgeville put it
best: “[T]here is no practicable mode of enforcing obedience to our laws without taking
immediate possession of [Cherokee] country, and stationing the necessary Judicial officers in it.
To accomplish this effectually, the country must be surveyed and disposed of—and settled by our
own citizens who are alone competent to the discharge of the functions of government.”2
These ideas coalesced during the American Revolution and evolved in the decades
afterwards. Although some historians have debated how best to categorize the revolutionary
rhetoric, others have argued that the growing egalitarian ethos emerged not from the struggle for
independence but from the presence of the frontier.3 Drawing on the revolutionary political
ideology called republicanism, Georgia’s revolutionaries sought to create a political community
of consent rather than submit to a system based on coercion. Not nearly as fervent as the

1 On the English origins of the common peace, see Cynthia B. Herrup, The Common Peace: Participation and the
Criminal Law in Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). On structural inequalities
and localism in the southern legal system, see Laura F. Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the
Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). On
contemporary uses, see “An Act to Amend the Penal Code of the State,” Acts of the General Assembly of the State of
Georgia, December 20, 1817. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type
=law&byte=4169530 (Accessed September 10, 2011), especially section 8, pg 123, which delineates crimes and
punishments against the “public peace and tranquility.”
2

Milledgeville Federal Union, September 11, 1830, 3.

A spirit of frontier egalitarianism has been a favorite theme for both historians and Hollywood, and has
become a central tenet in the quest to define American character and exceptionalism. See, for example, Frederick
Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” in Everett E. Edwards, ed. The Early
Writings of Frederick Jackson Turner (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1938): 185-229, as well as David S.
Brown, Beyond the Frontier: The Midwestern Voice in American Historical Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009), 25-50. Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall place both liberal individualism and westward expansion at the
heart of the American Revolution. See their At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 161-176.
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colonists in the hotbeds of discontent that sprang up in northern port cities, many Georgians
nonetheless adopted republican beliefs as a way of articulating their resentment toward royal
dictates by harnessing Enlightenment political principles. Moving away from a colonial political
culture rooted in deference, Georgia’s patriots sought to build a republican community that
rested on a commitment to the public good, most commonly called virtue. To ensure virtue,
republicans theorized that a land-holding citizenry, independent of the whims of others, would
bolster the nation and secure it from the threats of corruption. Republican theorists favored the
liberty of individuals, though they warned that too much liberty could lead to anarchy.
Therefore, some government control was necessary to provide social order and ensure the public
peace. The most important aspect of republican thought was a balance between the liberty of
individuals and the power of the government that could still ensure personal liberty without
completely neutering government authority. Arising directly from a fear of monarchical control,
republicanism came to dominate the thinking of Georgians in the years after the Revolution.4
Georgia’s role in the Revolution proved a small one, even though it experienced bloody
fighting that occurred, more often than not, in the backcountry. A bitter civil war swept across
Georgia, pitting royalists and their native allies against patriot partisans. Intent on sustaining the
relationship that had allowed the colonies to thrive and expand, thousands of backcountry

Contention among historians over the reality of republicanism as a means of organizing revolutionary
rhetoric has been nearly as vitriolic as that between Patriots and Tories. See, for example, Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation
of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). Carroll SmithRosenberg’s This Violent Empire: The Birth of American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2010) demonstrates the way in which different social groups in various areas perceived republican ideology
throughout the Revolutionary era, and how it helped usher in an American identity. Daniel Rodgers and Robert
Shalhope have demonstrated the numerous permutations and nuances developed by the historical profession in its
pursuit of explaining fully the revolutionary ideology. See Robert E. Shalhope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis:
The Emergence of an Understanding in American Historiography,” William and Mary Quarterly 29 (January 1972):
49-80; as well as Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79 (June
1992): 11-38. Historians have also attributed debate over the meaning of republicanism as a central factor in the
development of the second party system. See Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
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residents flocked to the king’s banner and joined royalist militia units. Others espoused ideas of
equality and self-rule and fought to destroy the bonds imposed on the colonists by the monarch.
Much of Britain’s strategy in Georgia centered on maintaining a formidable presence in
Savannah and Augusta and retaining a strong cadre of loyalists and native allies to combat the
threats posed by the patriots and the leveling ideas inherent in republican rhetoric. The presence
of Indian warriors allied with redcoats and royalists exacerbated the already brutal guerilla
warfare in Georgia’s backcountry. For the state’s revolutionaries, the “depredations” committed
by the Creek and Cherokee warriors who had sided against them proved difficult to forget. In the
aftermath of the Revolution, the victorious revolutionaries who experienced the terror of the
vicious backwoods warfare used it as an excuse to take native lands and force those who
remained into a subservient relationship with the state and its white residents.5
Preexisting social and political divisions exposed by the fighting became fissures in
republican Georgia, and, in turn, forged new ones. Loyalists fled the state and lost much of their
property to confiscation, but for those who had nowhere to flee, the vitriol of the patriots was
incredibly powerful. No group, however, suffered more at the hands of the victors than those
Indians who allied with the British. Feeling betrayed by the Creek and Cherokee who sided with
“tyranny and vice against liberty and virtue,” early national and state leaders found it easy to
take punitive actions against their Indian enemies.6 The dichotomy between vice and virtue

5 On the American Revolution in Georgia and its immediate aftermath, see Harvey H. Jackson, Lachlan
McIntosh and the Politics of Revolutionary Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003); Edward Cashin, The King’s
Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999);
Leslie Hall, Land and Allegiance in Revolutionary Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001). On the importance
of land distribution in revolutionary Georgia, see Laura Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
6 Quoted in Bernard W. Sheehan, “The Indian Problem in the Northwest: From Conquest to
Philanthropy,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds. Launching the “Extended Republic:” The Federalist Era,
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996), 222. Most historians of Revolutionary Georgia delineate
between “radical” and “conservative” revolutionaries. The latter sought to retain as many of the trappings of the
colonial social and order as possible; the former to make society more equal. Both sought to throw off monarchy and
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served as a useful reminder to revolutionary Georgians of the meaning of their struggle against
the king and his allies.
The strength of republican political values and the presence of a frontier helped shape
society in Georgia. Most of the state’s politicians wanted the frontier—along with its native
inhabitants—to disappear so that poor whites could occupy the land, become independent
landowners and thereby strengthen the republic. To insure an independent and virtuous
citizenry, the state sought to distribute large tracts of frontier land to its citizens at low prices.
Like the other states, rampant speculation became the primary mode of distributing land. In
Georgia, though, land distribution took a different direction after a highly political and legally
dubious transaction occurred. In 1794, the state sold off much of its western lands to a group of
four speculative companies for a fraction of their market value. These four companies in turn
sold the land to settlers at exorbitant rates and distributed the earnings to state legislators and
friendly newspaper editors who had supported the scheme. The fraudulent Yazoo Sale quickly
earned the ire of Jeffersonians, led by James Jackson, who cried foul upon learning of the overtly
corrupt land deal. Gaining control of the state legislature, the Jeffersonians rescinded the sale and
eventually transferred Georgia’s western lands to the federal government in exchange for $1.25
million and a promise to extinguish the land claims of the state’s native population.7 This socalled Compact of 1802 provided fuel for the supporters of state’s rights and Cherokee Removal,
to create a republican government. Although is imprecise to say that backcountry farmers were radicals, while
lowcountry planters and merchants favored a more conservative strain of republican thinking, that trend generally
held throughout the Revolution, with some notable exceptions. State politics in the post-Revolutionary period would
follow those general trends, as Jeffersonian backcountry farmers vied for power and authority with lowcountry elites.
See, for example, Harvey H. Jackson, “The Rise of the Western Members: Revolutionary Politics and the Georgia
Backcountry,” in An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Thad
Tate, Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985): 276-320. On the plight of loyalists in
Revolutionary America, see Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2011).
7 George R. Lamplugh, Politics on the Periphery: Factions and Parties in Georgia, 1783-1806 (Newark: University
of Delaware Press, 1986), 104,185-190.
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who promoted several schemes for removal to Arkansas, or even further afield.
As more settlers moved onto Cherokee land, treaty negotiators made more effective
demands for concessions. As this land became available for settlement, legislators sought a way to
dispense it as fairly as possible. Trying to move away from fraudulent speculation that had
tainted the Yazoo sale, state legislators chose to dole out land to the state’s poorest residents
through a land lottery. Political divisions in 1790 prevented the passage of the first lottery act in
spite of the legislation’s widespread appeal. Contemporaries often attributed political factionalism
in early republican Georgia to preexisting loyalties determined by the origin of the politicians in
those factions. Land-hungry small farmers from North Carolina more or less supported James
Jackson, while the more gentrified settlers from Virginia tended to lean toward Federalist
opposition under the leadership of George Mathews. When the North Carolinians supported a
lottery, they met surprising opposition from Jackson himself, who had allied with planterspeculators to defeat the populist legislation.8
It took another decade for the popular lottery legislation finally to win support from a
new generation of politicians. In 1803, the son of a Revolutionary War general, frontiersman
John Clark, ushered through the state assembly a lottery act over the opposition of Jackson’s
successors, William H. Crawford and George M. Troup.9 The machinations involved in the
passage of the lottery act instantly set Clark and Troup against one another, and political factions
coalesced around the two men. A son of the bustling backcountry, Troup moved east at a young
8 Most immigration into Georgia during the 1790s came from the Carolinas and piedmont Virginia. Wilkes
County, in particular, was a strong draw for piedmont Virginians who later became small planters in Georgia. North
Carolinians settled in the Broad River Valley. See David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, Bound Away: Virginia
and the Westward Movement (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 141-144; as well as George R. Gilmer,
Sketches of Some of the First Settlers of Upper Georgia, of the Cherokees, and the Author (1855; repr. Americus Book Company:
Americus, GA, 1926). Gilmer, of course, was one of these Virginians. Lamplugh, Politics on the Periphery, 192.
9 Frederick B. Gates, "The Georgia Land Act of 1803: Political Struggle in a One-Party State," Georgia
Historical Quarterly 82 (Spring 1998): 1-21.
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age and, after graduating from Princeton, began practicing law in Savannah. He derived most of
his political support from Savannah’s hinterland. John Clark earned his political support from
backcountry settlers, but enjoyed more widespread appeal because of his service in the state
militia during the Revolution. The two factions, Troupites and Clarkites, came to dominate state
politics through the 1820s. Though each faction had its regional strengths, the power of
personality drove state politics. Historians have sought to identify the policy differences between
the two groups, but have emerged rather empty-handed. One historian of the development of the
Second Party System agrees: Georgians, argues Richard P. McCormick, engaged “in a hectic
brand of politics that dealt not so much with issues as with personalities and which focused on the
efforts of two competing personal cliques—the Troupites and the Clarkites—to obtain space and
power.”10
Obtaining space translated easily into political success, so each party sought to outdo the
other in terms of forcing concessions from Indians and opening new lands to white settlement.
The idea of using land as a means of improving citizens did not begin in Georgia, though.
During the Revolution, as an enticement for service in the struggle for independence, the federal
government and states paid land bounties to Continental Line soldiers and militiamen. Of
course, not every militiaman or Continental soldier received a bounty, and those who did often
sold their claims to support their families. Thus, the state sought to provide further for its
Revolutionary veterans. State policy favored using cheap, abundant land to perpetuate the
independence of its citizens. In this way land-owning reinforced the basic tenets of republican
thinking. The Jeffersonian vision of a yeoman’s republic resonated in the land lottery in Georgia.
By granting vast tracts of land to the state’s poorest citizens, state leaders signaled their

Richard P. McCormick, The Second Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1966), 236.
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acceptance of a republic perpetuated and strengthened by the yeomanry. Between 1805 and
1832, state leaders implemented six different land lotteries that distributed thousands of acres of
land to settlers. After the political fallout from the first lottery cleared, politicians in both factions
agreed on the wisdom of cheap, large-scale land distribution. State leaders agreed that the
ownership of land made possible the independence of the lottery winners and strengthened the
republican character of state and national government.
Under Clark’s supervision in 1805 Georgia began raffling off Indian land as a way of
distributing it to the state’s poor and underprivileged. After that date, a pattern of land
procurement, violence, negotiation, and lottery emerged because settlers realized the benefits of
aggressive action against natives. First, whites would intrude on native ground and begin farming
small plots. Some had been given authority from the Indians to do so; others trespassed. After a
spate of violence between the rightful owners and the intruders, state officials would then ask
federal officials to intervene and negotiate more living space for white settlers. Once that
occurred, Indians would relocate behind their new borders and watch as their former homes
were raffled off to whites. This pattern recurred from 1805 until 1819, when the Cherokee
refused further concessions.
The number of draws open to each resident depended on marital status, military service,
and length of residency. Prior to the lottery, the governor dispatched surveyors to plat the land
into sections, districts, and lots. On the day of the lottery, two large drums were filled with slips of
paper. In one barrel, each piece of paper had a lot number; in the other, the names of the lottery
contestants had been recorded. The lottery organizers turned each drum and one by one a lot
and a name were drawn until all of the land had been disbursed. The “fortunate drawers” paid a
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small fee for title to their land, usually around forty cents an acre.11 Granting thousands of acres
to the state’s poorest citizens was supposed to create the Jeffersonian ideal of a yeoman’s republic
and lead to an equality of condition amongst the state’s landowners. In reality, many “fortunate
drawers” could not even afford the nominal fee to claim the land and as a result sold their claim
to speculators. Despite the best efforts of the government to create and perpetuate a steadfast
yeomanry, speculation plagued a system that had been designed to benefit the small farmer. Just
before the 1832 lotteries, an editor objected to them as inherently corrupting because they
engendered a “spirit of speculation which the disposition of lands by lottery is calculated to
excite.”12
Georgia’s leaders touted the raffle system because it adhered to republican thinking and
because they saw land-holding as key to upholding social order. For Representative Wilson
Lumpkin, only the settlement of the northern reaches of the state by white freeholders could
create social order. “Until this portion of the state was settled,” he declared, “by an industrious,
enlightened, free-hold population—entitled to, and meriting, all the privileges of citizenship,” it
would remain “altogether impracticable to enforce the Laws of the United States.” Lumpkin’s
assertion that only a hardworking yeomanry could practice good government and enforce the
law neatly expressed the idea of social order reinforcing the public peace. His argument also had
racial overtones. The current residents of the Cherokee country, whom he dismissed as “mixed
breeds and white bloods,” continued to defy republican government and the laws of Georgia and
the United States. Lumpkin hoped that “the Indian peoples might become an interesting and
worthy member of our great confederacy of states” by accepting American values that promoted
11 David Williams, The Georgia Gold Rush: Twenty-Niners, Cherokees, and Gold Fever (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1993), 47-48.
12
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social order. Until then, Georgians believed they had the right to take Indian land and submit the
Cherokee to state law.13
For white southerners, social order relied upon a strict racial hierarchy. At the apex of
southern society, slaveholding whites held the bulk of political and economic power but were
followed closely by the yeomanry and other whites. Ascriptive inequalities ingrained in southern
life and thought also determined the ways in which southerners organized their communities.
Indians and blacks experienced vituperative classification and subjugation that placed them at
the bottom of southern life and outside of the white community. Though visible, these groups
had few legal rights and little respect in the white republic. Georgia most often asserted white
superiority in its laws that regulated the behavior and movement of black slaves. Georgians used
a variety of tactics to promote and secure white superiority, though none proved more effective
or important than the acts passed by the state legislature to it. In 1817, legislators amended the
state penal code to detail punishments for all manner of crimes committed by a slave, from
assault to arson to insurrection, many of which were punishable by death if committed by blacks
but by jail time if committed by whites. Barring slave testimony in courts proved another effective
way of limiting a slave’s standing in white society. In a world where a man’s word was his honor,
state laws stripped slaves of standing and justice by keeping them silent.14
On the border between the Cherokee Nation and the state, white settlers and natives
interacted in ways that put the superiority of whites in flux. Deeply rooted beliefs held that
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Indians corrupted the white polity were not easily discarded. Illustrating the fears of Georgia’s
leaders, a traveller, “Eugenio,” published an account of his journey through the Cherokee Nation
in the Macon Telegraph. Having passed through western Tennessee on his way to Georgia, and
“[f]atigued with a long and toilsome day[‘]s ride over the mountains,” he anxiously awaited the
first sight of “one of those small hamlets which indicate a white settlement.” He instead happened
upon a “cluster of cabins” and inquired of the owner, a “deeply intoxicated…man of gigantic
stature in the Indian costume,” if he could stay the night. Denying the traveler permission to
enter his home and, as if to add emphasis to his refusal, the Indian passed out in the threshold. At
that point “a little dark eyed Indian girl” admitted him into the house. Inside, he expressed
surprise at the civilized comforts that awaited him: tea service, a well-cooked supper, and a
drawing room stocked with the latest books and a piano. The eldest daughter, only seventeen,
played the instrument for her guest and excelled at her rendition of “Home Sweet Home,” which
she played with “pathos and feeling.” That night he learned the family’s history. The father, not
an Indian at all, but a white man, had once been “a man of considerable talent and literary
acquirements.” However, his prolonged “intercourse with the savages” had taught him “brutal
habits” and encouraged his “indulging in drunkenness.” In spite of the daughter’s refinement, the
message was clear: racial mixing on the frontier degraded whites when they fraternized with
Indians and lost essential characteristics that had made them superior.15
The tale of the drunken white man dressed as an Indian and his daughters held other
lessons for white leaders. The eldest daughter, Charlotte, was engaged to a northern suitor.
“Eugenio” learned that, after several years of marriage, the northerner had engaged in
speculation that ruined the family. The husband, having become mired and “dissipated,”
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deserted his wife and child and absconded to Europe. Having to flee back to her father’s cabin,
Charlotte and her child now resided as “wretched victim[s] of man’s perfidious baseness.” Here,
readers witnessed the vulnerability of the Cherokee where they currently resided. A large native
population beckoned “perfidious” whites to the backcountry, where they could cheat and swindle
with few repercussions. The removal of the Cherokee, then, would help protect Indians from the
plots of “perfidious” whites and improve the morals of the white community.16
Idealized racial views held by the state’s politicians had difficulty surviving, much less
replicating, when they encountered complicated realities on the frontier. As Georgians moved
into the backcountry, they encountered a landscape that had been inhabited for centuries by
Cherokee and Creek families who raised crops and livestock in tightly-knit towns and villages.
Moving usually in family units to settle on land, whites often resided on abandoned Cherokee
plots, used Cherokee improvements made to the land, and farmed the same fields that the
Cherokee had cleared and cultivated. Despite the hard-heartedness of many whites toward their
native neighbors—most viewed Indians as either noble or vicious, but savages nonetheless—their
feelings did not preclude a significant amount of commercial, religious, and personal interaction
where the two societies did overlap. Indeed, a great degree of cooperation and intermarriage
occurred as whites and Cherokees mingled on the frontier. As late as 1838, Cherokee men and
women still moved about with regularity and visited their white neighbors, though that tended to
panic white frontier residents. “Some are cheerful and visit among the whites,” noted a resident
of Rome in Floyd County. But the majority “are drinking and stubborn and say they don’t
intend to leave the country.”17
16

Ibid.
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The idealized social order envisioned by state leaders faced a difficult implementation on
the edges of state power. Proximity to a different racial group put American assumptions of
republican order up against frontier realities. As whites and Indians interacted on native ground,
the pragmatic need for economic exchange or social interactions trumped preconceived notions
about a racialized other. By the 1830s, state leaders expressed concern over racial mixing and
hoped to remove the Cherokee as soon as possible. Most importantly, the prospects of republican
self-government dwindled if the Cherokee were allowed to maintain their current territory.
According to Governor Gilmer, an enervated Cherokee people had become subservient to a
politically active class of mixed-race planters. Rather than a government that mirrored that of the
United States, Gilmer saw in the Cherokee Nation not popular sovereignty, but “the rule of that
most oppressive of governments, an oligarchy.”18 The “oligarchy” of mixed-race Cherokee
politicians spoke English, practiced Christianity, and, most troubling to Gilmer, utilized the
American legal system to forestall removal. Mixed-race Cherokees undermined American
notions of white supremacy because they potentially corrupted the white polity and undermined
the racial hierarchy adopted by southern culture and thereby threatened the expansion of social
order and the public peace.
Though Georgians urged on the removal of all Indians within the boundaries claimed by
the state, federal officials were reluctant to abandon a long-standing program of acculturation.
Looking westward after the Revolution, the new states saw dozens of Indian nations, who all
claimed sovereignty over their territory and political independence from the new nation. Seeking

Revolutionary Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 232-235; as well as William G. McLoughlin, Cherokee
Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 326-330; Samuel Steward to George R.
Gilmer, April 24, 1838, RG 393, M1475, “Correspondence of the Eastern Division Pertaining to Cherokee
Removal, April-December 1838,” roll 1.
18

George R. Gilmer to William Wirt, June 19, 1830 in Gilmer, Sketches, 274.

25

a unified policy, President George Washington and his advisors drew on Enlightenment racial
theory and declared that, rather than subjugate its native neighbors, the new American republic
should instead seek to assimilate them into white society by teaching them “civilized” skills such
as farming, reading and writing, and growing crops to sell in the growing market economy.19
Such a sympathetic outlook from the nation’s leaders did not preclude a racist bent in the minds
of white Americans who resented Indians and the new federal policy. Indeed, sympathetic
expressions toward natives in the early Republic, according to one historian, became more
dangerous than the hatred of backwoodsmen for the endurance of Indian peoples. Whereas
frontier settlers expected to clash with natives over land use, they imagined the conflict as one in
which Americans would inevitably prove victorious and the vanquished foe would move
elsewhere, relinquishing their claim to the land. Philanthropists, argues Bernard Sheehan,
imagined a world in which no Indians existed because they had been incorporated into American
society, their culture fading before the superiority of American values and mores. Lumpkin’s
civilizing call fit with that philanthropic line. In effect, philanthropists wanted to eradicate Indian
culture so that American values could flourish.20
In Georgia, much of the resentment toward the Cherokee that had persisted since the
Revolution made implementing federal assimilation policy difficult, at best. Gilmer laid bare his
prejudices against the Cherokee in his memoirs, where he argued that the state could lay claim to
Cherokee land because of the savagery of the Indians. Gilmer believed that the Cherokee desired
19 On Indian policy in the early Republic, see Reginald Horsman, “The Indian Policy for an ‘Empire of
Liberty,’” in Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert, eds. Native Americans and the Early Republic
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), 37-61; Richard White ironically terms the new relationship
between the American government and Indian peoples “the politics of benevolence.” See White, The Middle Ground:
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 469517.
20 Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1973), 278.
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“to act by trick, deceit, and stratagem,” and that their “master passion was revenge.” Though
some native leaders were called eloquent, Gilmer argued, ironically, this might have been the
case because they “followed the vagueries of their imagination in speaking, without investigating
facts.” As taxpayer money went to teach the Cherokee English or improved plowing methods,
Georgians grew increasingly resentful of federal patronage that appeared to benefit the Cherokee
at the expense of white citizens. Their rhetoric turned violent. “The perplexing evils with which
we are embarrassed can only be removed, by the entire removal or extermination of the Indian
race,” Lumpkin cried.21
Federal agents had to convince the Cherokee that adopting American values and labor
practices would only expedite their integration into the social and political fabric of the nation,
while Americans continued to encroach on native ground and demanded title to it. Treaties that
resulted in a series of land cessions that transferred Indian country to the burgeoning white
republic only emboldened white settlers, who felt more confident about moving onto land
claimed by the Cherokee, knowing full-well that the federal government would eventually lay
claim to it. For natives struggling to maintain territorial integrity, the retreating boundary
pressured them to resist further compromise measures, so federal negotiators had to resort to
questionable methods to extract further concessions. Often employing a strategy of divide and
conquer, federal treaty negotiators exploited weaknesses in the decentralized Cherokee
government and congratulated themselves when leaders signed away the lands of their rivals.22
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Georgia’s political leaders, especially Gilmer, exalted in new land concessions. For him, the
answer to the question of land use was a simple one. Industrious white farmers needed the land
to extend order: “The millions of acres of land which are now of no value, except to add to the
gratification of the idle ambition of the chiefs, must be placed in possession of actual cultivators of
the soil, who may be made the instruments for the proper administration of the laws.”23
In 1819, U.S. negotiators managed to extract from the Cherokee a final round of
concessions that benefitted land-hungry Georgians. A rush of new settlers moved into lands
recently occupied by the Cherokee. Political values and land ownership proved easy enough to
guarantee, but the relatively loose racial views of settlers worried leaders to no end. After 1819,
federal negotiators could do little to gain more land for white settlement because of a growing
nationalist movement growing among the Cherokee. As a result, rumors swirled across the
frontier, especially ones that portended a violent doom for white settlers. In Athens, one
newspaper warned frontier residents that “THE INDIANS WOULD CUT THE THROATS
OF EVERY WHITE PERSON IN THE COUNTRY BEFORE THEY WENT TO
ARKANSAS.” Rumor-mongering and trepidation pervaded the Cherokee frontier and made for
tenuous relations between whites and their neighbors. With so much uncertainty plaguing the
backcountry, the white community sought some way to provide order in a world that seemed
devoid of it. Even as state leaders threatened violence against the Cherokee—including
extermination—they also worried about violence directed at white settlers.24
To stave off violence, the backcountry needed a stabilizing force that could prevent
violent behavior from erupting in the first place. Leaders agreed that the best solution to the
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problem was to expedite settlement so that a virtuous white yeomanry could extend order into
the backcountry—even though they recognized that settlement caused its own problems.
Between 1820 and 1838, state leaders became increasingly aware that white citizens from
Georgia instigated most of the disorder. Such a realization flew in the face of republican thinking,
which stipulated that a hard-working yeomanry upheld and perpetuated republican simplicity.
Though most of the complaints coming out of white backcountry residents expressed concern
because of a looming Indian attack, whites initiated and sustained violent behavior in CherokeeGeorgia borderlands. The fast-paced nature of social change in the Georgia backcountry made
implementing an idealized form of social order nearly impossible. Indeed, the precarious nature
of frontier settlements and the proximity to a large Cherokee population seemed to intensify
threats to social order and the public peace.
To preserve order, state leaders recognized the need for sovereignty over the Cherokee
country and its residents. An “exercise of sovereignty” would allow the state to extend state law
and open up land to white settlement. They also recognized that such an audacious move would
upset the Cherokee and no doubt spark violence. Yet without sovereignty, they would have no
way to stop the violence once it began. After 1819 and well into the 1830s, the public peace
became an overriding concern of state politicians and white families on the frontier. For
Georgians living in the borderlands, the threat of violence and crime pervaded their existence.
Citizens and politicians alike abhorred “assassinations, murder and the shedding of human
blood.” In the fall of 1834, Governor Wilson Lumpkin warned that the common peace required
a citizenry able to check such crimes and follow “a faithful administration of the law.” Unless
such a law-abiding citizenry could inhabit the disputed territory, he predicted, “greater evils
await our beloved country.” As Cherokee Removal neared, white residents of the border counties
continually worried about their safety. After the passage of the Treaty of New Echota in 1835,
29

Lumpkin apprised his aide-de-camp that “some of our white Citizens are believed to be in great
danger of personal violence, if not assassination and massacre,” because of the objections
expressed by the Cherokee over the treaty and what they saw as forced removal.25
In the sparsely settled counties bordering the Cherokee Nation, the question became one
of how best to preserve the common peace with so many perceived threats. An Indian population
that could more or less come and go as it pleased, and a thinly spread white population, provided
little sense of security. In the first years of the 1830s, no one seemed certain of the governing
body that had the authority to provide order. One editor in Milledgeville sought to convince his
readers that he had the answer. The “unfortunate condition of the country” caused him to
wonder which authority had “the right and the ability . . . to restore and preserve peace and
harmony within its disordered borders?” As he saw it, three options existed. First, the Cherokee
could attempt to order the backcountry, though he doubted they could. “[T]he Indians are
utterly incapable of preserving the internal quietude even were the right conceded to them.”
Such a concession meant the state had recognized Cherokee sovereignty, something it was
increasingly reluctant to do. The editor felt similarly about the second option: that “it is totally
impracticable if not impossible for the General Government to do so is equally certain.” Only
one answer satisfied the editor. “It is confidently answered that the State of Georgia is that
power.”26
State politicians in Milledgeville never doubted where sovereignty over the backcountry
resided, though they could not agree on how best to assert it. They agreed that moving white
settlers into the contested lands and removing the Cherokee would uphold both moral and racial
Mary E. Young, “An Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia,” Journal of the Early Republic 10 (Spring
1990): 43-63. Wilson Lumpkin to Glass, October 11, 1834 in Governor’s Letter Book, 1833-1840, Drawer 62, Box 65,
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order. Before removal commenced, though, they did not agree on how best to instill the common
peace. Most politicians wanted to introduce order through civil law, meaning that courts, judges,
and juries would convict criminals of legal violations and sheriffs would bring them to justice. In
early 1830, Governor George R. Gilmer requested one of his superior court judges to uphold
order more forcefully when he demanded “the interposition of the civil authority in suppressing
further violence on the part of our citizens.” Others wanted a more forceful response that would
punish criminals and provide a deterrent to others considering violating the public peace.
“Nothing but a strong military force can arrest the evil while the county remains in its present
condition,” an editor in Macon wrote. He concluded that the “repeated and increasing atrocities
call loudly for the interposition of the strong arm of the government.” A military response meant
mustering county militias and having them dispense justice, violently if need be. In the midst of
backcountry chaos, Georgians called loudly on the state government to interpose itself between
defenseless citizens and frontier havoc though no consensus emerged on how best to do so.27
The debate over civil law or military force as a means to order the backcountry came
down to the question of restraint and the appropriate level of violence that authorities could use
to restore order. For the most part, the legislature sought to use the civil authorities as the
primary response to disorder. To do so, it hastily created new counties out of the land acquired
from the Treaties of 1817 and 1819 and even pondered the legality of extending state law into
Cherokee territory, not in conjunction with the Cherokee, but as an way of announcing the
supremacy of state law. Courthouses and jails, often some of the first structures built in new
settlements, created a legal edifice for the projection of local, state and national statutes and
provided a way to extend state and national laws into the backcountry. State leaders zealously
27 George Gilmer to Walter Colquitt, February 15, 1830 in Governor’s Letter Book, 1829- 1831, Drawer 62,
Box 64, GDAH; Macon Telegraph, October 16, 1830, 3.
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created and chartered new counties after each concession by native inhabitants. Upon the
ratification of the Treaty of Cherokee Agency in 1817, three new counties appeared the following
year, Gwinnett, Habersham, and Hall. Over the next eight years, the legislature incorporated
four more border counties, Rabun, Campbell, Carroll and DeKalb, the last three of which had
been carved out of former Creek land gained from negotiations at Indian Springs. In Hall, for
example, construction of the inferior court began in 1822, a scant four years after incorporation,
and the first jail was built later that year. In Carroll County, the log home of William Wagnon
served as the site of county business until a tax to build a more permanent structure was levied.
From 1826, these six counties bounded the Cherokee Nation within the state. The settlers there
were the front line of republican order as it sought to overcome Cherokee harmony.28
The violent atmosphere of the backcountry stemmed in large part from Georgia’s quest
to assert a social order that resident Cherokee did not subscribe to. Georgians, of course, saw
themselves as victims of a rapacious people who threatened the superiority of whites and who
rejected republican government. “Are we as the people of a Sovereign State to be thus treated, is
our property to be destroyed and the law afford us no security?” wondered the lawyer Allen G.
Fambrough. “Are we as free citizens to have our rights Jeopardized our persons attacked
assaulted and abused and will the State say we are remedeless [sic], if so we who reside in frontier
counties must retreat from the vindictive wrath of savage vengeance.” Settlers arrived in the
borderlands expecting state protection but found themselves exposed to a potential attack.
Therein lay the central paradox of expansionism: as more settlers moved into the borderlands
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violence increased proportionally. As violence increased, state leaders saw the need to impose
order either through civil or military channels. Creating order, however, required more settlers.
The cycle of violence created by settlement, order, and sovereignty only instigated violence and
hampered efforts by state leaders to create an idealized society based on republican ideology,
agrarianism, and white superiority.29
Just as Georgians sought a form of order to check the changes wrought by the
Revolution, the Cherokee grappled with a world in which their societal values underwent rapid
flux. Prior to the Revolution, the Cherokee entered a precipitous cultural dislocation, as much of
their land was parceled off to grasping colonists and as the traditional concept of harmony
evolved to meet new circumstances. As pressure for their land increased, the Cherokee hardened
their position on acculturation, land concessions, and acceptance of white neighbors: in the 1810s
nationalism blossomed. This renascence sought to unite the Cherokee people into an immovable
political nation that refused any further concessions. Instead, as some Cherokee adopted aspects
of republican values at the expense of harmony, they also experienced political and economic
divisions that undermined those nationalistic impulses.30
For the Cherokee people, the repeated land concessions that occurred not just in Georgia,
but also in Tennessee, Alabama, and the Carolinas, capped more than a century of disruptive
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social change that had fundamentally altered Cherokee folkways and customs. The most defining
aspect of the Cherokee worldview was an ethic of harmony. The concept of harmony rested on a
balance of opposing forces. In the Cherokee cosmology, fire and water provided a balance in the
spirit world. In the natural world, men and women, war and peace, and animals and plants all
helped balance Cherokee society. The balance dictated by harmony prescribed acceptable
patterns of behavior and deportment and delineated the proper way to live. Not only did the
ethic of harmony instruct the Cherokee on how to live in tune with the natural and spirit worlds,
but it also dictated the means by which the various clans and towns could live in concert with one
another as well as other nations. The idea of harmony necessitated some degree of reciprocity in
the dispensation of justice. A murder committed by one Cherokee against another, for example,
required a similar action against the perpetrator to “still the crying blood” of the victim’s family.
Such a method of preserving harmony ensured balance between the towns and clans so that one
could not gain power or influence over the other.31
Harmony not only dictated a balance between clans and towns, it also asserted a type of
equality between the sexes when it came to maintaining social order. Most aspects of Cherokee
life were strictly gendered: women took responsibility for agriculture and child-rearing; men for
the hunt and war. The seven Cherokee clans were all matrilineal, meaning that a child’s
membership in a clan was determined by the mother. Clan ties dominated most aspects of
Cherokee life, including connections to the land. According to Cherokee lore, the spirits created
the land specifically for Cherokee use. By burying their dead in it, they had sanctified it and
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claimed it as their own. Lacking a system of land ownership the Cherokee held the land in
common, though individuals could be granted tenure for certain parcels.
Contours of everyday life shifted as whites encroached onto Cherokee land and turned
native ground into shared ground. Prior to the Revolution, many Scotch-Irish had moved into
the Georgia backcountry seeking profits and new trading partners. Because of Cherokee
stipulations that only a Cherokee could trade within the Nation, many white men found
Cherokee wives and in the process became adopted members of Cherokee society. Following the
matrilineal Cherokee tradition, their bicultural children enjoyed all the rights and protections
offered by their mothers’s clans. Their offspring, Cherokee métis, combined cultural elements of
their white fathers and Cherokee mothers to create a hybridized culture drawing on certain
aspects of both peoples. Many readily adopted plantation agriculture and the practice of racial
slavery that brought them into the world of American commercialism and the benefits of the
market economy, though they abided by the rules of Cherokee society. These bicultural men and
women, usually hailing from wealthier backgrounds, became the cultural and political elites of
the Cherokee Nation.
Surrounded by cotton-planting southerners, Cherokee métis most readily copied the
agricultural practices of their neighbors in an effort to gain acceptance in the white south.
Plantation agriculture disrupted traditional Cherokee tribal patterns of land use that had stressed
communal stewardship of property rather than individual ownership. Along with land-ownership
and plantation agriculture, another distressing element to normative patterns of Cherokee life
involved the introduction of chattel slavery. For centuries, the Cherokee had used slaves as a
labor force, but had never considered them property. With increased métissage came distinctly
American views on race, slavery, and property that undermined and contradicted those of the
Cherokee. Traditional slavery went hand-in-hand with the notion of harmony because most
35

slaves had been captured in warfare. In the harmonious Cherokee worldview, wars were
retaliatory in nature and usually waged as a corrective to a past wrong. As the federal
government clamped down on warfare between native peoples, the nature of slavery itself
changed from a temporary condition based on the capture of prisoners to a permanent system
based on racial subjugation. By adopting a race-based system of slavery, Cherokee men and
women began to embrace ideas of hierarchy, which further undermined harmonious social
relationships. Matrilineal relations dictated that property belonged to the wife, but the American
plan of “civilization” promoted male property ownership and male agricultural labor. The
accumulation of slaves and private property became goals unto themselves. Once these changes
solidified, Cherokee women lost much of their influence in day-to-day activities, as first Cherokee
men, and then African slaves replaced them as the primary agricultural laborers and providers.32
As a greater number of bicultural men and women comprised the Cherokee population,
structures of political power shifted. Gaining power at the expense of traditionalists, male métis
straddled two societies, acting as mediators between them. Although they certainly desired wealth
and power to mimic their Anglo neighbors, the métis also wholeheartedly adopted Cherokee
society as their own. They eyed their white neighbors with increasing uncertainty and watched as
other Indian nations were swallowed up, hunted down, or expelled beyond the Mississippi. Their
unique position afforded them opportunities to gain power and to steer Cherokee society. By the
1820s, the Cherokee had been completely encircled by whites settlements, and had given away
much of their land to appease settlers. The métis had slowly gained an increasing amount of
political power within the nation and sought to use that power to fend off further concessions.
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Further, they sought to prove to federal Indian agents the success of their acculturation policy to
show their people’s readiness for republican government.33
In order to solidify their claim, the Cherokee slowly went about installing republican legal
forms closely mirroring those of the United States. The full expression of republicanism that the
Cherokee adopted did not become law until 1827, though a series of legislative efforts prior to
that date moved the Cherokee away from a society based on harmony and toward one based on
constitutional law. Much like their neighbors in Georgia who struggled over the meaning of a
republican society, the Cherokee split on how to best to impose their idealized version of a wellordered society. Part of the problem arose from those who resisted its implementation. During
the 1820s, Cherokee leaders in the lower towns split with those from the upper towns on the
merits of removing their people to Arkansas, or other parts of the west. Other traditionalists
opposed the timeworn folkways that had guided their people through social dislocation and
physical displacement. The sentiment for removal, however, waned as the Cherokee developed a
romantic conception of nationalism, which they felt entitled them to their land. Nationalism, in
turn, begat efforts to ensure territorial sovereignty.34
Beginning with a series of treaties signed with the United States government, first with the
Treaty of Hopewell in 1785, the Cherokee asserted legal title to their land, though in exchange,
they allowed Congress to have the power of regulating commerce with their people. This freed
the Cherokee from having to negotiate with delegations from each frontier state, and in turn
allowed a U.S. Indian agent to reside within Cherokee country. Finally, they agreed to stop
33 On the cultural ramifications of métissage, see Brett Riggs, “The Christie Cabin Site: Historical and
Archaeological Evidence of the Life and Times of a Cherokee Métis Household,” in Robert S. Brunk ed. May We All
Remember Well: A Journal of the History and Culture of Western North Carolina (Asheville, NC: Robert S. Brunk Auction
Services, 1997), 1:228-248.
34 See Mary E. Young, “The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic,” American Quarterly 33 (Winter
1981): 502-524.
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violent retaliation against whites who committed murdered against members of their Nation.
Though a small concession, it undermined the Cherokee notion of harmony. Wariors unable to
still the crying blood of their slain relatives had to take their grievances to federal officials who
would determine the appropriate resolution. The nationalists, however, stressed the need for a
strengthened, unifying central government. Though it went against Cherokee tradition of
decentralized authority, several towns in 1809 joined together to form a National Committee to
oversee administrative duties and to treat with the U.S. Indian agents.35
Less than a decade later, in an effort at greater centralization, the Cherokee eschewed
their reliance on traditional law and turned to written laws with the political reform act of 1817.
Often called the first written Cherokee constitution, the act solidified the importance of bicultural
Cherokee who had slowly gained power within the Nation by drawing on traditional forms of
Cherokee culture and mixing them with the republican values they found appealing. The result
was an Indian nation whose institutions began to resemble those of the United States. It created a
general council that met to create legislation, as well as establish the Light Horse Patrol to police
the borders, prevent intrusion and arrest Cherokee men and women who had broken the law. In
essence, the Cherokee had formed a nation, complete with a system of courts and a police force
designed as an expression of Cherokee national sovereignty, which contradicted the claims of
both the United States and the state of Georgia.36
In December 1827, the Cherokee went even further when they ratified their first written
Constitution. Closely resembling the American Constitution, the Cherokee version crafted by
twenty-one elected delegates to a convention adopted patriarchal republican institutions and
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ideals and adapted them to suit “civilized” Cherokee cultural forms. For instance, it created a
three-pronged national government consisting of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but
never mentioned the clan system and forbade the traditionally important role women had played
in the dispensation of justice. In writing their constitution, the delegates had three primary
objectives. First, the constitution formalized the Nation’s boundaries in order to establish its
sovereignty. Cherokee national sovereignty lay not in a mythic past, according to the new
Constitution, but from “[t]reaties concluded with the United States.” As such, national selfdetermination depended upon the relationship with the United States and the land stipulated to
them in various treaties conducted with that nation. In order to retain both their sovereignty and
land, the Cherokee reaffirmed their determination that their borders “shall forever hereafter
remain unalterably the same.” The second goal of the new constitution promoted Cherokee
nationalism and sovereignty. It rejected outright the civilizing program of the United States by
affirming that Cherokee citizens held property in common, though it recognized that individual
citizens had the right to make “improvements” to the land. However, the newly nationalized
land policy prevented individuals from “dispos[ing] of their improvements in any manner
whatever to the United States, individual states, nor to individual citizens.” Third, the Cherokee
Constitution of 1827 sought to prove to American officials that the Cherokee people had fully
adopted civilized ways. Hoping to show that their republican constitution amply demonstrated
just how successful acculturation had been—even if it inherently rejected that program—they
submitted their plan of government to President John Quincy Adams for approval.37
For many traditionalist Cherokee the new constitution proved problematical because it
disrupted seemingly timeless cultural ways, according to historian Theda Perdue, “[b]y
37 The Cherokee Constitution of 1827 was fully reprinted in the Cherokee Phoenix over the course of its first
three issues. Cherokee Phoenix, February 21, 1828, 1. For a general discussion of the Constitution, see McLoughlin,
Cherokee Renascence, 394-400.
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reordering inheritance and depriving clans of coercive authority, the council seriously
undermined the matrilineal kinship system on which women’s traditional status partly rested.”38
Cherokee traditionalists, especially those who rejected contact with whites, saw the constitution
as a tool of empowerment for the elites—a document legitimizing a small, influential, and wellconnected cross-section of the community—and marginalizing the many. The signers did not
represent the majority of the Cherokee people, and, in fact, their lives differed greatly from those
of their constituents. By 1838, twelve of the signers owned more than twenty percent of the slaves
present in the nation and farmed a plot four times the size of an average Cherokee farmer. The
signers also differed from the rest of the nation economically not only because they represented
the values of a growing market-based middle class, but because of their racial composition as
well. Only four delegates were “full bloods,” and could do little to prevent the bicultural signers
from privileging their adopted cultural forms in the new constitution. Nothing proved more
central than slavery and race to the “civilized” faction of the increasingly powerful mixed-race
middle class.39
For a group whose own ethnicity would prove a political liability in the coming years, the
signers of the constitution took great pains to exclude those they deemed less desirable even as
they cried foul when white Georgians called into question their own racial desirability. The
constitution adopted a strict blood quantum and defined anyone as a “negro” who had black
parentage. Those defined as “negro” could not vote, “hold any office of profit, honor or trust,
under this Government,” and were denied other rights reserved for those Cherokee who passed
the test of racial purity. A law passed by the General Council in April 1828 went even further,
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stipulating that no free blacks were allowed into the Nation and were deemed “intruders,” unless
they had a permit for residency. The growing centralization of power into the hands of the
planter elite coincided with the Cherokee acceptance of slavery. Many of the laws created by the
new republican government, designed expressly to secure private property, further fastened
slavery onto the Nation. For the mixed race Cherokee trying to mimic the hegemonic system of
their white planter neighbors, it made sense to legally discriminate against blacks to show that
they had fully embraced white cultural and legal forms. Their discriminatory policy provided,
they thought, all the proof needed. In this way, the Constitution of 1827 looked similar to other
state constitutions in the South, even Georgia’s.40
On the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation, order and harmony met, overlapped, and
intertwined much as the two societies harboring those assumptions did. White Georgians
advanced their ideas into the backcountry while Cherokee men and women sought a way of
preserving the old and adopting the new. With the Constitution of 1827, the Cherokee signaled
their efforts at reaching an accord between the two worldviews. Georgia’s politicians were much
less willing to accommodate those currently possessing the land. The U.S Indian Agent Hugh
Montgomery, himself a Georgian, understood that the political climate within the state prevented
any real chance for an accord between the Georgians and the Cherokee. “The prevailing idea in
Georgia, especially among the lower class, is that they are the Rightful owners of the
soil…indeed, sir, there is only one point on which all Parties, high and low, in Georgia agree, and
that is that they all want the Indian Lands!” Having ratified their constitution, the Cherokee felt
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emboldened when it came to preserving their land. Developments in Georgia, though, would
upset their newly acquired confidence.41
The struggle between Georgia and the Cherokee for possession of the land began as a
political struggle over sovereignty. Georgia’s leaders grandstanded against the Cherokee assertion
of sovereignty as an affront to the rights of the state. Once the Cherokee asserted their
nationhood, it was only a matter of time before the state responded. By 1825, Georgia was also
experiencing a fundamental political shift as inchoate political factionalism gave way to a more
formalized party alignment even as it bore traces of the state’s personality-driven style. In that
year, ushered on by growing egalitarianism and a cry of underrepresentation in the smaller
counties, the legislature relinquished its role as presidential elector, building on its efforts from the
previous year when it made gubernatorial races decided by white male suffrage. The effects of
the electorate’s democratization had serious implications for the state’s stance on Indian policy.
Now, governors would face accountability from the voters for their success in opening up more
land to voters and as a result took a more hardline approach in dealing with natives residing in
what state leaders considered their land.42
The democratization of the white electorate had drastic ramifications on the tense
situation in the Cherokee borderlands. Campaigning for the governor’s mansion in 1825—the
first election decided by popular vote—George M. Troup, the leader to the lowcountry political
faction, drew upon the Indian-hating rhetoric of his backcountry rival, John Clark. Promising to
expel the Creek Indians from within the bounds of the state, Troup tapped into much of the
discontent expressed by white Georgians over the continued presence of large numbers of
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natives. By agreeing to expel the Creek, he tapped into a populist vein and became the champion
of widespread property holding for the citizens of the state who looked longingly to the rich
cotton lands between the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers. By doing so, he effectively subsumed
the most popular elements of the Clark faction, united the interests of lowcountry planters and
backcountry farmers and won by a narrow margin.43
Troup’s stance on Indian Removal differed remarkably from previous governors because
he successfully transformed it into a state’s rights issue. Before he could hope to remove the
Cherokee from their mountainous homes in the north, he looked to the Creek in the western
reaches of the state. Federal treaty-makers had negotiated with Troup’s cousin, the Creek leader
William McIntosh, into removal for a paltry sum. Invoking the sovereignty of his state, Troup
balked when President John Quincy Adams rescinded the Treaty of Indian Springs upon
learning of its fraudulent nature. Adams negotiated a new treaty with different Creek leaders—
McIntosh having been assassinated as a conspirator by Creek warriors—and the Senate easily
ratified it. Troup, however, refused to observe the new treaty and dispatched surveyors into the
Creek Nation to ready the land for a lottery. Adams announced he would send in the federal
army to enforce federal law; Troup mustered the militia and dared Adams to do so. Eventually,
Adams backed down and, as historian Sean Wilentz phrased it, “permitted the nation to
surrender to a state.” When Troup declared that the federal government held no sway over
Indian affairs within the state of Georgia, he sparked the growth of a racially potent brand of
state’s rights rhetoric that flowered in the controversy over Cherokee Removal. 44
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Politicians in Georgia, however, thought the cultural and institutional similarities with
Cherokee elites had gone far enough. Most realized that the more the Cherokee adopted aspects
of American culture the more difficult it would become to secure their removal. For Georgians,
federal acculturation policy ensured that the Cherokee would have allies in Congress—especially
a growing northern cadre of congressmen who connected Christian morality and antislavery
rhetoric to the plight of the Cherokee. Northerners who championed the benevolence of federal
policy and simultaneously condemned the inhumanity of removal could easily undermine the
state’s removal efforts. Georgia’s congressmen argued that their state sovereignty was threatened
because the Cherokee defenders claimed the supremacy of the federal government in matters
relating to Indian policy. Thus, much of Georgia’s reaction to the Cherokee Constitution of 1827
stemmed from its fears over congressional inaction on removal and growing public sympathy that
put the state in the wrong.45
When the Cherokee constitution reached the state house, Governor Troup immediately
condemned it and urged President Adams to do the same. Though Adams did not immediately
reject it he did not champion the new government either. This invigorated Georgia’s politicians,
who, in an effort at political retaliation, took a momentous and emboldened step when the
legislature declared: “The lands in question belong to Georgia – She must and she will have
them.” The whole impulse of Cherokee sovereignty flew in the face of Georgia’s claims to
Cherokee lands given to the state by the Compact of 1802. Drawing on this agreement, the
legislature argued that Georgia, prior to the accord, could have resorted to force in order to
remove the Cherokee, and that it did not surrender that right when it signed the compact. Thus,
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Georgia could still resort to violence if Congress continued to tarry. “[T]here is nothing in this
provision which prevents the United States or Georgia from resorting to force; on the contrary,
this right seems to be admitted.” Though the fiery rhetoric threatened violence the legislature
toned down their threatening message by insisting that the state would “not attempt to improve
her rights by violence until all other means of redress fail.” The state legislature insisted that the
United States government fulfill its end of the compact and remove the Cherokee for good. If
they failed to act, then legislators during the next session had the authority to extend state law
over the “lands in controversy.”46 If this occurred, then the Cherokee would be granted private
property rights, but could only retain, at most, one-sixth of their current holdings.47
In 1828, when it became clear that Andrew Jackson would run against the incumbent
president, Georgians flocked to his banner. Georgia’s voters knew Jackson’s reputation as an
Indian fighter and a man who would uphold promises to resolve the Cherokee problem in favor
of the state. In fact, both the Clark and Troup factions favored Jackson so much that John
Quincy Adams did not even appear on the state’s election ballot.48 Adams’s dithering during
treaty negotiations to remove the Creek Indians from the state had, according to Representative
Wilson Lumpkin, “rendered Mr. Adams peculiarly obnoxious to the people of Georgia.” No

“The Joint Committee on the State of the Republic…”Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia,
December 27, 1827, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte
=8820198&lawcnt=24&filt=doc. (Accessed September 10, 2011), 236-249. See also McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence,
411-12; Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Georgia and State Rights: A Study of the Political History of Georgia From the Revolution to the
Civil War…(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 72.
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This strategy of granting allotments to native peoples eventually succeeded in displacing the Creeks,
Choctaw, and Chickasaw mostly because government negotiators could play separate tribal factions against one
another and acquire favorable land cessions. On the allotment strategy, see Mary E. Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts, and
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 156.
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“true hearted Georgian, not blinded by prejudice,” could fail to support the friends of Jackson.49
Lumpkin’s statement proved prescient; of more than twenty thousand votes cast during the
election, upwards of 19,000 went to Old Hickory.50 The unanimity of Georgia’s voters in the
Election of 1828 demonstrated the level of support within the state for removal. Georgians
wanted Cherokee land, and they saw Jackson as the best way to get to it.
With the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, Georgians looked hopefully to the future
with regards to Cherokee expulsion. In the winter of 1828, the legislature passed a bill that
extended state law over the territory and people residing within the Cherokee Nation. It also
declared the state supreme with regard to Indian policy and effectively nullified federal
intercourse acts. The law made provisions for the border counties of Carroll, DeKalb, Gwinnett,
Hall, and Habersham to extend their legal frameworks into the backcountry until the formation
of new circuit courts and counties occurred. The extension law, as it became known, not only
subjected Cherokee residents to state law, it also prevented the Cherokee from testifying in state
court against whites, and beginning June 1, 1830, abolished “all laws, usages, and customs” of
the Cherokee Nation. Borrowing methods and concepts the state had used to subjugate blacks,
the extension law announced the inferiority of Cherokee and prevented them from seeking legal
redress. It also required all whites living in the backcountry, except for federal agents, to apply for
license to continue residing therein. The law expressed the state’s formulation of sovereignty and
white superiority and sent thinly veiled threats to native residents: Georgia was a white man’s
country and there would be no physical space or legal recognition for anyone else, not even the

Wilson Lumpkin, The Removal of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company,
1907), 1:41.
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50 Recent works differ as to the actual vote tally in Georgia. Donald Cole has the Jackson vote at 19,362
while 642 voters went for Adams. Lynn Parsons notes that 19,363 Georgians cast their vote for Jackson, while none
did so for Adams. See Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 183; Parsons, Birth of Modern Politics, 182.
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mixed-race Cherokee who had worked so hard at adopting southern institutions and economic
practices. The legislature had effectively given the Cherokee two options: remove, endure
hardship, and persist; or stay, endure hardship, but submit.51
With the passage of the extension law in late 1828, three separate political bodies claimed
sovereignty over the Cherokee territory. First, the Cherokee claimed the land as their own and
with their most recent constitution declared themselves a sovereign nation with laws and
institutions that governed the conduct of individuals residing therein. Second, the state of
Georgia and its extension law nullified the existence of the Cherokee Nation, and claimed
sovereignty over the land because of the Compact of 1802. Finally, the federal government
claimed it had sovereignty over the territory in question because of the doctrine of discovery and
the passage of a series of intercourse acts. The doctrine of discovery held that the United States
gained sovereignty over the Cherokee territory because of the Treaty of Paris that ended the
American Revolution. According to Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1823 Supreme Court
decision Johnson v. M’Intosh, the British “discovery” of North America gave them ownership over
it. The discovery doctrine as laid out in the Johnson decision converted the indigenous residents to
tenants who were subject to eviction without notice. Once the British had been defeated their
sovereignty had transferred to the American government. To reinforce its hold on the various
Indian nations scattered across the cis-Mississippian frontier, Congress, beginning in 1790,
passed a series of intercourse laws through powers granted by the Commerce Clause that allowed
federal agents to “preserve peace on the frontiers.” The intercourse law passed in March 1802
further strengthened the previous provisions, and regulated the commercial relationships

51 “An Act to add the territory lying within the limits of this State…” Acts of the General Assembly of the State of
Georgia, December 20, 1828, 88-89, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&
type=law &byte=9186842&lawcnt=2&filt=doc 89 (Accessed September 10, 2011).
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between Americans and Indians, and gave the federal government a strong claim in regards to
the sovereignty question. The passage of the extension law, though, put the question of Indian
policy into flux because the state had declared itself sovereign in all matters regarding the
backcountry population. Though President Jackson would make a principled stand on
nullification when it came to the state of South Carolina, he did little to prevent Georgia’s
actions.52
Before the Cherokee had much time to ruminate on the possibilities of the extension law,
uncertain news came out of the Georgia hills. In the autumn of 1828, a hunter ranging through
land owned by his pastor stumbled upon gold on the banks of the Chestatee River.53
Throughout the remainder of 1828 and well into the spring of the following year, few outside the
region knew of the find. Then, in August 1829, the Georgia Journal caught wind of the story and
published the first account of the state’s two working, profitable gold mines. “So it appears that
what we long anticipated has come to pass at last, namely, that the gold region of North and
South Carolina would be found to extend into Georgia.” Predicting the chaos and uncertainty
that the mines would breed, the Journal’s editor urged the legislature to “prohibit, under severe
penalties, the working of any gold or silver mines in the State.”54 By the fall of that year
thousands of gold seekers and fortune hunters had descended upon the north Georgia hills.

On the Johnson case, see Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest By Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossed the
Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), especially 100-116; as well as Stuart
Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005),
178-188. For the text of the Johnson case, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.), 543-573 (1823). On the
intercourse act, see “An Act to regulate the trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace along
the frontiers,” March 30, 1802, Statutes at Large, 7th Congress, 1st Session, 139-145.
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53 Georgia Journal, August 1, 1829, 3. Many people laid claim to the “first” gold find in the state. Beginning in
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Georgia Journal article of August 1, 1829. See David Williams, Georgia Gold Rush, 22-25. More recently, towns across
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Although the first find did not occur on Cherokee land, miners found that the deposits extended
northwards and soon made their way into the Nation. Anxiety, chaos, and violence followed in
their wake.
The first national gold rush would have dramatic consequences for those living for the GeorgiaCherokee frontier and dampened their prospects of enjoying a peaceful existence. As thousands
of unwanted prospectors poured into the backcountry, state leaders and Cherokee councilmen
sought ways of preventing bloodshed and of asserting control of the contested territory. For
Georgia, the chaos in the backcountry would allow the state to extend its authority at the expense
of the Cherokee. The Cherokee fully understood that their way of life and their tenuous grip on
their homeland could soon come to an end, and would use the opportunity to seek federal
assistance in maintaining their boundaries. Though the contest between Georgia’s republican
order and Cherokee harmony had raged for nearly three decades, the gold discovery brought it
to a fever pitch.
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CHAPTER TWO: BORDERLANDS SOCIETY AND THE ROOTS OF DISORDER,
1820-1830

Competition over sovereignty between the state of Georgia, the federal government, and
the Cherokee Nation helped impose on the borderlands a confusing tangle of laws, authority
figures, and boundaries. Rather than permitting any one power to assert a single legal
framework, the three groups worked at separate purposes and in the end, contributed to the
confusion that engulfed the region. As a result, ensuring order and harmony proved difficult.
What developed prior to 1829 was a social landscape in which crime flourished because no
government could control backcountry inhabitants. Four factors fueled frontier lawlessness: the
dispute over sovereignty, transportation improvements leading to population growth, economic
disparity that fueled an underground economy, and changing patterns of Cherokee settlement.
Their confluence combined to permit the growth of a powerful ring of thieves that found refuge
in the borderlands. Prior to 1829 and the beginning of the gold rush, frontier residents tolerated
the disorderly population as best they could, though surprisingly few violent outbreaks occurred.
The discovery of gold in 1828 altered the precarious balance that had developed along the
Cherokee-Georgia border. The gold rush, however, did not create frontier violence. Violence
and crime had long been a part of frontier life, and state officials along with Cherokee
councilmen blamed much of the disorder on undesirable elements of the white frontier
community. If Georgians wanted to create order in the backcountry and extend the white
republic, political leaders first had to admit that their own citizens instigated many of the area’s
problems before they could control the intruders. Such recognition would allow them to temper
their idealized expectations and target those who shirked a well-ordered society.
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Despite Georgia’s insistence that the Compact of 1802 and the extension law gave the
state unrivaled sovereignty over Cherokee country, frontier settlers had long been living on or
near native ground in a subservient role. It would have made little sense for white settlers to seek
the violent expulsion of their native neighbors when such actions would have instigated bloody
reprisals and endangered their families. Instead, they made the best of their situation. Not only
did they have to busy themselves with the toil that accompanied starting new farms, they also had
to survey their new surroundings and take stock of their new neighbors—both Georgian and
Indian. Similarly, the Cherokee had every incentive to cooperate with their white neighbors in
hopes that their peaceful coexistence could spark some sort of political compromise.
Accommodation and cooperation therefore marked relations between whites and natives, at least
until the gold rush made competition for resources and space more commonplace than
compromise.
The formation of the five

Carroll

1820
White/Slave
Population
---

1830
White/Slave
Population
2724/487

Gwinnett

4050/538

10949/2332

Habersham

2868/277

9757/909

Hall

4681/399

10563/1181

Rabun

509/15

2115/59

Total

12108/1229

36108/4968

County

border counties, Carroll, Gwinnett,
Habersham, Hall, and Rabun,
combined with the extension law to
spread Georgia’s authority to the
borders of Tennessee and Alabama.
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planters, and shopkeepers filled up the
territory quickly. The rapid rate of

Figure 1. Population Growth in Five Border Counties. 1820 and
1830 U.S. Census. Accessed at University of Virginia Library
Historical Census Browser. http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/
index.html (Accessed August 1, 2011).

population growth experienced in
frontier regions demonstrated the great

desirability of cheap land and the chance for economic prosperity offered by newly acquired
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Indian land. Between 1820 and 1830, growth rates in Gwinnett and Hall counties exceeded 50
percent, while the populations of Habersham and Rabun increased threefold. Such dramatic
development created social environments ripe with anxiety and uncertainty as frontier residents
sought to recreate community and civic bonds that could provide
familiar aspects of order.
For most settlers, the chance
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Figure 2. 1820 Slaveholding in Hall County. 1820 U.S. Census.
Errors in totals due to rounding.

economic world in which collaboration
and cooperation occurred in myriad ways and challenged their notions of a proper social order.
Most of the residents who had moved into the border counties by 1820 did so with a desire to
farm, though they did not lack their share of boosters, merchants, and other entrepreneurs. Still,
agriculture was paramount, and many a lottery winner had grandiose schemes of becoming a
planter grandee. Of the nearly 5,000 residents in Hall County, for example, almost 1,400 men
engaged in agriculture, while 1,100 men in Gwinnett farmed, out of a total population of 4,600.
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The number of frontier residents employed primarily in agricultural pursuits demonstrated how
powerful the Jeffersonian vision of a yeoman’s republic flourished in the Georgia backcountry.1
The small number of slaveholders among the white population further strengthened the
possibility of creating a yeoman’s republic along the frontier. In Hall County in 1820, only 112 of
the 640 households owned slaves, or 17.5 percent. Of those, thirty-six owned a single slave while
nineteen families owned two. Only one slaveholder in the entire county, Robert Young in Elias
Miller’s militia district, owned twenty slaves, while his two nearest competitors owned fourteen
apiece.2 With about one sixth of Hall County’s households engaged in slave labor, those
slaveholding families had
something of an aristocratic bent
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Figure 3. 1830 Slaveholding in Hall County. 1830 U.S. Census.
Errors due to rounding.

cast, differentiating the region even from other parts of the cotton kingdom and other
borderlands communities across North America. After all, slaveholding aligned the economic
County returns for Gwinnett and Hall Counties, 1820 U.S. Census. Slaveholding in the other border
counties varied to some degree. In Gwinnett County, slaveholding was somewhat more democratic. Of the 657
households there, almost 24 percent, or 153 households, owned slaves. In Habersham County, 57 of 512 households
owned slaves, or 11.13 percent. For a discussion of Carroll County see Chapter Three. Because of its small
population, Rabun County is an outlier. Therefore, I have relied upon Hall County as a rough average of the border
counties.
1

2

County level returns for Hall County, Georgia. 1820 U.S. Census.
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interests of a number of wealthy Cherokee and whites and created a commonality between the
two groups. Still, the number of slaveholders in the backcountry was slight, especially the number
of large planters.
A decade later, in 1830, slave ownership remained proportional to what it had been in
1820, though the number of large slaveowners had swelled. As migration into Hall County
increased, the relative number of slaveowners remained constant. By 1830, a higher percentage
of slaveowners owned more than sixteen slaves, and the wealthiest man in the county, John
Allen, owned thirty-two. By 1830, slaveholders had cemented themselves as a relatively select
group consisting of just 16.55 percent of all the county’s families. Wealth along the frontier, at
least in the form of slaves, was held by a small group of families. The rest of Hall’s families
scratched out an existence on small plots of land as best they could.
The availability of cheap and unoccupied land was not the only factor contributing to
the population explosion in the border counties. Internal improvements financed by the federal
government and technological improvements opened up the interior South to settlement and
trade. In 1804, Congress requisitioned funds to construct a federal road through the middle of
the Cherokee Nation. Designed to increase interstate trade and secure the timely delivery of the
public mail, the federal road also allowed whites unfettered access to Cherokee lands. Carved out
of wilderness by government workers, it made travel over previously unassailable terrain—dense
forests, dismal swamps, and steep hills—not only possible, but downright accessible to those with
the desire to do so. Cutting from Augusta, Georgia through the heart of the Nation, passing near
the council grounds at Red Clay, crossing the Tennessee River at Ross’s Landing and on to
Nashville, the federal road split Cherokee country nearly in half. The Augusta-Nashville road
was but one in a series of roads constructed by the federal government that crisscrossed the
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American south, and it made a greater amount of white-native contact inevitable.3

George

Featherstonhaugh, an English traveler, observed the social world of the Cherokee borderlands as
he traversed the roads and paths of the Cherokee Nation. A geologist by trade, Featherstonhaugh
noted that most of the white frontier population looked “as melancholy and lazy as boiled codfish,” owing to their poor diet and voracious drinking habits. What the “parsnip-looking country
fellows” enjoyed the most, however, was “political disputation in the bar-room of their filthy
taverns, exhibiting much bitterness against each other in supporting the respective candidates of
the Union and States-rights parties.” When he arrived at Spring Place, the location of a
prominent Moravian mission, Featherstonhaugh noted that “almost every store in the place was
a dram shop,” and the amusement of the townsfolk consisted of visiting each of shop in turn and
getting “red-hot drunk with whiskey.”4
Making his way to the National Council meeting at Red Clay, Featherstonhaugh also
encountered dozens of Cherokee men and women on similar journeys. At his inn, a “halfbreed
youth” and his wife, a “pretty Cherokee creature,” stopped for medical attention. The man had
tumbled form his horse after becoming “beastly drunk” and had been struck by the horse’s hoof.
It was not the wounded youth that drew Featherstonhaugh’s attention, but his wife who took her
husband’s injury as mundane, because she “was probably accustomed to see him drunk every
day.” At a tavern between Spring Place and Red Clay kept by a man named Bell,
Featherstonhaugh could only procure “filthy pieces of bad cake” to eat. When he asked a
Cherokee woman, presumably Bell’s wife, who could speak some English, why the tavern keeper
On the Cherokee debate over allowing the federal road to pass through their lands and the resulting
effects, see William G. McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), 77-91; on the impact of federal roads on Creek society, see Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal
Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2010).
4 George W. Featherstonhaugh, A Canoe Voyage up the Minnay Sotor…(1847; St. Paul: Minnesota Historical
Society, 1970), 2:223, 226.
3
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did not keep cows to make milk and cheese, she only replied “it was too much trouble.”5 The
Englishman’s observations obviously revolted his delicate sensibilities, though his impressions of
the borderlands population seemed to corroborate those of state politicians who saw the habits of
the backcountry population as unbecoming of citizens in the white republic.
The federal road, however, made ordering the frontier population increasingly difficult,
especially because of the sieve-like border: even the Chattahoochee River, in years of drought,
became crossable on foot. Such a permeable boundary allowed for whites to come into the
Nation unimpeded, and once there, removing these unwanted intruders became an arduous task.
The ease of slipping past federal or Cherokee patrols convinced many who never received
permits to trade or reside within the Nation to try their luck squatting on farms and fields
belonging to the Cherokee. It also allowed the disorderly population to cross national boundaries
at will and return to their haunts in the sparsely settled border counties.
Hoping to mitigate some of the problems they anticipated from the increased traffic, the
Cherokee charged tolls and erected gates to prevent outlaws and other undesirable people from
entering their domain, especially at night. The constitution of 1817 also permitted the National
Council to dispatch a sixty-man lighthorse patrol for the purpose of policing the borders and
controlling the varied population living on the Cherokee side of the frontier. With the passage of
the intercourse laws, the federal government had the power of bolstering the Cherokee’s meager
border guard, yet usually refused to exercise it. The intercourse acts required merchants to apply
for a license to ply their wares, which meant that white traders who wanted legal business on

5

Ibid., 2:223-24.
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Cherokee ground had to ingratiate themselves with federal and Cherokee officials in order to
acquire the appropriate permits.6
Roads and rivers, the arteries of trade, brought hundreds of whites into the Nation and
made it impossible for the Cherokee or government agents to keep tabs on all interlopers.
Hundreds, if not thousands, of whites made their way into the backcountry and became people
“in between” two different societies. The Cherokee officially did not recognize the legitimacy of
these interlopers, nor did the state of Georgia have any authority over them. The liminality of
whites who resided illegally in the Cherokee Nation, though, was tolerated by most Cherokee
residents as long as they complied with Cherokee laws. Moreover, the federal roads now allowed
easy access to Indian country and it made discerning those who were allowed onto Cherokee
ground, those who were just passing through, and those residing illegally a tough task.
Along with the new roads, steamboats also provided easy mobility into and out of the
Cherokee Nation. After the extension law went into effect and more Georgians moved into the
backcountry, especially after 1832, steamboats began plying the waterways. The town of Rome,
Georgia, founded in 1834 at the confluence of the Etowah, Oostanaula, and Coosa Rivers
became the region’s primary cotton market because of its prime river location. On board the
steamships, travelers encountered a microcosm of the disorderly white community on the
southern frontier. What they found disgusted not a few observers. Most notable to one English
traveler, Thomas Hamilton, was the brazenness with which passengers displayed weaponry. A
collection of walking sticks in the corner of the main cabin aboard one steamer all concealed
daggers, which struck Hamilton as the most “unmanly and assassin-like weapon,” something he
probably did not mention to those so armed. Men armed to the teeth, guilty of conversation
6 After 1819, federal forces in the Cherokee country were extremely limited, usually restricted to the agent
and a handful of sub-agents. The Cherokee Lighthorse therefore often protected borders with the agent’s blessing.
McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence, 280, 289-290.
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“interlarded with the vilest blasphemy,” engaged in habitual drinking and gambling that
continued unabated day and night. On Hamilton’s first voyage, not even the captain was
immune to such practices. In fact, the captain, “one of the most flagrant offenders,” became
“decidedly drunk” and could not even pilot the boat. The few ladies on board, quite sensibly,
remained in their cabins. Hamilton noticed a wide assortment of the white men who inhabited
the backcountry, but generalized that, “Many have fled for crimes, to a region where the arm of
the law cannot reach them.” In short, just like life aboard a steamship, the community on the
southern frontier was violent, where alcohol and gambling were prevalent, and where women
occupied specific roles.7
The influx of white settlers not only disrupted notions of order but also destabilized the
Cherokee who had to constantly adjust to the exigencies of frontier life. Bonds of community and
kin that glued the Cherokee society together had little time to adhere in the face of constant in
migrations and repetitive treaty concessions. A census conducted by the Cherokee Phoenix in 1828
listed 144 men and 61 women who had married into the Nation; a war department census in
1835 listed 201 whites who had a Cherokee spouse. By 1835, the number of white-Cherokee
marriages accounted for fewer than 10 percent of the total number of Cherokee households,
while the number of mixed-race individuals accounted for roughly eighteen percent of the
Cherokee population. New settlement arrangements dispersed Cherokee families and broke up
large nuclear families and established villages. Though these interracial partnerships never
constituted a majority of recognized marriages within the Cherokee Nation, they exerted a great
degree of change within Cherokee society as an increasing number of families adopted American

7 Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners in America (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1833) 296-297. On
the ways in which life on southern steamships mirrored the southwestern frontier at large, see Robert Gudmestad,
Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 53-77.
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economic practices and gender constructions. Many Cherokee families left villages that practiced
female-centered communal farming for individual homesteads. As men and slaves took up
agricultural responsibilities, female isolation in farms and homesteads provided opportunity for
victimization.8
The lack of sovereignty, expansive population growth, ease of transportation, and the
opportunity to commit crimes all contributed to the growth of a ring of criminals who preyed
upon Cherokee people. The growth of a permanent, agricultural-based population in the
backcountry also coincided with the development of a fringe population composed of landless
young men who rejected civil society. The roots of frontier violence were found in this segment of
the white frontier community. Many in the settled regions saw its members as marginal and
deficient in character. As early as 1825, the federal Indian Agent at New Echota, Hugh
Montgomery, commented on the makeup of the whites who inhabited the frontier: “I need not
tell you, that there are in this as in every frontier country, a great number of disorderly people,
who hang on between the white and red people, and act as a kind of pioneers to civil society.”
On “the Georgia frontier in a few years past” the disorderly population had increased “owing to
the noise about treaties,” and the potential for free land. Montgomery’s observations about the
“disorderly people” implied that they did not belong to civil, much less polite, society. He also
noted that many of the disorderly frontier residents functioned as the first wave of white residents
and easily moved between two different societies. Two years later the state sent surveyors into
8 On the number of interracial couples in the Cherokee nation, see Tables 1 and 2 in William G.
McLoughlin and Walter H. Conser, Jr., “The Cherokees in Transition: A Statistical Analysis of the Federal
Cherokee Census of 1835,” Journal of American History 64 (December 1977): 680-681. The 1835 Census listed a total
Cherokee population of 16,452, which consisted of 2,637 households, 1,454 “halfbloods” (8.79% of the total
Cherokee population), and 1,492 “quarterbloods” (9.02%). On changing Cherokee settlement patterns see Douglas
C. Wilms, “Cherokee Land Use in Georgia Before Removal,” in William L. Anderson, ed. Cherokee Removal: Before and
After (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 1-28. The same census listed 8,916 Cherokees living within the
bounds of Georgia, or 54% of the Cherokee population. Of those, 68 whites were connected by marriage to the
Cherokee. Further, 776 slaves owned by natives resided in Georgia. See “Report from the Secretary of War,” Senate
Document 120 (Serial 315-2) 25th Congress, 2nd Session (1838), 535.
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Carroll County to plat the land gained from the Creek for a lottery, one citizen complained to
the governor, “you may rely upon this fact; that it is the vilinous white men in this part of the
country, who instigate the Indians to be troublesome.” Disorderly and villainous, Georgians who
made trouble on the frontier had already been cast out by their betters. Though the first whites
into Cherokee territory may have acted as pioneers, they soon conflicted with more permanent
residents who began to stake their claim to the land because of their clashing interests and
values.9
Americans often tend to romanticize the initial wave of pioneers who “conquered” the
frontier and made it safe for further expansion. In antebellum Georgia, white settlers in fact
made settlement more precarious and dangerous for those who followed because of the criminal
activities they engaged in. The disorderly frontier population consisted mainly of young or single
men who tended to congregate together with others like them. Whether they found civil society
too confining, or the toil and drudgery of farm life unsatisfying, or they yearned for riotous
liberty, they caused a vast amount of unrest and uncertainty wherever they went. Many of those
men formed themselves into loose bands of thieves that specialized in stealing Cherokee property
and then moving it out of native ground as quickly as possible. At the heart of the disruption was
property theft. The most common complaint issued by individual Cherokee to the 1842 U.S
Claims Commission was the theft of horses, livestock, and hogs. Hetty Vance wanted
compensation for a mare stolen from her pasture “supposed to be done by a notorious horse thief
9 Col. Hugh Montgomery to Colonel McKenny, April 23, 1825 in “Intrusion on Cherokee Land”, H. Doc
89 (Serial Set Vol. 197, Session Vol. 3) 21st Congress, 1st Session (1830), 2; Ulysses Lewis to George Troup, January
27, 1827, in L.F. Hays, ed., Georgia Military Affairs, bound transcript, WPA Project No. 5993 (Morrow, GA: Georgia
Department of Archives and History, 1940), 5:206. It is important to note here that Montgomery essentially
predicted the argument historian Frederick Jackson Turner made in 1893 regarding the frontier as a safety valve.
Certainly the frontier did draw its fair share of criminals out more “civilized” areas, but it put them into direct
contact with native peoples across North America. Maybe the frontier was a safety valve for whites in the east, but
not for natives who had their social worlds completely disrupted by their introduction. See Turner’s “The
Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Everett E. Edwards, ed., The Early Writings of Frederick Jackson
Turner (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1938), 185-229.
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by the name of Mosley.” When some of Vance’s friends tracked Mosley, they found the thief and
the horse “at the house of John Willows about 75 miles” away from Vance’s farm. Unable to
recover the animal, Vance’s friends confirmed Mosley’s connection to a ring of bold horse
thieves. This type of encounter became altogether common in the borderlands. Cherokee men
and women continually had to track down horses, hogs, and cows that had been taken from their
farms and fields.10
For thieves, livestock served as an easy target because of the porous nature of the
backcountry and the ease with which they could sell the stolen goods. Cherokee farming methods
did little to alleviate the problem. Cherokee farmers usually left their livestock unattended to
wander the hills and forests in search of their own forage. Though national law stipulated the
height and build of fences and commissioned rangers to track down stray cattle, these efforts met
with little success. Horse and cattle thieves, therefore, had no difficulty taking whatever they
desired. Unattended horses and cattle also proved such popular marks because thieves could
unload them quickly, and the distances they could cover made it difficult for the rightful owners
to reclaim their property. Even if the Cherokee did find their stolen animals, claiming them
within state bounds and in state courts bproved impossible because of the legal status of
Cherokee citizens. Horse thieves and cattle rustlers became increasingly savvy and moved stolen
goods into Alabama, Tennessee, and Georgia, states that all wanted to remove the Cherokee
population in order to open land for their own settlers.11
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In 1821, Tahlegalooraytee had a horse stolen from him along the Cherokee-Alabama
border, and the next year Young Bird claimed that five white men came to his farm and “drove
off twenty head of hogs, some of them pork hogs, into the white settlements.” In another case,
Peggy Helms, charged that “she had her horse stolen by white men in the limits of Georgia,”
after the extension law went into effect. Some of her friends attempted to recover the horse where
they saw it in the possession of a Georgian, but “there was no chance for a Cherokee to recover
property at the time.” Other Cherokee men and women tried to recover their property, and most
met with failure. Goose Langley tracked a missing steer to the Georgia state line but never
recovered it. Four Killer encountered the same problem. Langley “tract my cows . . . to where
they crossed the [Chattahoochee] River, but had to return home empty-handed because he lost
their trail.12
At least twice in the span of five years, a Cherokee, Lacy Christy, had livestock stolen
from his property. First, in 1830, when John Holcomb took a chestnut sorrel “with no cause.”
Five years later, Christy lost a mare to Hest Walker, a “U.S. citizen travelling thro that part of
the country,” which he later sold for about 40 dollars. Atawluny, a resident near Raccoon Town,
had a brand new fur hat, four horses, and sixty hogs appropriated from his land, “each taken
from him by citizens of the U. States.” Peacheater claimed that whites had stolen 3 yokes of
oxen, 11 head of cattle, 6 yearlings and a few hogs taken from his property. Knowing the name,
or at least the nationality, of the thieves, and in Christy’s case, the amount that his mare had
fetched on the black market, meant that at some point the Cherokee had tracked their property
but could not recover it. George Blackwood had fifty hogs stolen from his land by Buck Herrod,

12 Claim of Tahlegalooraytee, March 20, 1842, in Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims, Tahlequah District, 45;
Claim of Young Bird, March 7, 1842, ibid., 6; Claim of Peggy Nelms, March 28, 1842, in Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee
Claims, Saline District, 200; Claim of Goose Langley, April 12, 1842, in Marybelle W. Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims,
Goingsnake District (Tulsa, OK: Marybelle W. Chase, 1989), 116-117; Claim of Four Killer, April 8, 1842, ibid., 98.
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“a notorious thief who served his two duties in the Georgia state Prison for theft,” but he never
recovered them. Two years later, another white man named Filo pilfered two of his remaining
hogs. Charlatehe had horses stolen form him in 1832, 1834, and 1835 by a white man the
Cherokee knew only as Rattlesnake. When he encountered Rattlesnake, the thief would not give
up the horse. Whortleberry had a brown horse and eleven head of cattle taken from him in 1829.
When he tracked them to the “white settlements” but he and his friends could not “overtake” the
thieves. Two years later, he lost thirty-five hogs to a white settler named Stark. Some Cherokee
had the aid of federal authorities to help them reclaim their property, but even that rarely helped.
Wassassee, who had his horse stolen form him in 1829, was perhaps the unluckiest when it came
to reclaiming his lost property. Not only did he lose his horse, but in the botched attempt to
reclaim it, he lost a $15 saddle and a $20 rifle, and was injured to boot.13
In spite of the growing number of settlers moving into the borderlands, whites and
Indians knew one another intimately. That Cherokee residents knew the names of the thieves,
could discuss their reputations, and even knew the amount of time disorderly whites had served
in prison, spoke to the great degree of contact between the two groups. Furthermore, those
Cherokee who hunted down stolen property had awareness, if not familiarity, with the locations
or fences who operated within the illicit borderland economy. When every type of moveable
property was for sale, from hogs to humans, at least some people in the backcountry thrived on
the chaos sown by the intruders.
In December 1825, to appease nervous Cherokee, and to clamp down on the illicit
economic activity not permitted by the intercourse acts, Hugh Montgomery alerted his sub13 Claim of Lacy Christy, March 24, 1842, in Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims, Tahlequah District, 162; Claim
of Atawluny, April 26, 1842, in ibid., 181; Claim of Peacheater, March 25, 1842 in 1842 Cherokee Claims, Goingsnake
District, 22-23; Claim of George Blackwood, March 31, 1842, ibid., 47-48; “Claim of Charle-te-he,” April 6, 1842,
ibid., 86; Claim of Whortleberry, April 16, 1842, ibid., 150; Claim of Wassassee, April 1, 1842, in 1842 Cherokee
Claims, Tahlequah District, 256-257.
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agent, J.G. Williams, to the increasing amount of crime along the border. “As you will probably
meet with complaints from Indians, while on the different Frontiers, about property Stolen from
them,” he instructed Williams “to attend to their complaints.” That meant that not only could
the sub-agent authorize the Cherokee to pursue their lost property, it also meant the agent should
use his authority to assist the Cherokee “as far as is convenient . . . in searching out their
property.” Independent-minded settlers paid little heed to such directives. When Thigh Walker
lost a horse near the Hightower River he went looking for it. He located it some time later in
Kingston, Tennessee. When a white witness swore on oath that the horse belonged to the Indian,
Walker could still not claim it. Finally, Williams ordered the thief to surrender the horse, but the
command went unheeded. Even federal directives mattered little to the unruly frontiersman.14
Other forms of moveable property, especially slaves, were also popular targets for
backcountry criminals. In February 1837, William Mosely “took sick and died” just as he and his
family were preparing to emigrate to Arkansas. Whether this Mosely was the same man who had
stolen horses from Hetty Vance is uncertain. However, before he became ill, he allowed one of
his slaves to travel to Walker County, Georgia, to visit his mother before he, too, was forced west.
Once the slave man had left and Mosely died, the heirs never again saw the slave because he had
been taken from his mother’s owner “by citizens of the U. States [from] Rayburn County,
Georgia so that the heirs has lost the slave and his services.” The heirs, not so much upset by the
loss of their slave as the value of the services he rendered, asked for $1500 in compensation from
the federal government for the loss of their chattel, and $100 per year from the labor that he
would have otherwise rendered, which they later received.15 The presence of black slaves owned
14 Hugh Montgomery to J.G. Williams, December 12, 1825 in “Letters Received by the Office of Indian
Affairs, 1824-1881,” Roll 72, M234, RG 75, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.;
Claim of Thigh Walker, March 18, 1842, in Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims, Saline District, 133.
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by Cherokee families complicated usually stark dichotomy drawn regarding race in the
antebellum south. The fact that whites stole them from Cherokee slaveowners reinforced the
notion of white supremacy and the complexity of backcountry life. No doubt Cherokee planters
who owned slaves served as a reminder to poor whites regarding their place in society. Stealing
slaves and then owing their labor became a quick path to acceptability and mastery.
Malicious crimes also plagued Cherokee families. Hetty Vance had run-ins with frontier
whites. In 1823, Vance found herself boarding five whites from Georgia when her home
mysteriously burned to the ground along with $2,300 worth of hidden bank notes. Though no
one saw the five men set fire to the house, neighbors caught and “examined” them on the matter.
“[F]rom all that could be ascertained in the answers it was firmly believed that they were guilty of
the charges.” It should be noted that Vance’s large stash of paper money was highly unusual,
though the fact that she boarded white men was not. Whether the men used Vance’s home as a
staging area for their criminal forays or for more innocent purposes is unclear.16 Elizabeth Ware
and her husband lived on Shoemaker Creek within Georgia’s claimed territory, and encountered
trouble with the extension law. “Owing to the oppressive character of the laws of the state
towards citizens of the Cherokee Nation,” Ware declared, “her husband was compelled to absent
himself from home which left her in a defenceless condition.” Why he had to leave state
boundaries is mysterious—unless he was a fugitive from state justice—but when he did he left his
family defenseless. With her husband gone, whites burned her house to the ground as a way of
forcing off the native inhabitants so they could move onto that particular tract of land.17 House
burnings proved so pernicious because they destabilized Cherokee families and made them
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fearful for their safety in their own country. The fact that Cherokee families had their homes
burned underscored the uncertain and chaotic nature of life in the borderlands and the ease with
which encounters with frontier whites turned dangerous.
Three sisters, Nancy, Alecy, and Sinny had much of their livelihood taken from them in
1820 when white intruders burned three hundred bushels of their wheat crop. To compound
their problems, the whites then set fire to their house and destroyed an additional fifteen acres of
corn. The three sisters speculated that such a malicious crime was an act of revenge undertaken
by intruders after federal troops cut down their corn to compel them to leave.18 Like Vance and
Ware, the three sisters had to cope with seemingly random frontier violence that was often
directed at women. The gendered component to backcountry crime highlighted the maledominated world of the backcountry and the subordinate position women occupied in the mind
of the white “disorderly” population. Cherokee men rarely had crime happen to them firsthand.
Their livestock disappeared in the night or when the owner was out of sight. Perhaps this was a
way for thieves to avoid detection, but more than likely it was a way for them to avoid conflict.
Women, on the other hand, experienced crime and violence firsthand. The gendered component
to backcountry crime allowed frontier whites to demonstrate their mastery over women who had
no recourse or means to protect themselves from the ravages of the “disorderly people.”
Other Cherokee women faced victimization from men whom they should have been able
to trust. The beleaguered Hetty Vance ran into trouble with whites from Georgia in 1830 when
her husband, Henry Vickery, died. A few years later she married John Vance, a white Georgian.
Because of the extension law, Hetty had few property rights because the law denied Indian
women the right to own property. Therefore, when she remarried, property left to her by her
first husband transferred to her new spouse. The estate’s administrator, Oliver Stricklen, a lawyer
18
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from Georgia, demanded payment from Hetty when he learned that she had sold some of the
property before signing away control of the estate to her new husband. When Hetty refused to
give him the money, Stricklen “forced her negroes off,” whom he later sold and took the
proceeds as her payment. Soon thereafter, Stricklen had Hetty “carried to the white man’s jail.”
When her husband notified the court of what had occurred, the court ordered her freed by a writ
of habeas corpus, but she handed over her bank notes to Stricklen “in order to keep undisturbed
her liberty.” Stricklen also terrorized Margaret Baumgarter, who lost eight horses and two-dozen
cattle when Stricklen stole the livestock “for the benefit of another.” To white men, even to a
man like Oliver Stricklen who was supposed to uphold the law, exploiting Cherokee women and
their property proved easy enough in the chaotic backcountry. 19
White men professing love and devotion exploited other Cherokee women. Americans
too poor to buy land on their own, or too luckless to win it in a land lottery, could improve their
prospects through marriage. Once they had married a Cherokee woman, a white man had
certain privileges including land to farm or trading rights within the Nation, By 1835, the power
of acculturation was evident across the Cherokee nation as more families turned to market-based
agriculture, especially cotton planting. Some Cherokee farmers even took on white
sharecroppers. For Robert Rodgers, it brought monetary rewards that he had no right to. When
federal agents in 1832 began enrolling Cherokee for removal to Arkansas, Robert applied “as the
head of his family for a numeration from the agent.” Once the enrolling agent began disbursing
payments that compensated enrollees for their improvements, Robert took the money and left his
Betsey, his wife of nearly twenty year. Betsey became distraught, not just because her husband
had left, but also because the payment was possible because she belonged to the Nation. Without
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his marriage to Betsey, Robert “had no such right without a lawful connection with a Cherokee
woman, he being a white man.” In 1833, Jesse Townsend, a member of the Georgia Guard,
married the niece of a prominent Cherokee named Captain Oldfields. On the eve of his
wedding, he consulted a judge to see if he could have Oldfield’s abandoned property transferred
to him as a condition of his marriage. He showed his fiancé a false bill of sale and she agreed to
the purchase, never knowing that Townsend had never spoken with her uncle and saw her as a
way to get at the land. Not only did Cherokee women face vulnerability to violence and crime
perpetrated by intruders, but also from men they had taken into their homes. As the political
pressure to send the Cherokee into the west mounted, Cherokee women faced a continual stream
of problems that weakened Cherokee resistance to removal.20
The Cherokee grasp on their land and property in the face of white encroachment
became even more tenuous when treaties gave away Cherokee land to appease Georgia’s
appetite for land. Not only did the native inhabitants have to relocate, they also had to contend
with new neighbors who felt entitled to anything left behind. In the fall of 1818 the Cherokee
man Kalonoshaskee had to move across the Hiwassee River because his land had been given
away in the latest treaty. His horses, however, knew nothing of the treaty and returned to their
old pasturage on the “white side of the river.” Kalonosheskee inquired into their whereabouts
and believed that “white people living at his former residence or others living near them, stole or
run off [the] horses and made profit of them.” He “made enquiry & search” at his old homestead
after the creation of the new treaty line to no avail. Charley Roots had a similar experience after
the Treaty of 1819 ceded his land to white settlers. He lost a large steer to a “citizen of the

20 Claim of Betsey Rodgers, March 14, 1842, in Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims, Saline District, 47; “Property
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United States of the name of Logan” after Roots moved from the ceded lands to Cherokee
country, along with eight acres of fenced land.21
Some even tried to take their grievances to state courts, but met with little success. If a
Cherokee stole a horse or pig from a settler and crossed the boundary, few legal options existed
for the settler to retrieve the property. A Cherokee who had livestock taken by a white had even
less chance of legal redress. For example, in the April 1829 term of the Carroll County Superior
Court, a Cherokee man named Soft Shell Turtle sued a Georgian named Grief Felton for the
theft of a “certain sorrel mare about six years of age of the value of eighty dollars as of his own
right & property.” Felton seemed to admit to the crime when he confessed he had no defense
other than stating that he was white and the plaintiff an Indian. The judge agreed, and ordered
Soft Shell Turtle to pay Felton over ten dollars in court costs, an exorbitant sum for such a simple
suit. When Bill Silk, a Cherokee, was accused of an “alleged crime that would not have hurt him
in the courts of his own country,” he had to leave the state because of the legal abuse heaped on
him. In another case, Jacob Harnage could not recover the horses stolen from him by “Young
John and Old John Stansel” because he did not have “the power to get redress from them as they
were white men of Halbersham [sic] County.” Though the state legislature probably never
imagined the extension law would allow for backcountry crime to flourish, it did precisely that.22
The cases of Soft Shell Turtle, Bill Silk, and Jacob Harnage exemplified the ways in
which Georgia’s legal system exerted power on the frontier. By June 1830, new counties had not
been created in Cherokee territory, but the extension law had gone into effect. Once that
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occurred, Cherokee residents had no way to seek legal redress for their stolen property. The ease
with which Felton could claim that the Cherokee had no case because he could not claim
citizenship, along with the lack of the deliberation and the steep fine imposed by the judge
demonstrated that he agreed with Felton’s rudimentary argumentation. With the issue of
sovereignty still unresolved and the growing menace posed by dangerous whites, the Cherokee
had no legal recourse within Georgia’ legal system nor did they have a national government
strong enough to impose order. When the extension law precluded Cherokee claimants from
testifying in Georgia’s courts against whites, the state legislature, not surprisingly, tipped the
preponderance of borderlands power in favor of white intruders. Through 1829, Cherokee
residents and sympathetic whites residing in the border counties tolerated the loss of property;
reports of violent retaliation seldom cropped up. Most tried to reclaim property themselves or
friends would do so if they spotted the missing livestock, but usually those attempts were fruitless.
After the gold rush began, the high number of thefts and the difficulty of receiving justice tipped
the Cherokee away from non-violent and toward violent action.23
News of the gold find greatly increased the scope of migrants moving into the Cherokee
Nation, though it did not immediately have an impact on state politics. In the midst of the news
arriving from the backcountry in 1829, Georgians went to the polls and elected a new governor,
George Rockingham Gilmer. A member of the Troup, or State’s Right, faction and the scion of a
coastal planter family, Gilmer’s campaign said very little about the news from the frontier.
Instead, he cautiously backed the cause of the ascendant Southern Radicals in their protests
against the 1828 tariff and tacitly supported the growing number of nullifiers within the state.
The inflammatory rhetoric surrounding South Carolina’s growing nullification movement gained
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some traction in Georgia, and it occupied most of the Gilmer’s attention. However, when he took
office, he focused on domestic issues rather than those inciting South Carolina. Believing that it
was simply a matter of time before violence erupted along the frontier, Gilmer anticipated “great
danger” from “frontier citizens, the Indians, and licensed occupants of the Indian country,” who
“would battle for possession of the gold mines.”24 Neither he nor the Cherokee Principal Chief
John Ross desired bloodshed, but the intruders paid little heed to such bothersome matters as
national sovereignty or judicial jurisdiction. Only gold mattered, and the rush to attain it
threatened to undermine what fragile stability persisted in the region. Lawmakers wondered how
to restore order in the face of such overwhelming chaos, especially when state agents nervously
described one mining camps as “a scene, of disorder, vice, & confusion, that beggars
description.”25
The mining community that developed over the next five years further undermined the
notions of order cherished by state leaders. Rather than well-maintained farms selling profitable
harvests of cotton or other crops, backcountry residents seemed more intent on mining, digging,
or stealing gold. Mining camps, comprised mostly of men, sprang up and collected together those
who sought the “color” beneath the surface. As camps became more permanent fixtures, taverns,
gambling dens, and grog shops also sprang up, along with all sorts of moneymaking ventures
intent on fleecing the miners. As news of the gold strike reached across the Atlantic, a large cadre
of Germans and Englishmen descended upon Georgia, as well as Mexican treasure hunters.
Many claimed to have invented easier and more efficient methods of sorting gold from gravel.
24 Gilmer, Sketches, 279. On the connections and timing between Georgia’s support for nullification and the
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Freed slaves also made their way into the gold region. One, a man named Free Jim, owned a
claim within the town limits of Dahlonega. The amalgamated mining camp population became
another worry for state leaders intent on spreading republican virtue into the backcountry.26
However fearful respectable state leaders may have been over the prospect of violence
and crime escalating in the backcountry, state politicians in 1829 looked to intruders as the likely
instigators of violence. Cherokee leaders also commented on the lawless character of the
intruders. “Since Gold has been discovered in this nation, a very strong incentive for intrusions
has been offered to the frontier inhabitants of Georgia. We understand several hundreds of these
people are now basely at work, digging for Gold on the sources of the High Tower [Etowah]
river.” With the discovery of gold, many in Georgia saw dwindling prospects for the solidification
of a republican community in the backcountry. Reports filtered back to the state house of a
society filled with “All classes of people, but especially the idle and profligate” whose motives
“lead to most of the disorders of society.” Freed “from the restrains which the laws impose upon
the evil dispositions of men,” the intruders “exhibited scenes of vicious indulgence, violence, and
fraud, which would not have been tolerated for a moment if means could have been used to
prevent them.”27
Clamoring for some way to restore republican order in the backcountry, the editor of the
Milledgeville Federal Union feared the spread of the “peculiar condition of the country at this
time—presenting the most disgusting scene of licentiousness, riot, tumult, and blood-shed—
endangering the peace of that portion of the State which lays contiguous to it—requires of our
next legislature not only prompt but most vigorous regulations.” For Colonel Hugh
On the mining camp population, see David Williams, The Georgia Gold Rush: Twenty-Niners, Cherokee, and
Gold Fever (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993); as well as, Otis E. Young, Jr., “The Southern Gold
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Montgomery, the U.S. Cherokee Agent, the problem arose from the intruders whose “morals are
as bad as for you to Conceive; you can suppose the gamblers, debauchers, and profane
Blackguards all Collected from six states without either law or any other power” preventing them
from acting on “their vicious propensities.” Echoing the editor, Montgomery had “abundant
reason to conclude that if law is not speedily and effectually introduced, spectacles will be
exhibited at no distant day at which humanity will sicken and revolt.”28 In other words, loosed
from the bounds of civility and law, white men had reverted to a state of savagery and needed a
reminder of proper deportment.
The sheer volume of the intrusion made some sort of violent conflict inevitable. By June
1830, it became self-evident that the republican order envisioned by many state leaders faced
serious threats. One state agent sent to investigate the intrusion reported at least “four thousand
whites engaged at the mines & their number is increasing daily.” Another spoke of at least
“fifteen hundred on Cane Creek; but the whole number was spoken of as three thousand—the
number is certainly fast increasing. I saw a daily movement of diggers, while on the Frontier,
towards the Territory.” “I was informed,” a colonel of the Georgia militia wrote to the governor,
“that there had been just before my arrival between four and five thousand men engaged in
digging and searching for gold in that part of the nation attached by the laws to the county of
Hall.”29
Governor Gilmer and other respectable citizens saw the problem in the backcountry as
one that stemmed not from the presence of Cherokee residents or gold, but the fact that the “idle
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and profligate” could flagrantly disregard state law and ignore the rules of republican society.
White settlers desirous of starting farms and obeying laws did not cause the problems plaguing
the backcountry, but gold fever and the effects it had on the intruders did. A dearth of
respectable settlers and a paucity of law enforcement allowed for the plunder upon the mines to
continue, permitting the passions of the intruders to rule their actions. A stern dose of law and
order, a healthy respect for private property, and an influx of upstanding white citizens would
cure the “idle and profligate” backcountry residents of their “evil dispositions.”
To push for order in the backcountry, Gilmer and his supporters used the idea of
savagery as a justification for some form of state-supported social regulation. Not surprisingly,
their complaints about a disorderly white frontier population mirrored those made by state
officials prior to 1829. Both before and after 1829, state leaders argued that the roots of frontier
violence could be found within elements of a white population that took more pleasure in chaos
than a well-ordered society. Disorderly whites, in turn, corrupted natives, which counteracted
any progress gained from acculturation. Gilmer argued that instead of a rejuvenated Cherokee
population, he saw a people who “have lost all that was valuable in their Indian character, [who]
have become spiritless, dependent and depraved” largely because of contact with white men
“whose corrupt habits or vile passions” further degraded the Cherokee. Rather than any sort of
improvement, the Cherokee had actually regressed because of their contact with ne’er-do-well
white citizens.30
Odious whites and mixed-race Cherokee made the task of social regulation that much
more vexing for Gilmer and his allies because the problem did not have a single source, though it
allowed them to easily tie two separate problems—the presence of Cherokee and intruders—into
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one neat rhetorical package centered on the concept of savagery. By linking the intruders and the
Cherokee, Gilmer, in effect, made anyone residing beyond the border counties a threat to
Georgia’s sovereignty and a threat to the white republican community of law-abiding citizens.
Gilmer took a circuitous path to solve the conjoined problem, but would eventually argue that an
expansive use of force would be necessary to regulate the social world beyond the frontier.
The Cherokee, long the target of such rhetoric, also disowned the actions of the intruders
by laying bare their “savagery.” As attacks against Cherokee residents increased, they found it
easier to lay claim to a greater degree of civilization than Georgia’s ravenous miners. Elias
Boudinot, the editor of the Phoenix, reprimanded “these savage whites” for their brutal attacks on
peaceful Cherokee men and women. Having “outstripped the Indians in deeds of blood,” he
hoped they would receive swift and sufficient punishment for their crimes. When the intruders
showed no signs of relenting, the Cherokee decried those who “have acted more like savages
towards the Cherokees, than the Cherokees towards them,” but were still “permitted to continue
in their unlawful proceedings, notwithstanding the frequent complaints made to the agent.”31
As winter set in, the intruders became increasingly desperate in their search for precious
metals and turned to more desperate measures to earn a living. According to the Phoenix’s editor,
“white men eight in number, well armed with guns, in the dead of the night…came into
Hightower, and forcibly enter[ed] a house, kidnapped three negroes, two of whom were free, and
made their escape into Georgia.” Presumably, the blacks they had kidnapped would soon be sold
into slavery in Georgia. Another group entered Cherokee territory to arrest over a dozen men
who had “punished a notorious thief,” probably a white man from Georgia. When a posse of
white men from Habersham County rode into the Nation “with hostile intentions,” a group of
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Cherokee Phoenix, August 5, 1828, 2; Ibid., September 9, 1829, 3.
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Cherokee men intercepted them. The Cherokee demanded that the “savage invaders” make
restitution for slaughtering a hog they had come across in their rampages. When the Georgians
refused, the Cherokee confronted the armed men and took a gun as payment, illustrating the
resonance of harmonious justice in Cherokee life, a system the Georgians little understood.32
The above examples demonstrate the ways in which small acts of personal violence aided
in the spread of fear and anxiety across the backcountry. Thefts, beatings, and kidnappings
became regular occurrences that soon gave way to more bloody dealings. The eruption of
violence feared on both sides of the Chattahoochee never really occurred all at once. Instead,
violence increased in stages, but it was built on the criminal environment already present. The
bloodletting feared by political leaders on both sides began with the shooting of a horse. In
August 1829, a Cherokee hunter on the north bank of the Chattahoochee River—the
southernmost boundary of the Nation—came under fire by a group of whites after a boy had
seen the hunter and mischievously warned his neighbors that a score of Cherokee “with hostile
intentions” would imminently cross the river. The frontier residents organized a posse and fired
on a lone hunter they spied across the river. The hunter, busying himself with securing his quarry
onto the horse, did not even know he had been fired upon until he arrived home and noticed his
mount’s oozing wound. By morning, saddled with a dead horse, the owner sought to retaliate
against those who had killed his mount, though the Phoenix did not record his actions.33 Nonviolent retaliation came to an end in the winter of 1829-1830 when thousands of whites flocked
to the Cherokee Nation in search of gold. Such an overwhelming rush of humanity into the
backcountry created confusion and chaos that left white and Indian residents reeling. Though
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they had grown accustomed to dealing with property theft, the sheer magnitude of the
“intrusion” disrupted community ties and threatened to overwhelm residents. The switch to
violent retaliation came only after the number of intruders reached a critical mass. State
authorities and Cherokee councilmen both feared for the safety of peaceful residents on the
frontier, and nervously awaited a bloody war of extermination to commence. What they got,
instead, was banditry, lawlessness, and personal violence, but surprisingly few killings. Despite the
overblown rhetoric of state officials, not all of the intruders exhibited villainous traits. Many
simply wanted the gold and kept to themselves. Others banded together into communities several
hundred strong that made violence against them foolhardy. Likewise, young Cherokee men
intent on preventing intrusion did not instigate violence either. Their leaders kept a rein on the
young warriors and prevented them from initiating violence.
The uncertainty regarding sovereignty initially paralyzed state and federal officials who
took no actions to uphold laws or borders. However, once federal and state officials shook
themselves out of their initial torpor, each began a campaign designed to strictly limit the
“disorderly people” present in the backcountry. From 1830 until Removal commenced in 1838,
a combination of federal, state, and local efforts would all use violence to implement order and
social control through violence and intimidation. The much-feared violent outburst predicted by
politicians began, ironically, because of their need to impose order over a population that did not
conform to their ideas of a white, republican yeomanry.
The gold rush that began in 1829 fundamentally altered the frontier dynamic that had
developed. A combination of squabbling over sovereignty, explosive population growth fueled by
large quantities of available land and transportation improvements, and changing patterns of
Cherokee settlement contributed to the development of a ring of thieves who hawked stolen
goods on a thriving black market. With the creation of four new border counties and the passage
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of the extension law, the state sought to exert control over land claimed by the Cherokee. As
borderlanders contended with an uncertain political future and rampant crime and loss of
property, they sought some measure of security. State leaders blamed less-than-desirable
elements of the white population for the violent atmosphere present in the backcountry and
connected that problem with the presence of the Cherokee. Only by removing all of those
“disorderly” and “savage” elements could the white republic extend beyond the frontier.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PONY CLUB, SLICKS, AND REGULATION, 1829-1832

Crime and violence perpetrated by “disorderly” whites had altered the precarious frontier
dynamic that developed after 1820. Waves of intruders who entered the backcountry and sowed
discord wherever they went proved especially troublesome to peaceful frontier residents. In
Carroll County, a newly created border county, a group of disorderly intruders proceeded to
intimidate county authorities and horded power for themselves. Called the Pony Club, this group
of “disorderly” whites sought to concentrate the efforts of backcountry thieves into one profitable
organization. In the absence of state or federal aid to counter the Pony Club’s ravages, local
residents turned to vigilantism to rid Carroll of the Club’s pernicious influence. In doing so, the
orderly citizens who opposed the Club, who called themselves the Slicks, adopted a version of
social order that embraced violence to compel social control. However, their version of order
included allying with Cherokee residents and adopting a native method of punishment. In the
end, the Slicks imposed order in Carroll County and laid the groundwork for other efforts that
employed violence to create order but did so through a violent regulation of the local population.
The complicated legacy left by the Slicks had important consequences and demonstrated the
pliable meaning of republican order.
In many ways, the events in and around Carroll County mirrored those transpiring
throughout the backcountry. Gold deposits had been found in the county’s northern reaches and
its proximity to Alabama only compounded the movement into and out of the area. However,
the situation in Carroll differed from other parts of the Cherokee-Georgia borderlands primarily
because of the development of a highly organized band of thieves called the Pony Club, which
sowed disorder throughout the county and across the Cherokee Nation. The Pony Club got its
start in the chaotic world of frontier unruliness. It began as a concerted effort by horse thieves to
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scour the backcountry for valuable Cherokee property and evolved into a force that partially
controlled civil authority in Carroll County. Most reports regarding the Pony Club did not
mention it by name until 1829, the same year the gold rush began. A Cherokee man, Thompson
Tucker, noted its rise as early as 1822, however, when he told claims commission investigators in
1842 that he had a bay horse worth eighty dollars stolen form him “by a company of persons at
this time known as the Pony Club,” who were all “citizens of the United States of the State of
Georgia.” Tucker hired a man to retrieve his property, but to no avail. Known for their “acts of
theft on the property of Cherokee citizens,” the Pony Club started small but soon became a
serious threat to Carroll County’s stability. Tucker’s attribution of his horse’s theft seven years
prior to the Club’s formation emphasized the influence that it exerted on Cherokee thinking.1
Much like the criminals who plagued the borderlands after 1820, the Pony Club began as
a group of loosely allied thieves who made use of backcountry conditions to prosper. The
explosive population growth, lack of sovereignty, and changing patterns of Cherokee settlement
all coalesced to create a situation in which the Club could thrive. The locus of the Club’s power,
Carroll County, provided a haven for the band of thieves because of unique conditions in the
area. Proximity to the state line only increased the ease of transporting stolen goods across
jurisdictional boundaries. Rival authorities had little success tracking down stolen property as it
passed from Cherokee country to Georgia and then to Alabama. Three additional factors
contributed to the growth of the Pony Club in Carroll County. First, a large tract of land lying
north of Carroll County called the Creek Strip offered refuge for the Club. Second, because of
the disputed boundaries, several hundred Cherokee lived within Carroll County and offered

1 Claim of Thompson Tucker, March 26, 1842 in Marybelle W. Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims, Tahlequah
District (Tulsa,OK: Marybelle W. Chase, 1989), 73. See also, Don L. Shadburn, Unhallowed Intrusion: A History of
Cherokee Families in Forsyth County, Georgia (Saline, MI: McNaughton & Gunn, Inc., 1993), 650.

80

prime targets. Pony Club thieves travelled into the Cherokee Nation to steal horses, cows, pigs,
and other moveable property, and then sold the expropriations to farmers in Carroll County and
Alabama, to passing traders, or to prospectors. Finally, the fragile condition of civil government
within Carroll County allowed the Club to muscle its way in to the county government and
consolidate its powers.
Much of the Pony Club’s early success came from it first base of operations, called the
Creek Strip. The poorly defined tract of land had been wrangled over in two important treaties.
In 1825, Governor Troup, in spite of its obvious fraudulence, urged the ratification of the Treaty
of Indian Springs. That treaty gave control of the most of the Strip to the Cherokee. The
following year, the Treaty of Washington abrogated the Indian Springs agreement, but it did not
resolve the question of sovereignty over the Creek Strip. Georgians cried foul over the new
treaty, claiming it had infringed upon the state’s sovereignty. Negotiations designed to placate the
irate Georgians allowed them to survey the new border between Georgia and the remaining
Creek land under the supervision of a group of Creek commissioners. Two Cherokee leaders,
John Ridge and Richard Vann, who intervened when treaty negotiations almost broke down—
and received $15,000 apiece for their services—brokered this part of the negotiation. The border
that the treaty charged Georgia to survey became a serious problem over the next three years.
Troup selected a colonel in the state militia, Samuel A. Wales, to conduct the survey.
Uncertainty and a sense of betrayal ensued. Wales reported that Georgia had been shorted
100,000 acres promised to it in the last round of negotiations because of a misunderstanding over
the Strip.2

2 See Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1982), 123-125.
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The Strip became problematic because the new treaty did not explicitly state whether the
Georgians as a concession had extracted that tract of land. According to Georgia, the Creek
signed away the Strip because the new Treaty of Washington commanded the Creek to “cede to
the United States all the land belonging to the said Nation in the state of Georgia.” The Creek
maintained that they had ceded the land to the Cherokee two decades prior to any treaty with
the United States and could not give it away again. The Strip now belonged to the Cherokee.
State leaders claimed that no such transaction occurred and that the Creek ceded the land to the
United States. Called Vann’s Valley by the Cherokee, the strip occupied land above Carroll
County’s northern boundary but south of the Coosa River, and extended east to Buzzard’s
Creek. Georgians clamored for the land. When Wales ran his first line, a “Statesman & Patriot”
lamented in the Augusta Chronicle that the northern boundary was not “run off as high up the
Chattahoochee as . . . it should have been,” meaning the state had been deprived of land. To the
Patriot’s chagrin, the Creek residents who had feared that they would soon face removal could
now remain snugly in their homes “far within the Cherokee Nation.” By the end of June 1829 Colonel
Wales and his assistant, Thomas Lloyd, had finished their investigation of the “true boundary
line.” Wales surveyed the land south of the Etowah River and placed the boundary up to the
river’s southern bank, which moved the state boundary line north nearly two-dozen miles.3
In spite of the veracity claimed by Wales, the Cherokee knew that the Creek Strip was
theirs and had no intention of handing it over. White settlers, however, paid little heed to native
3 Augusta Chronicle, February 11, 1829, 2. For the text of the Treaty of Washington, see Charles J. Kappler,
ed. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 2:264-268. http://digital.
library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/cre0264.htm (Accessed November 11, 2011). Augusta Chronicle, June 6,
1829, 2. Much of Wales’s investigation into the “true boundary” consisted of interviews with white frontier residents
who had long resided with the Cherokee. The Cherokee Phoenix posted the official report Wales sent to the current
governor, John Forsyth. See, Cherokee Phoenix, May 8, 1830, 1. According to Wales, in a statement that would have
made the negotiators of the Treaty of Indian Springs blush, since the boundary that established the Creek Strip had
been negotiated in secret, without the knowledge of the United States, the state did not have to abide by the terms of
their agreement. However, he had not been ordered to survey the lands ceded by the Creek in that treaty, but in the
newer Treaty of Washington, where negotiations had not been conducted in secret.
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protestations and began moving into the territory. As early as 1825, Georgians living in the Strip
quickly developed a poor reputation among their neighbors. John Ross issued the first complaint
to Hugh Montgomery, the U.S. Agent and the man responsible for enforcing the intercourse
laws. A group of “Counterfitters & horse thieves infest Nickajack Creek and Lowrey’s Ferry,”
Ross wrote, which intimated that Montgomery should do something to remedy the situation.
Montgomery received other reports that reported on the “Border interest” and the influx of
“Intruders” who had “burned & destroyed . . . improvements and crops.” He promised to patrol
a large portion of the “Georgia Fraction”—another name for the Creek Strip—in search of
“those depreidators [sic] and try to bring them to justice,” but did not sound optimistic about the
prospect of success. Montgomery and his small squad included an interpreter, a Cherokee chief
named George Sanders and four other Cherokee as well as a few soldiers. When they arrived in
the Strip, they “Labour[ed]” with “Burning houses & fences & cutting down corn.” Because of
the “extreme heat, hard labor, & bad accommodations,” Montgomery took ill and had to call off
the whole operation. All told, the federal force found eleven families residing in the Creek Strip,
which included nine large “under cultivation.” Montgomery reported to the Secretary of War
that he burned every house occupied by white intruders that he came across.4
The following spring, Montgomery again traversed the Strip in hopes of engaging in the
“extremely odious” work of removing white intruders. His second venture apparently met with
little success because two years later, in early 1829, more problems occurred in the area as
American settlers continued to move into the land despite uncertainty over property rights.
When the Cherokee sub-agent traveled to the border he found Georgians “rapidly settling,”
John Ross to Hugh Montgomery, December 27, 1825, in Gary Moulton, ed. Papers of John Ross (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 1: 110; Hugh Montgomery to the Committee & Council of the Cherokee
Nation, September 26, 1826, Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, NARA, RG 75,
M208, Reel 10; Hugh Montgomery to James Barbour, July 21, 1826, Letters Received by the Office of Indian
Affairs, 1824-1881, NARA, RG 75, M234, Roll 72; James G. Williams to Hugh Montgomery, July 2, 1827, ibid.
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while a group of at least seventy men from Alabama had moved east into the Strip and had
“chosen places for settlement.” One backcountry resident, Jack Leathers, himself an intruder in
the Strip and charter member of the Pony Club, told Montgomery that the subagent had not
been within thirty miles of his property because other intruders had “frightened him off.”
Leathers reported that over 400 white families lived in the Strip, while Montgomery believed that
at least 100 families had taken up residence there. He issued a stern warning to the intruders in
the Creek Strip, urging them to “remove immediately” and “save themselves as well as the
government trouble & expense.” Other than that, Montgomery maintained no pretenses about
his power to keep intruders out. Understanding that his meager force stationed at New Echota
could do little to uphold the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation, Montgomery minced no words
in his recommendation to the Secretary of War: “I have no expectation that they can be kept off,
without the aid of a military force.”5
For the legitimate settlers living close to the Creek Strip, the problem was not so much the
number of intruders but their character. One resident from neighboring DeKalb County and
owner of sixteen slaves, Alston H. Greene, complained that the occupants of the Creek Strip used
their homes as “Harbers for stolen property.” Greene wanted upstanding neighbors, “good men
who would rent those places & would pay for them.” He proposed to act as Gilmer’s agent (for
no compensation) “in order to get rid of the Poney Club & others of suspicious character.”
Greene reiterated many of the problems found in the other border counties regarding the
character of those who bred disorder and the need for good citizens to counteract their abuses.
Further, his complaints also connected the maintenance of order to a landholding, virtuous

5 Hugh Montgomery to John Eaton, April 2, 1829, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 18241881, Roll 72; Hugh Montgomery to Secretary of War, March 3, 1829, “Intrusion on Cherokee Land”, H. Doc 89
(Serial Vol. 197-3) 21st Congress, 1st Session (1830), 8.
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population.6 Greene’s account of the criminal activities in the Creek Strip accounted for the
origins of the Pony Club. Though it did not form until 1829, the Pony Club’s origins were found
in the rampant backcountry violence and in the confusing tangle of sovereignty over the Creek
Strip.
The Club, however, became much more proficient in their theft of Cherokee property
than the unorganized frontier criminals who acted individually or in small groups. They posed a
more dangerous threat to Cherokee sovereignty, for if the natives could not eject a band of
thieves their claim to territorial sovereignty rang hollow. As the rightful owners of the Creek
Strip, Cherokee leaders had a difficult time dealing with the influx of whites residing there. Many
of the settlers who had moved into the Creek Strip, even those with honest intentions, ran afoul
of federal law and should not have had access to land. Several families of Georgians thought they
had legally purchased their land and improvements from Creek families who had immigrated to
Indian Territory in present-day Oklahoma. Though the white buyers felt that they held legal title
to the land because money had changed hands, the intercourse acts and treaties concluded
between the United States and the Creek prevented individual American citizens from
purchasing land or improvements from Indians. Federal law specified that only treaty negotiators
could legally dispossess Indians of their land and only after they had made payment to the
National Council. The Treaty of Washington stipulated that natives who made improvements to
the land would receive compensation from the federal government. Many an émigré received
compensation for the improvements from two sources, once by the government and once by
white settlers. After 1827, any Cherokee emigrants living in the Creek Strip, or the rest of the
Cherokee Nation for that matter, who sold their improvements to white settlers not only broke
6 Alston H. Greene to George R. Gilmer, January 14, 1831, Box 49, Folder 11, Telamon Cuyler
Collection, MS 1170, Hagrett Rare Book & Manuscript Collection, University of Georgia, Athens, GA.
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federal regulations, but they also infringed upon the Cherokee Constitution that banned such
transactions.7
Without any clear indication of
sovereignty, the Creek Strip attracted
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settlers who caused numerous
problems, threatened frontier order,
and created conditions favorable to the
success of the Pony Club. Within the
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Cherokee leaders found gold seekers,
white farmers, as well as horse thieves.
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of those professions to make end’s
meet. The influx of transient gold seekers allowed men to congregate together and coalesce into
the Pony Club. Early in the gold rush, some of them decided that making money by taking
Cherokee property looked more appealing than hunting for gold in frigid mountain streams. It is
uncertain how exactly the Club came together or who controlled its actions. Still, it threatened
frontier order and defied state and national laws.
The Pony Club had its beginnings not only in the chaos that spawned frontier violence and the
confusion wrought by the border controversy regarding the Creek Strip, but also in the peculiar
7 “An act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers,”
act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139-146.
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demographic conditions of Carroll County. Formed in December 1826 from the last remnants of
the Creek Nation, Carroll County quickly emerged as a refuge for criminals and land
speculators, as well as those who sought to make something of themselves in a more honest
fashion. Called the state’s “last frontier” by one historian, Carroll County saw its share of
violence and turmoil as it slowly transitioned from an area with Creek and Cherokee residents to
a county inhabited primarily by whites and their slaves.8 Much like Hall County, Carroll County
also exhibited social and economic inequality: over 80 percent of households in Carroll County
did not own any slaves; households that did include slaves usually had just one. Carroll’s location
on recently ceded Creek lands at the confluence of Alabama, Georgia, and the Cherokee Nation
made it a particularly desirable location because much of its soil had never cultivated cotton.
Carroll also had peculiar demographic features, namely a significant number of Cherokee
families who legally resided within the
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who enumerated the Cherokee residing in Carroll listed them as free persons of color, which
corresponded to the way the extension law classified them. Of the 3,419 people living in Carroll
in 1830, the Census denominated 208 as free people of color and 487 as slaves. Carroll County,
therefore, had a triracial social system that contrasted with the typical white-black dichotomy
encountered by southerners. Of the two hundred or so Cherokee who resided within Carroll, the
overwhelming majority did not own slaves. Still, the presence of Cherokee families who owned
slaves upset the idea of racial order. Their presence also allowed for a greater degree of
intercultural cooperation between Carroll’s white citizens and their Cherokee neighbors to
enforce a racial hierarchy.9
Cherokee leaders, though, had other ideas about the Pony Club’s origins. Framing the growth of
the Club not as the result of borderland lawlessness but as a conspiracy by power-hungry
Georgians, the Cherokee saw the Club as an extension of state authority and symptomatic of the
depths to which the state would go to acquire native land. With their recent declaration of
sovereignty, the Cherokee had the most at stake in claiming jurisdiction over the Strip. Some
Cherokee leaders suspected that the Pony Club was nothing more than a front by state leaders to
engender chaos and thereby force the Cherokee into removal. According to Elias Boudinot, the
editor of the Cherokee Phoenix, white citizens from Carroll “are still flocking in and possessing the
land. Many of the most notorious members of the ‘Poney club’ are no doubt foremost in this
business.” For Boudinot and other Cherokee, the lawlessness wrought by the horse thieves was all
part of an “expeditious” method of removing the rightful landowners. By setting “loose such a
community upon us,” Boudinot declared, the “honorable” state of Georgia complicity approved
of their methods and saw the Pony Club as a state-sanctioned scheme of intimidation. In contrast
9 Carroll County schedule, 1830 U.S. Census, as well as University of Virginia Historical Census Browser,
http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/index.html (Accessed September 20, 2011).
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to the Cherokee, Georgians saw a conspiracy afoot when they argued that the “chiefs, headmen,
and warriors” of the Cherokee Nation comprised the rank and file of the Pony Club. Such a
supposition worried Georgians because it implied a weakness in the white polity if it allowed an
inferior group to exert power in the borderlands.10
Conspiracies aside, Carroll County’s location at the confluence of state and national borders, its
proximity to the Creek Strip, and a domestic Cherokee population provided the perfect
opportunity for a band of thieves to coalesce. With plenty of Cherokee property available, the
ability to cross permeable boundaries, and the legacy of frontier crime as its backdrop, Carroll
County proved fertile ground for a more powerful organization to evolve from its rather loose
beginnings in the world of frontier crime. The transformation began in February 1830 when a
Cherokee squadron burned down the homes of white intruders in the Creek Strip and expelled
them back into Georgia. The new direction the Club took stemmed from this incident and most
of their exploits after that involved beatings, shootings, and intimidation not just aimed at the
Cherokee but at members of the white community who disapproved of their methods.
Prompted by threats to their sovereignty in the form of intruders in the Creek Strip and
with no aid forthcoming from the federal government, the Cherokee decided to act on their own.
Hugh Montgomery’s attempts to rid the Strip of intruders in 1826, 1827, and 1829, had all
failed. With no additional aid forthcoming from President Jackson, the Cherokee National
Council sought to take a more active approach to defending its borders and regulating the people
who resided within them. The National Council authorized John Ross to remove a group of
intruders who had taken up residence in homes vacated by those Cherokee who had voluntarily
removed to the Arkansas Territory. In February 1830, a group of Cherokee citizens “with all
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possible lenity and humanity” expelled eighteen white families who had paid for the land.
Convinced “that if the houses were not destroyed, the intruders would not go away,” the
Cherokee “determined on the expediency of setting fire” to the homes, but not before they let the
families remove their bedding, cookware, and other movable property. When federal forces had
previously combined with some Indians to set fire to houses occupied by intruders, Georgians
had more or less acquiesced and left, if only to return once the troops left.11
Such compliance would not occur when the Cherokee sought to replicate Montgomery’s
stern actions. News of the Cherokee retaliation spread into neighboring Carroll County, and the
next night, February 4, a posse of at least twenty armed men, led by the sheriff of Carroll
County, entered Cherokee land and arrested four Cherokee men who had taken part in the
house-burnings and expulsion. The four native men had become drunk on whiskey before the
posse caught them and their condition prevented them from defending themselves. One, The
Waggon, was beaten with the butt of a musket, while another, Chuwoyee, who was too drunk to
stand, suffered a severe beating and was lashed to a horse so his captors could bring him to
Carrollton. After he fell from the horse several times, the Georgians beat Chuwoyee “most
barbarously” until he died. The posse continued on to Carrollton, but not before they dumped
the “shockingly mangled” body on the road for any passerby to see. The remaining three natives
taken to Carrollton soon eluded their captors, but in the scuffle The Waggon suffered a stab in
the chest by a rough frontiersman known to the Cherokee as Old Philpot. There is no evidence
to suggest that the sheriff at this time was acting in concert with the Pony Club. However, his

11 The entire account of the settlers’s expulsion, Chuwoyee’s murder and the subsequent events is recounted
in a letter from John Ross to Elias Boudinot, Cherokee Phoenix, February 17, 1830, 2.
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actions do show how effectively local authorities could terrorize the Cherokee under the guise of
the extension law.12
That same day, Allen G. Fambrough, Governor Gilmer’s appointed advisor in the county
and the foremost prosecutor in Carrollton, informed the governor of the steps taken by the
sheriff. “[T]he sheriff of our county will set out today with a company of twenty men to take the
company of house-burners or so many as we have been able to designate, which is nine.” Upon
the sheriff’s return, Fambrough offered a glowing account of the foray into the Nation. The
“Indians were much affrightened” when the sheriff’s posse approached, wrote Fambrough. He
did admit, though, that the posse made a hasty retreat when it came under fire. “One white man
though a native of the nation whirled and fired his riffle [sic] at the crowd and some one of the
company shot at him but no Injury done.” When he learned that Carroll’s sheriff had sought out
the Cherokee squadron, Gilmer regretted “that any of the citizens of the state should have placed
themselves out of the full protection of its laws by going” into the Creek Strip, “until its
possession was peaceable obtained.” Though he maintained that the state’s “sovereign character”
would soon extend over the Strip and its inhabitants, by February 1830 it had not. The extension
law did not go into effect until June, so the sheriff and his posse had no legal authority to send his
posse into the Strip. Furthermore, the state legislature had already given its “silent assent” to a
War Department note reiterating that the Cherokee, and not the state, had sovereignty over the
Strip.13
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Cherokee Phoenix, February 17, 1830, 2.

13 Allen G. Fambrough to George Gilmer, February 8, 1830, Cherokee Letters, 1:204. Fambrough was also
awarded a colonelcy in the state militia for his service to the governor. See Augusta Chronicle, February 3, 1830, 2;
Allen G. Fambrough to George Gilmer, February 21, 1830, Cherokee Letters, 1:206; George R. Gilmer to Allen G.
Fambrough, February 15, 1830, Governor’s Letter Books, 1829-1831, Drawer 62, Box 64, GDAH.
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After the Cherokee expelled the intruders, the Pony Club altered its tactics. Beginning in
1830, the Club moved out of the Creek Strip and into Carroll County where it began to exert
undue influence over civil authorities in Carrollton. By controlling members of the local county
authority, the Pony Club could expand its illegal activities and remain unmolested by state and
local authorities. By appropriating the authority vested in the county by the extension law, the
Club could use violence and intimidation against the Cherokee to subject the natives to the
Club’s power. In this regard, the Cherokee who saw a conspiracy in the Pony Club’s growing
power were partially correct. The Club never had a mandate from the state authorizing it to
pillage the frontier, but its members could count on state law to provide them immunity from
legal recourse.
How the courtship between hardened criminals and supposedly upright county officials
occurred is not recorded. Whether through intimidation or bribery, though, the Club, by 1832,
counted, for starters, the sheriff’s deputy, several constables and justices of the peace, at least two
high-ranking prosecutors, and not a few militiamen in its ranks. Fambrough served as the best
example of a high-ranking official who had been co-opted by the Pony Club. Fambrough entered
his post with good intentions, but soon enough began acting in concert with the Club. In July
1830, Fambrough breathlessly wrote the governor of a scheme undertaken by several whites in
Carrollton who passed fraudulent bank notes and bills of sale to Cherokee residents. One of
Fambrough’s informants, a white citizen of Carroll, planned on testifying against a Justice of the
Peace, Ramson P. Boswell, and four or five of his co-conspirators. Fambrough had also planned
on using Cherokee informants but the extension law of 1828 prevented Cherokee from testifying
against whites in court. Boswell and his confederates never stood trial for their crimes because the
witness never testified against the Club, probably out of fear. In spite of Fambrough’s efforts to
seek out criminals, he did not prove immune to the growing power of the Pony Club. His
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seduction by the Club occurred rapidly, and it stands to reason, like the witness who would not
testify, that Fambrough was threatened with bodily harm if he did not cooperate.14
Every good criminal organization needs a better lawyer to prevent its members from
serving time, and it seems that the Pony Club found that lawyer in Fambrough. In the same way
that the state couched its land grab in legal terms, the Club sought to use state law to their
benefit. As early as 1828, Fambrough defended noted criminals and future Pony Club members
in Carroll’s Superior Court. In September 1828, Fambrough defended Richard Philpot from a
suit filed by Jonathan Davis for a small debt. The jury foreman, Samuel Leathers (a relative of
Hugh Montgomery’s informant) another noted horse thief and Pony Club member, and the rest
of the jury found for Philpot. Even though his peers found him innocent, Philpot swore to Davis
that he would settle the debt “in trade”—an admission of guilt—yet proving that some honor
among thieves existed. The date of this trial is crucial, for it occurred before the Club’s
formation. It did, in any case, showcase strategies Fambrough later perfected, namely the
intimidation of juries by placing vociferous thieves as jury foremen. Such a strategy, in theory,
allowed Fambrough to secure nearly any verdict he desired. The Club’s infiltration of the
county’s legal system helped explain why it proved so successful. The feat of controlling the court
system, however, had less to do with reality and more to do with the perception of the Club’s
power. What success it did enjoy came from Fambrough’s legal prowess, though even he found it
impossible to fix every trial and stack every jury.15
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By 1832, the system worked well enough and it propelled the Pony Club into a position of
power. In a report to the governor, one state agent noted the impossibility of fully understanding
“the outrages and injuries which the association called the Poney Club” had inflicted upon the
frontier community. “Property stolen, honest men abused, and the civil authorities resisted were
matters of no unusual occurrence.” Indeed, so powerful had they become that when other
residents filed charges, the Pony Club could assert its influence to ensure that securing a
conviction was difficult. “Resort has been had to legal process, but all in vain; for out of the
numberless prosecutions which have been instituted against the confederates of the Poney Club,
not one has been successful. They are always present in sufficient numbers to swear each other
clear of any offence with which they may be accused.”16 The Macon Telegraph reported that the
Club, because it had “settled so numerously in neighborhoods” could elect “constables and
justices of the peace from their own body.” If any member “was seen marauding,” due process
against him was impossible to achieve because his comrades would ensure his discharge from any
“exculpatory affidavits.” Anyone who brought suit against Club members, moreover, instead
faced “fictitious charges” leveled “by the officers of the peace.”17
Carroll’s residents in 1832 had the impression that the Pony Club controlled the juries
and verdicts of both the inferior and superior courts, though the Club’s control was never as
extensive as believed. For four years, Fambrough defended members of the noted gang of horse
thieves. But even for a lawyer so skilled as he had difficulty controlling the verdicts rendered
against the most notorious members of the Pony Club. His most problematical client, Calaway
Burke, had a violent reputation and in the span of two years was sued at least four separate times
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by other residents of Carroll County. In early February 1831, Burke lost a suit and had to pay a
creditor $31; in April he was sued three times and lost two of those cases and had to pay almost
two hundred dollars worth of debts and court fees.18 The relationship between Fambrough and
his unruly client would play a larger role in the downfall of the Pony Club, but up until 1831, the
two used the legal system as a tool to aid the Club—even if they only achieved measured success.
In the same April session of the Carroll County Superior Court in which he was sued in three
separate cases, Calaway Burke also served as the jury foreman in an important case involving two
known backcountry criminals, Philip Bosworth and Reuben Philpot, one of the men who had
beaten Chuwoyee. According to the suit, Philpot “Injured and damaged” Bosworth in March
1830 on the public road where he accosted Bosworth “with force & arms.” Philpot pulled
Bosworth from his horse, and “did then and there with fists sticks stone and knives . . . bruise &
wound” the victim, and commenced “striking him on his head face heart shoulders & other parts
of his body & by biteing and gouging with teeth thumbs and fingers,” which eventually “crippled
and disabled” Bosworth. The jury awarded Bosworth fifty-five dollars, though he had brought
suit against Philpot for ten times that sum.19
In some instances, especially when particularly odious residents with poor reputations
behaved in egregiously violent ways, juries counteracted the Pony Club. By April 1831, when
Calaway Burke was sued four times, it appeared that the center of the Club’s power—Carroll
County’s courthouse—was no longer the safe haven it once had been. Though the Club did not
enjoy a perfect success record in court, its ability to put noted Club members like Calaway Burke
John Robinson vs. William and Calaway Burke, February 3, 1831, Carroll County Superior Court
Minutes, 1828-1833, 210-211; John Thomas v. Calaway Burke, April 1831, ibid., 241-243; John Thomas v.
Calaway Burke, April 1831, ibid., 243-245; Arthur Alexander v. Calaway Burke, April 1831, ibid., 245-246.
19 Philip Bosworth v Reuben Philpot, April 28, 1831, Carroll County Superior Court Minutes, 1828-1833, 234.
The fight between Bosworth and Philpot resembled much of the white-on-white violence that permeated the
antebellum South frontier. See, for example, Elliot Gorn, “’Gouge and Bite, Pull Hair and Scratch’: The Social
Significance of Fighting in the Southern Backcountry,” American Historical Review 90 (February 1985): 18-43.
18

95

into the jury box gave the impression that the Pony Club controlled the county’s judicial system.
The fact that Philpot had only received a fine and not a jail sentence underscored the Club’s
power. That county residents believed that the Club controlled the courts and other elected
officials only added to their frustration stemming from the increasing amount of theft and
violence.
With a notoriously corrupt judicial system, Carroll’s residents became increasingly
concerned for the prospects of the public peace in their county. As fall gave way to winter in
1830, a rash of shootings and murders erupted near the border, but always in Cherokee country.
In November, Carroll residents John A. Craddock, his two sons, and William Young traveled
from within the Cherokee Nation to their homes in Carroll when another group of men
comprised of Johnston Lee, Jim Lee, and Sam Scott laid an ambush. William Young “fell
desperately wounded.” The victims left their fallen friend to fend for himself and fled for their
lives. Once their targets fled, Sam Scott “Stamp’d” the injured Young in the face and chest until
he “Expir’d.” According to the author of the report, Jacob R. Brooks, the perpetrators hailed
from the Cherokee Nation though he did not offer an explanation of why the Craddocks and
William Young had ventured there. Brooks also reported on “a most Horrid Murder” that had
recently taken place within the Nation. He knew few of the facts, only that a white man’s body
had been found burned along with most of his personal papers. The grisly discovery stoked the
fears of white residents in Carroll County who fretted over the outbreak of more killings. Brooks
confirmed the wary frontier mood to Gilmer: “Your excellency will perceive that a Crisis has
arrive[d],” a time, he felt, when “Georgia must act efficiently or Submit. The excitement on this
frontier is very Great.”20

Jacob R. Brooks to George R. Gilmer, November 12, 1830, Cherokee Letters, 2:242-243. It should be noted
that Brooks was a close political ally of Gilmer’s and would soon enlist in the Georgia Guard, where he attained the
20

96

Immediately after the discovery of the burned corpse in mid-November, the Carroll
County deputy sheriff, Henry Curtis, led a small group into the Cherokee Nation “on lawful
business” to “levy an execution on some property:” horses claimed by Thomas York to have
been stolen. Major Giles Boggess, one of the leading citizens of Carroll County and officer of the
county militia, and definitely not a member of the Pony Club, accompanied the two men. The
three men stopped for the night at an abandoned cabin, and awoke to find themselves
surrounded by a party of nearly twenty Cherokee warriors. According to Boggess, the Cherokee
arrested the three white men, “securely tied & forced [us] to put off to the [Etowah] Mission
immediately without being allowed the privilege of our horses.” When they arrived at mission,
the missionaries released the men from their “strings,” but with no authority over them, sent the
Georgians, along with their escort, to a nearby detachment of U.S. artillery under the command
of Lt. Fowler at the Sixes mine.21
Fowler informed the sheriff that “for some years” the people of the Cherokee Nation near
Carroll County had been “mutch harased by a people cauled the poney Club,” so Fowler had
authorized any Cherokee living along the Etowah River to arrest “all whites who are intruders or
those who atampt to Commit depradations on the parsons or property of Indians with in the
Nation.” Such a directive was authorized under the intercourse acts, though usually federal
troops and not individual Cherokee carried it out. So when Curtis, Boggess, and York entered
the Nation with a warrant to seize two horses that had supposedly been stolen, the Cherokee had
simply followed Fowler’s command. Though the Cherokee did not recognize Curtis or Boggess,
“but recognizing yorke and nowing that avast quontitey of thare property had passed thru his
rank of 1st Sergeant.
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hands,” they arrested all three “as a parte of the poney Club.”22 At this point, accounts of what
followed diverge. Boggess stated that Fowler eventually sent the sheriff and his gang to a major at
Camp Eaton who released them and did nothing to prevent them from taking the horses by
force—aside from treating the men from Carroll “verry scornfully.” The Phoenix claimed that
Fowler sent the men to his superior who ruled in their favor and allowed them to take the two
horses, but then jailed York for a night.23
In December, a party of twenty-five mounted men, a “Considerable number of the
acnolleged poney Club,” entered the Nation seeking to capture the Cherokee who had arrested
the white men from Carrollton. Led by Giles Boggess, the mounted company came upon a group
of Cherokee children and kidnapped “a lad of a boute sixteen tyed him and took him and the
baste horse belonging to the family and maid thare escape.” They returned a second time,
chased and shot at two young Cherokee boys, and proceeded to kidnap another one who they
kept for more than five days.24 Underscoring the connections between the Pony Club and the
civil authorities in Carroll, the sixteen-year-old boy they kidnapped, Joseph Beanstick, who,
according the Cherokee Phoenix, “Had no agency in the arrest of Curtis, Bogus, and York” was
jailed for “four weeks during the coldest time of this winter, with no other covering than a cloak
and an old saddle blanket.”25
The interesting aspect of the posse’s ride into Cherokee country concerned the group’s
makeup. Not all of the men in Boggess’s posse were part of the Pony Club. It appeared that they
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could set aside their personal animosity in certain instances, which included terrorizing Cherokee
youths. One commenter on the posse’s ride into the Nation noted, “all parteys Can unite in the
opraising of an Indian,” suggesting that by December 1830 two separate camps existed in Carroll
County: the Pony Club and another group opposed to its actions, and that joint ventures into the
backcountry could halt their skirmishing.26 Their shared desire to rid the backcountry of its
native inhabitants shone through in displays of “martial exploit…on their return march.” With
Beanstick in tow, Boggess and his companions “would occasionally form themselves on the road
and discharge their fire-arms as a signal over the Cherokee youth in captivity.” The growing
factionalism and opposition to the Pony Club within Carroll County represented the displeasure
with the Club’s power. In spite of the animosity, though, in December 1830, the two sides united
to kidnap a Cherokee boy.27
The confusing tangle of relationships between the Pony Club, citizens of Carroll, and the
Cherokee made regulating the social world of the backcountry increasingly difficult. That
Boggess, the representative of law would willingly work with the Pony Club in an effort to
oppress the Cherokee demonstrated the hierarchy of priorities present in the minds of
borderlands residents. In 1830, the threat of Cherokee reprisals and incessant theft weighed on
their minds. With the menace of the Pony Club growing, Carroll residents began to see the Club
as the primary threat to stability and safety. In December Major Boggess and twenty-four Carroll
County militiamen sent a petition to the governor asking for “the liberty of forming a company &
to furnish arms for the Equipment of Sixty horsemen.” The men would all “still continue to doe
military duty in their respective districts & hold themselves in constant readiness” to aid the
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sheriff in implementing the law. Because the “distance being so great & the progress of the
malitia so tardy that offenders can scarsely ever be apprehended,” Boggess and the other
militiamen felt that a special mounted company would make more sense than cumbersome
infantry. Boggess’s intent to capture more horse thieves partly explains why he entered the
Nation with less than desirable company. Many of the militia’s responsibilities in frontier Georgia
rested on its duty of aiding the sheriff round up criminals or serve warrants. So it would not have
been out of the ordinary for Boggess to assist Curtis with his duties. Boggess, then, had not joined
the Pony Club, but he did concern himself with the implementation of the law—even if he had to
assist Thomas York secure some of his property. While he certainly held the Pony Club in low
regard, he cared even less for the Cherokee.28
Even when a respectable militia officer pushed for more forceful measures to quell the
Pony Club, state leaders refused to act, perhaps because Governor Gilmer did not believe the
reports coming from Carrollton. After all, his advisor, Allen Fambrough, defended Club
members in court. Content to wait for civil authority to establish order, Gilmer saw no need to
resort to more forceful measures. Others saw the Pony Club as a pressing issue that needed state
attention. The editor of the Macon Telegraph argued that only “a strong military force can arrest
the evil while the county remains in its present condition.” The paper urged the legislature “to
rid the country of this horde of thieves and counterfeiters.” Indeed, the Pony Club’s actions had
only become emboldened because of a lack of enforcement. During the election of 1829, “a
number of the Ponyites presented themselves at the polls in Carroll county, and offered to vote!”
For the Macon Telegraph’s correspondent, the connection between the expectations and rights of
the citizenry was clear. Because the Ponyites “plunder and pillage where and whomever they
28 Giles S. Boggess to George Gilmer, December 1830, Cherokee Letters, 2:247. State law permitted justices of
the peace and sheriffs to use militia companies in the apprehension of criminals. See Augustin S. Clayton, The office
and duty of a justice of the peace. . . . (Milledgeville: S. Grantland, 1819).
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please,” they posed a threat to self-government. When the county magistrate tendered them to
swear to the state constitution, the Club members assaulted the magistrate and “upset the ballot
box,” not because “they had any objection at all to swearing, but because their honor was
offended.” A few days after, the Ponyites rode into Campbellton in pursuit of a magistrate who
had reclaimed a stolen horse from one of their members. The Club caught up with him,
“violently assaulted and beat the officer, insulted the inhabitants, and galloped off again in
triumph.” Even though the extension law had gone into effect on June 1, 1830, the Pony Club
still ignored it and few civil authorities would willingly take on the club. The editor from Macon
put it bluntly: “The extermination of this nest of pirates is of more importance to the State than
the preservation of the gold mines.”29
The citizens of Carroll County agreed. Though Gilmer was willing to wait for the border
counties to implement the extension law, those living along the frontier did not evince such
magnanimity. Beginning in 1831 when citizens convicted Pony Club men in county court, the
people of Carroll County began to restore order themselves. In the wake of his experiences in the
backcountry, it had become apparent to Major Boggess that Curtis and his successor Benjamin
Merrill had sold out to the Pony Club, that no real order existed in the county, and that someone
had to stand up to the abusive outlaws. In early 1832, Boggess ran for county sheriff and his
candidacy gained widespread support from “honest” citizens. Carroll’s residents, concurrent to
the more formalized actions involving elections and juries, began a campaign of retaliation
against the Pony Club. Calling themselves Regulators or Slicks, citizens from across Carroll
County and the other border counties joined with Cherokee men and began to assert order
through violence. Eventually, their efforts proved effective and the Pony Club ceased its
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operations. While the Slicks beat the Pony Club out of the county, the real success at
implementing order came when Major Boggess and other citizens took back the levers of power
in county government. The Pony Club would not relinquish power so easily. The fight for
control over Carrollton’s politics became so contentious that an actual street brawl broke out
between the Pony Club and the supporters of the new sheriff. Armed men roamed the town and
by the end of voting day a riot ensued in front of the polling place. In the end, Boggess won, and
according to one historian “this band of early outlaws diminished after 1832.”30
For Carroll’s citizens, ridding the county of the Pony Club threat required more than a
new sheriff in town. Much of the Club’s potency came from the fact that they preyed on
Cherokee who could not take legal recourse against them, and that that they had near immunity
from the justice system because they stacked juries and had civil authorities in their ranks. Once
Boggess became sheriff that arrangement changed. Indeed, it appeared that the Slicks cooperated
with the Cherokee to restore order to the frontier. Not sensing how much their power had
diminished, the Club resorted to their old tricks and tried to intimidate a jury to defame the
sheriff. After the election Pony Club members charged Boggess with assault and attempted
murder for his role in the street fight that occurred on election day. However, when the jury
received the charges, they refused to accuse Boggess of any crime and applauded his efforts to
clean up the town. The jury, instead, accused two lawyers, including Fambrough—the
governor’s agent in the county—of conspiring with the Pony Club. The lawyer resented the
charge. When he read the same charges in the Macon Telegraph connecting him to the Pony Club,
he dared the “FLAGICIOUS LIAR AND POLTROON” to attack him in a manner more
befitting a man of honor. Further, Fambrough, a proud member of Gilmer’s Troup faction,
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noted that the Telegraph offered its support to the Clark party and no doubt speculated on his
connections to the Club to “throw contempt upon that party, in state politics, in whose ranks I
am proud to be found.”31
The pro-Clark Macon Telegraph, though it certainly was out to score a political victory,
claimed the connection between Fambrough and the Pony Club not for overt political motives,
but because a jury had named him as the Club’s benefactor. Much of the jury’s resentment
toward Fambrough came from a case in which citizens of the county connected him to the Club.
In June 1832, Fambrough was present when his erstwhile client and member of the Pony Club,
Calaway Burke, was shot and killed by one of the county’s “honest citizens,” John Goodwin.
Fambrough, according to one witness, “was present when Burke was shot armed as his friend.”
Accompanied by Major John A. Jones of the county militia, the two had caused “most of the
excitement” then plaguing the county, and “together with some of their friends, were the only
persons who appear constantly armed in public.”32 By implying that only dangerous men
appeared armed in public, the author of the report sought to discount the character of Jones and
Fambrough, and, by extension, the rest of the Pony Club and further contributed to the swing in
public opinion against the Club.
Though an empowered jury had stood up to Fambrough, the rest of the Pony Club
membership still excelled at concealing their identities. No one knew with any degree of certainty
the extent of the Club or the rank in civil government to which its members had climbed. One
report had their numbers ranging “from one hundred and fifty to two hundred members.” At
any one time, though, no more than “twenty-five or thirty” men were seen together, even at their
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primary rendezvous. When spotted by a traveler, “they dropped like turtles off a log” and
vanished into the swamps near Hominy Creek.33 Other than Fambrough, York, Burke, Curtis,
Major Jones, and Old Philpot, determining the membership of the Pony Club proved difficult for
several reasons. Few men walked around Carrollton announcing their allegiance; fewer still took
legal recourse or had their names recorded; others employed aliases. Some Georgians speculated
that the Cherokee comprised much of the Club’s membership. One account mentioned the
ethnicity of the members, claiming their ranks “have been maid up parte of white and parte of
red men,” which could explain why they could hide their identities so well.34 Although it would
make sense that some form of multiethnic cooperation existed between thieves, no other accounts
confirmed this report. Stealing horses had long been a part of Cherokee culture, but raids usually
occurred against enemies and not neighbors.35 Cherokee men, more than likely, sought reprisals
against the Pony Club, and reclaimed much of their property from members—which explains
why York had to search for his property in Cherokee territory with Boggess and Curtis.
Beginning in 1831 and into 1832 when the “honest citizens” began to fight back against
the outrages of the Pony Club, discerning its members became a much easier task. Pony Club
members who had crossed paths with the Slicks bore the telltale signs of Pony Club membership:
flayed flesh. The Slicks took their name from their favorite form of punishment when they caught
up to horse thieves, slicking, or whipping the backs of criminals with hickory switches upwards of
fifty or even a hundred times. Drawing on the legacy of colonial social movements that sought to
regulate backcountry life, Carroll County’s Regulators shared similar methods, if not motives,

33 Bonner,

Georgia’s Last Frontier, 32-33.

34 William Thompson to George Gilmer, December 27, 1830, Cherokee Letters, 2:263; Macon Telegraph,
October 16, 1830, 3.
35

Perdue, Cherokee Women, 123-24.

104

with their namesake. The most successful regulations occurred between 1768 and 1771 in several
North Carolina piedmont counties as an effort at establishing local control over an unfair legal
system and political structure dominated by lowcountry aristocrats.36 The Slicks wanted to take
control of a world quickly slipping from their grasp because of the lawlessness controlled by the
Pony Club and the ineffectiveness of both state and federal authorities in bringing about an
ordered society. Rather than wait for an unresponsive state leadership to impose order,
individuals in the backcountry banded together in a last ditch effort at recreating peaceful
settlement. For the Regulators, “their [sic] seemed to be no other alternative left, but for the
honest part of the community to subdue or expel the Poney Club, or themselves abandon the
Country.”37 Their regulation sought to impose the values of the community against those who
made them a mockery; a charivari bent on restoring order.
The most interesting facet of the Slicks, though, was not their namesake but their chosen
form of punishment. Slicking had long been a method of punishment in Cherokee culture and
very quickly became the tell-tale sign of a horse thief had been visited by the Regulators.38 That a
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vigilante group on the border of the Cherokee Nation took up a native form of punishment
revealed much about the Regulators, their motives, methods, and about backcountry life in
general. The permeability of the boundary between Georgia and the Nation facilitated crosscultural communication between the Cherokee and their white neighbors, and it made sense for
neighbors who had a stake in the region’s stability to draw on a variety of cultural practices to
protect their homes and families. Adopting a Cherokee form of punishment demonstrated the
high level of hybridity and syncretism present along the frontier. Both societies, though,
interpreted the punishments meted out by the Slicks in different ways.
Many sectors of the polyglot backcountry population took part in regulating the values
and behavior of their neighbors. All types of people, “Magistrates and Constables, Methodists,
Baptists and men of no religion, old settlers and new comers, men of respectability and men of
notorious character,” joined in the regulation around the mines where, by 1832, “A high degree
of excitement prevailed every where, reason was drowned in clamour, and the laws gave place to
the will of a furious multitude.”39 Even those across the state line in Alabama joined. By the
summer of 1832, many of the Pony Club’s efforts at acquiring new property had turned
westward as white settlers flocked onto Creek lands opened up in Alabama by the Treaty of
Indian Springs. The influx of settlers created new opportunities for the Pony Club to further
enrich its members. “From the latter State,” one reporter announced, “ponies, horses and cattle
were taken in large numbers,” and soon enough, the “spirited and sagacious” Alabamans
stealing a horse shall Receive one hundred lashes on there Bere Back; a Cow, fifty; or a hog, twenty-five…” and so
on. Quoted in McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence, 175. Slicking remained a part of Cherokee life even after Removal.
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Ozarks” (PhD diss., Louisiana State University, 2011).
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“formed themselves into a society under the cognomen Slickers or Sleeks.” Under the command of
“General Lynch,” the Slicks from Alabama “invaded our territory, observing however the greatest
respect towards persons and property, except the members of the Poney Club.” When the Slicks
did capture their quarry their retribution was swift, “sometime whipping them soundly on the
spot,” or they would protract the anticipation by taking their captive into Cherokee country and
“placing the lash in the hands of the aboriginals, who are said to leave seldom an inch of sound
skin on the posterior part of the body between heels and the neck.” According to the reporter,
the application of force had an altogether chaotic effect on the climate plaguing the
backcountry.40
The whippings inevitably brought the conflict between the Regulators and the Pony Club
to a head and eventually led the murder of Calaway Burke. In April, Burke had been taken from
his home and detained for several days. When released, Burke crossed paths with one of his
captors, Francis Adams, in Carroll County and tried to drag him to the courthouse when a Slick
from Alabama, John Goodwin intervened. As the event intensified, more men arrived at the
scene, some drew pistols and declared their intent on protecting either Adams or Burke. Both
sides agreed that a justice of the peace needed to sort out the mess, and so a small party went
looking for one. The Slicks, however, had sent off a messenger to gather more men, while one of
the Pony Club went in search of Fambrough. Somehow, Burke managed to escape but
reappeared with Fambrough, both of them armed with pistols. At this point, the reinforcements
arrived and shot Burke in the road.41
Soon after Burke’s murder, the Slicks commenced a well-coordinated and simultaneous
40
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41 The account of Burke’s murder is recounted in the Columbus Enquirer, August 4, 1832, 3, and contains a
more detailed, though probably more imaginative account, than that of the Macon Telegraph, June 14, 1832, 3.
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series of raids targeting individuals in Carroll and Cherokee Counties, and Alabama. They beat a
man named James Upton, and another named Crawford Wright who was taken from his family,
tied to a tree, stripped, and whipped “90 or 100 lashes.” Further, the Regulators extorted a
promise from Wright that he would not “law” his persecutors, and that he would leave Georgia
within twenty days. Nine more men were whipped within a short time span, including Old
Philpot and Roberts, former a state legislator from Hall County. After the outbreak of whippings,
most of the Pony Club “made a sudden retreat,” out of the county because they had been
coerced into leaving the county while under the lash.42
In one respect, the Slicks represented the will of the white community and its desire for
order. At the most basic level, the intent of the punishments carried out by the Slicks was to
inflict pain, but they also sought to humiliate their victim by performing the punishments in
public spaces. The combination of horrific wounds and public beatings made identifying a horse
thief possible and further reinforced notions of the regulation as a direct expression of the
community’s values. Once identified, Pony Club members received stern treatment, harassment,
and vitriol from formerly agreeable neighbors. Slicking also signified mastery over an inferior in
the American South. White southerners had long used the lash as a form of punishment and
control over African American slaves. For a slave, learning to bear the lash comprised one of the
more dehumanizing and demoralizing aspects of slavery. The lash, though, had only been used
against blacks and uncooperative animals. By employing it against whites, the Regulators
completed the denigration of an accused Pony Club man: by slicking a white man, the
Regulators, in effect, compared him to a black slave not worthy of a trial by his peers, only their

42
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derision. A thrashed horse thief had been deemed unfit for the freedoms enjoyed by the rest of
the republican community.
The use of violence to compel social order, however, went against the prevalent grain of
thinking in early republican Georgia regarding the role of civil authority. The path to order in
frontier regions followed a well-worn pattern in which white settlers infringed on native ground
and used violence to compel the Indians to leave and cede their land. Using violence against
Indians was an acceptable use of force though frontiersmen generally hesitated to employ it
against other whites. The Slicks, therefore, were an anomaly in the borderlands of nineteenthcentury Georgia. The violence engaged in by the Slicks, though, had a specific purpose and
defined limits: only horse thieves received beatings and only to compel respect for the law. The
corruptibility of local authorities and through them, republican self-government, required a
corrective on the local level. In that regard, the Slicks adhered to previous regulations. Their
violent actions sought to create a more responsive local government that catered to the needs of
the local community and, more importantly, treated all members of the community equally.
By beating a thief, the Slicks also satisfied the harmonious values of the Cherokee because
the punishment created balance. True, a Cherokee farmer would not get his horse back, but the
beating satisfied Cherokee law and the edict of harmony. For example, in December 1829, a
Cherokee jury convicted Jesse Stansell, a white horse thief from Georgia, to receive fifty lashes for
stealing a horse, “which,” declared the foreman of the jury, George Saunders, whose opprobrium
of Stansell’s toughness, if not his manhood, was glaringly obvious, “was fifty less than what is
common in our country for such an offence.” Despite the state’s insistence that the Cherokee
could no longer dole out legal punishments, Saunders and the rest of the jury had no qualms
about executing Cherokee sovereignty: “We acted agreeably to the laws of our country in
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punishing the man.”43 For Saunders, the matter proved a simple one. Stansell had broken the
law within the Cherokee Nation, and faced punishment according to its laws. Georgia’s
authorities did not see it that way. Stansell returned to Hall County where he gave a deposition
to the judge Augustin Clayton, and declared that the Cherokee had detained him upwards of
thirty hours “without any legal authority,” stripped Stansell of his clothes, tied him to a tree, “and
inflicted on the bare back . . . with large hickory switches fifty lashes, to the great effusion of his
blood, the laceration of his back and sides, leaving deep wounds, gashes and bruises all the
same.”44
For the most part, 1832 marked the end of the Pony Club and of the Regulators, too.
The Pony Club needed the acquiescence of the citizenry, but once the residents fought back their
reign came to an end. Just as the Pony Club boomed in a chaos-strewn environment, the Slicks
also needed the threat of violence and a sense of lawlessness to thrive. Once matters cooled, they
could go about building up their homes and towns, plant the next harvest, and look toward the
future. Their success ultimately rested in the widespread support that the community
demonstrated for the Slicks, even if they openly cooperated with Cherokee.
Even though the Slicks enjoyed widespread community support, no consensus existed on
their legitimacy. One editorialist, a “Citizen of Carroll,” attempted to defend the Pony Club, but
knew his efforts would prove foolhardy in the end: “No man can escape condemnation or the
opprobrium of being friendly to the poney club who dares to disapprobate the lawless career of
the regulators.”45 The “Citizen” understood the complexities of a vigilante movement. By using
extralegal violence to masquerade as the true representatives of an orderly society along the
43 Cherokee
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frontier, the Slicks had imposed their own version of legality on the residents of Carroll and
claimed legitimacy for themselves. The division within the white frontier community over the use
and applications of violence provided a useful lesson for state leaders, one that ultimately went
unheeded. Applying violence against elements of the white community, even those that went
against the predominant republican grain, proved divisive. As the state ramped up efforts to
regulate the backcountry, its actions riled backcountry residents who felt persecuted and
victimized for political reasons and exposed the irony of using violence to create order.
Throughout the early nineteenth century, Americans embraced seemingly contradictory
methods to deal with the uncertainty created by rapid social change. Many turned to moral
reform to enforce a code of community standards. Religious awakenings spurred on much of this
activity, as did the ever-changing landscape wrought by the growth of the market. In conjunction
with reform, Americans turned to mob violence to assert social control over deviant or foreign
populations. Violence against Irish immigrants, Catholic nuns, or saloon keepers united one part
of a community against another. The desire of these violent episodes was to regulate the social
and moral landscape of antebellum America. By calling themselves “Regulators,” the Slicks not
only drew upon a historical movement that had particular resonance in the southern
backcountry, but they also put themselves squarely in the camp of those who used violence as a
form of social control. Regulation, in other words, could effect order. By regulating, or using
violence to control the aberrant local population, the Slicks began a trend in the backcountry that
both federal and state officials would follow.46

On reform movements generally in the early nineteenth century, see Ronald G. Waters, American
Reformers, 1815-1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997). On the evangelical-inspired origins of reform, see Robert H.
Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). On
the growth of the market as a catalyst for reform, see Thomas Bender, ed., The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and
Abolitionism as a Problem of Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For violence as a
means of enforcing community standards, see Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, eds. American Violence: A
Documentary History (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1970), especially 298-308, 450-452. Hofstadter and Wallace
46

111

Georgia’s officials remained largely unconcerned with the outbreak of the frontier
Regulators, nor did they evince much concern for the roots problems of frontier violence.
Instead, they targeted the intruders as the region’s underlying problem and sought to halt their
activities rather than aid the citizens of Carroll County. By the summer of 1832, a general in the
state militia, John Coffee, conducted a brief investigation, but concluded that the Regulator furor
had died down. The new governor, Wilson Lumpkin, could gaze upon the events along the
frontier and congratulate himself for not having unleashed the overbearing power of the state to
control the behavior of whites. Even though he wanted state law to take hold along the frontier,
Lumpkin saw no harm in “the late disturbances in Carroll and Cherokee counties.” He
concluded “that whatever excesses may have been committed in the punishment of Bad men, the
object of the party engaged in administering speedy correction, was founded in honest & upright
motives.” In an outright snub of Fambrough, the current governor labeled him as one of the real
culprits “who had become the advisors if not the aiders and abettors of a combination of bad
men.” Good citizens, however violent they became, had brought order to the borderlands and
restored virtuous self-government to Carroll County.47
The roots of frontier violence, Carroll County’s proximity to a multitude of borders and
contested space, and its unique demographics allowed for the growth of a dangerous group of
horse thieves, the Pony Club, to thrive along Georgia’s boundary. The Club became adept at
stealing Cherokee property and selling it to white farmers or intruders. Their organization also
characterize one kind of violence as “Violence in the Name of Law, Order, and Morality,” which Richard Maxwell
Brown sees as “socially conservative” designed to maintain the status quo. Though the Slicks did seek the overthrow
of the county government, they only wanted a return to civil authority, a conservative action. They differed in their
stance on allying with Indians, something of a radical notion in Jacksonian America, though something that had
occurred to a great degree in the Cherokee-Georgia borderlands. See Richard Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence:
Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 4-5.
47 Wilson Lumpkin to Gen. John Coffee, July 14, 1832, Cherokee Letters, 2:352-53. Richard Brown argues
that the “legal illuminati” generally support vigilante movements because “vigilantes and lynch mobs acted in
response to an unsatisfactory legal system.” By condoning the Slicks, the governor and militia general acknowledged
their usefulness in restoring a functioning legal system to Carroll County. See Brown, Strain of Violence,145.
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allowed them to control aspects of the county’s civil authority. When the Club’s actions reached
a critical point, members of the backcountry community, both white and Cherokee, had united
briefly to rid themselves of the Pony Club. To do so, Slicks resorted to violent measures, which
broke up the criminal ring and undermined the state’s insistence on civil authority as the proper
way to order the backcountry. The prospects of local control and of a lasting cross-cultural
alliance waned as the immediate threat to frontier stability subsided. Frontier residents acted
forcefully against the Pony Club because they felt that the state and federal governments refused
to take action. Instead of targeting the Pony Club, though, both the state and federal authorities
sought out larger threats to republican order, mainly the thousands of gold miners who had taken
up residence within the Cherokee Nation. The Slicks demonstrated a practical application of
violence and how it could be used to create order.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL POWER, 1830-1832

Since the passage of the first intercourse law in 1790, the United States had declared its
intent to protect the borders of Indian nations from incursion by whites. As more miners invaded
Cherokee space, natives expected the federal government to fulfill its obligation to the Cherokee
people by upholding treaties and legislation. Historians characterize the federal government in
the nineteenth century as one that remained “out of sight” except at the nation’s borders, which
the army maintained. With the ongoing intrusion, the governor of Georgia asked federal forces
to use their coercive authority to uphold the intercourse acts. The targets, white men from
Georgia, did not benefit from the emboldened federal presence. Federal agents found that the
use of power to restore order upset the victims of their actions and served as a rallying cry for the
champions of limited federal interference. These protests convinced the governor to ask for the
withdrawal of federal troops and to replace them with troops from Georgia. Though brief, the
federal response temporarily succeeded in halting the intrusion. The backlash to violence against
whites led federal officials to attempt to conduct a more effective program of “voluntary”
removal though even that program failed to generate much interest. This program led to a
greater degree of cooperation between federal and state agents. Occurring simultaneously,
lawsuits filed by the Cherokee Nation in the Supreme Court sought to delay removal efforts and
triggered a showdown in the upper echelons of American government. The brief army
maneuvers showed state leaders that an organized and efficient use of violence could prove useful
when it came to regulating the backcountry population and went a long way to asserting the
sovereignty of the state.1
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The contest for sovereignty between the state, the federal government, and the Cherokee
intensified as waves of gold seekers made their way onto native ground. Framing their struggle to
retain possession of their remaining land as nothing short of an existential crisis, the Cherokee
pled with the federal government to help maintain their national borders. Though they had sent
a powerful message when they expelled whites who had taken up residence in the Creek Strip,
their inability to contend with the overwhelming scope of the intrusion undermined their claim to
nationhood. More important, the safety of their citizens was at stake because of the violent and
lawless atmosphere created by the miners whose gold-addled drive often collided violently with
Cherokee residents attempting to go about their lives.2 Simply put, whites who made their way
onto Cherokee land violated federal law, and the absence of strong federal action to shore up
Cherokee borders ensured the continuance of “flagrant outrages committed upon our peaceable
citizens and their property by intruders.”3 The Cherokee took a two-pronged approach when
dealing with the intrusion. First, they advocated for the federal government to uphold the
intercourse acts and expel white interlopes. Second, the National Council hired former Attorney
General William Wirt to bring their complaints to the federal judiciary.

2 Americans in the nineteenth century usually needed little reason to intrude upon native ground, but the
discovery of gold and other precious metals offered more of an incentive for them to do so. Aside from the rush in
Georgia, Americans in Illinois discovered deposits of lead and as miners moved in they sparked the Black Hawk
War. See, for example, John W. Hall, Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 74-85, and Kerry Trask, Black Hawk: The Battle for the Soul of America (New York: Henry Holt,
2007), 60-65. The discovery of gold in California would have drastic implications for Native populations. On the
thousands of international immigrants who poured into California, upsetting environmental and social landscapes,
see H.W. Brands, The Age of Gold: The California Gold Rush and the Birth of Modern America (New York: Doubleday, 2002)
as well as Susan Lee Johnson, Roaring Camp: The Social World of the California Gold Rush (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 2001). Elliot West’s magisterial account of the reverberations felt on the Great Plains as gold seekers traveled to
Colorado in the late 1850s is discussed in his Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998). In 1874, the discovery of gold in the Black Hills intensified the conflict between
the expansive Lakota and American empires. See Richard White, “The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the
Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Journal of American History 65 (September 1978): 319343, and Jeffrey Ostler, The Lakotas and the Blacks Hills: The Struggle for Sacred Ground (New York: Penguin, 2010).
3 Cherokee Deputation from the Nation to the Secretary of War, February 11, 1830 in “Intrusion on
Cherokee Land”, H. Doc 89 (Serial Set Vol. 197, Session Vol. 3) 21st Congress, 1st Session (1830), 27.
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State leaders also expressed a need for urgency and decisive action in dealing with the
intrusion, yet none was forthcoming from Washington. Likewise, the state seemed unresponsive
to the presence of so many miners. By May 1830, nearly a year after the intrusion had begun,
Governor Gilmer expressed anxiety over the state’s proper course when he admitted to fellow
Georgian and United States Attorney General John Berrien, “I am in the doubt as to what ought
to be done with the gold diggers.” Citizens clamored for relief and petitioned state leaders to act.
“Our own Legislature must take the matter in hand. They owe it to themselves and their
constituents to rid the country of this horde of thieves and counterfeiters; and it is time something
was done.”4
Gilmer’s initial hesitancy mirrored the legislature’s. Though the legislature had sought to
solve the sovereignty issue when it passed the extension law, no one knew with any certainty the
law’s viability. Underlying Georgia’s claim to sovereignty was the desire of the state’s citizens to
possess the gold fields that littered the backcountry. Because the state considered itself supreme
over the lands in question, state leaders argued that intruders were actually trespassing upon state
soil and stealing state resources. Even before June 1 passed and the extension law went into
effect, Gilmer declared time and again: “the state considers itself entitled to all the valuable
minerals within the soil of the Cherokee territory.” By not acting to prevent the miners from
entering the gold region, the state “is now permitting itself to be plundered of its wealth from the
strong desires of its authorities to avoid any collision with those of the general government.”
Further, he issued a proclamation urging the intruders to depart because the state had extended

4 George R. Gilmer to John Berrien, May 6, 1830, Governor’s Letter Book, November 10,1829-June 29, 1831.
Drawer 62, Box 64, Georgia Department of Archives and History, Morrow, GA; Macon Telegraph, October 16, 1830,
3.
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its jurisdiction over the Cherokee and would not wait to “put an end to the lawless state of society
which has hitherto existed among the gold diggers.”5
However, when the Cherokee squadron ejected white Georgians from the Creek Strip, it
had the effect of not only empowering the Pony Club, but also of steeling the governor’s resolve
and altering the state’s course. Rightly understanding that a white backlash against the Cherokee
could precipitate a crisis, Gilmer resorted to measures considered anathema to those espousing a
state’s rights platform: he asked for federal assistance. Writing to the commander of Fort Mitchell
in Alabama, Gilmer advised the officer “that a party of white men headed by the sheriff of
Carroll County is . . . entering the Indian Country for the purpose of arresting Ridge and his
assistants.” Gilmer cautioned the fort’s commandant that such “conduct may excite the Indians
& occasion unnecessary bloodshed.” To stave off any violence, Gilmer informed the commander
that he had already asked state civil authorities to “prevent any lawless attacks” upon the
Cherokee living near Carrollton. To complement the civil authorities, Gilmer requested “a
competent force” from Ft. Mitchell “to prevent any further violence on the part of the Indians.”
In effect, Gilmer hoped the civil authorities in Carroll could restrain those Georgians howling for
blood while federal troops acted as a restraint against potential Cherokee reprisals.6
As the ostensible leader of Georgia’s vociferous state’s rights contingent, Gilmer carefully
tread the issue of federal intervention. Though he railed against federal interference as an assault
on Georgia’s rights in public, in private, the governor succumbed to the reprieve offered by the
5 George R. Gilmer to John M. Berrien, May 6, 1830, Governor’s Letter Book, GDAH; for Gilmer’s
proclamation for citizens to remove themselves from the gold region, see Gilmer, Sketches of Some of the First Settlers of
Upper Georgia…. (Americus, GA: Americus Book Company, 1926), 266-67.
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presence of troops and conceded their usefulness if not their constitutionality. “You are aware
that it would be contrary to my opinion of the rights of this State,” he assured one advisor, “to
recognize by any official act, the power of the United States Government to remove the Indians
from the Cherokee lands.” Despite his certainty in Georgia’s course, he admitted that the
presence of federal troops “in the Cherokee country is very useful, in restraining the whites from
trespassing upon public property, and committing violence upon the Indians. . . . The effect of
their presence in restraining our citizens, ought not to be lost, if it can be helped.” So uncertain
was Gilmer over the use of federal troops that the day before he requested aid from Ft. Mitchell,
he reassured his advisor in Carroll County, Allen Fambrough, that circumstances did not require
“the interposition of the military authorities.”7 Perhaps his hesitancy hid his hypocrisy, but
Gilmer’s vacillations over federal involvement showed the governor’s conflicted feelings on the
matter. Despite the fact that Georgia’s leaders had, for a decade, staked out a policy asserting
state sovereignty regarding the Indian population living within the bounds of Georgia, Gilmer, at
this uncertain hour, willingly asked for federal aid.
Both state and Cherokee officials could agree on the need to impose some type of order in
the backcountry, but their zeal for sovereignty prevented any sort of intergovernmental
cooperation. Rather than a tandem effort, both sides sought to protect their sovereignty and their
claim to the riches that lay seductively beneath the surface. Gilmer’s approach divided the issue
into two distinct problems. One was the state’s problem, and the solution involved civil
authorities imposing the law on state property. Further, the governor argued that the state’s civil
authorities could prevent intruders from crossing the national boundary from Georgia, but once
intruders crossed the border they became a Cherokee and federal problem. Federal law
7 George R. Gilmer to Yelverton King, July 5, 1830 in Gilmer, Sketches, 280-281; George R. Gilmer to Allen
G. Fambrough, February 15, 1830, Governor’s Letter Books, GDAH.
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stipulated that once whites crossed the frontier between the state and the Cherokee Nation,
including those who had purchased homes from emigrants, they had gone beyond the state’s pale
and therefore became subject to federal jurisdiction. At that point, expelling intruders became a
Cherokee or U.S. Army responsibility. In his stance on divided jurisdiction, Gilmer proved
disingenuous: he argued that the state already had suzerainty over the gold region because of the
extension law, yet he wanted none of the responsibility associated with ordering the population
therein. However hypocritical Gilmer’s stance proved, his proposed solution demonstrated an
understanding of the political realities and underscored his desire to avoid a showdown over
Indian policy. It also marked the beginning of cooperation between state and federal authorities
in their efforts to remove the Cherokee.
Just as Gilmer wanted to avoid a confrontation with federal forces over the nature of the
state-federal relationship regarding intrusion in the backcountry, he also desired order. So did
federal officials. In February 1830, Secretary of War John H. Eaton wrote to the commander of
Ft. Mitchell to send troops into the Cherokee Nation. While the governor had tried to strictly
limit the role of the Army, it appeared that the Secretary of War had others ideas. Eaton ordered
the commander and his men to “advance forthwith” from their post in Alabama and “stay any
act of hostility that may be contemplated on either side.” Such an expansive and vague set of
orders gave the commander, Brevet Major Philip Wager of the 4th U.S. Infantry, wide latitude
in dealing with the intrusion. The orders also gave the impression that it was the Army’s
responsibility to prevent any hostilities, originating from both within and without the Cherokee
Nation, from occurring. In early March, Wager sent thirty-six men from Ft. Mitchell to the gold
region. Wager then issued an order to all whites living in the Creek Strip to leave but predicted
trouble and feared that he and his men would have to compel them to depart. Wager’s
declaration required all persons digging for gold to leave the Cherokee Nation by March 25,
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1830. Most observers anticipated resistance to the orders, but one “gentleman recently from that
section, tells us that the intruders have no such designs.”8
With reports of hundreds and perhaps even thousands of intruders residing illegally
within the Cherokee Nation, the small infantry detachment faced a difficult task. Fulfilling its
orders became so arduous, in fact, that by the first of December nearly three hundred regular
troops from both the 4th Infantry and 2nd Artillery had been garrisoned at Camp Eaton (named
in honor of the Secretary of War) adjacent to Scudder’s Inn along the National Road near the
Etowah River. By the following year, though, Camp Eaton had been abandoned by federal
troops and in their place resided troops from Georgia. Between March 1830 and December 1831
six companies of U.S. troops had been sent and then withdrawn into the Cherokee Nation.
Though brief, their time along the Cherokee border ushered in a new period of violence along
the frontier.
At the end of March 1830, the first federal troops made their way through Decatur in
DeKalb County on their way to the gold mines to uphold Wager’s orders.9 Other federal troops
did not arrive until June. The initial detachment set about preparing a small encampment and
patrolling the gold region. As more federal troops arrived, they scoured the countryside and
expelled anyone suspected of mining for gold. They received a list of individuals from Hugh
Montgomery containing the names of those whites whom the Cherokee had authorized to live
within the Nation and therefore immune from expulsion. These individuals included white men
and women who had married into Cherokee society, licensed traders, and missionaries.10
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The troops had a difficult task. Not only did they have to eject thousands of Georgians
hiding within in the woods and hills of the Cherokee Nation, but they also had to discern which
whites could stay. In early June, they began conducting forays into areas most densely populated
with intruders. Their efforts proved somewhat effective, and by the second week of June, they
had reportedly cleared out the mines in one small region. The miners, for their part, had not
vacated the backcountry altogether. Many simply waited for the troops to leave the vicinity to
continue their activities. While the Cherokee remained confident that federal action would help
provide security, they also knew the miners would return “unless the troops are stationed”
permanently. Further irritating the Cherokee, other groups of “intruders snugly settled neatly on
the whole extent of the frontier,” avoided arrest and continued their work.11
Though Wager reported on a few early successes, efforts later that summer proved less
effective. “The First of the attempts, to remove the Gold Diggers by U.S. Troops . . . has proved
abortive. [The miners] are multiplying in number daily.” With only thirty-six men at his disposal
and a growing number of intruders, Wager’s 4th Infantry stood little chance of making a
thorough sweep through the mines or preventing more miners from arriving. Having expelled
some intruders who returned under cover of darkness, the infantry could do little more until they
received reinforcements or took more forceful measures. The ineffectual efforts at clearing the
mines worried some Georgia residents, who not only resented the federal presence but also
wanted a chance to strike it rich. In August, a state agent reporting to the legislature affirmed the
worst fears of the state’s leaders. “I have no idea that either the resistance of Indians, the civil
Talks, and Treaties, 1786-1838 WPA project no. 4341 (Atlanta: Georgia Archives, 1938), 1: 230-231. This list contains
over fifty names, the location of their residences, and other remarks about the inhabitants. Usually the remarks
commented on the relative wealth of the individual listed. For example, Ambrose Harnage resided in Long Swamp
and “has considerable property,” while John Rogers, who resided in the Chattahoochee community, had “a few
negroes & large stock.”
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authority of this state, or the United States Troops, short of their shooting at [the intruders] and
shedding blood, can or will remove the Gold diggers from the Cherokee Country, or even lessen
the number, but for a few days.” Without reinforcements and escalated force, Wager could do
little more to prevent the intrusion.12
Initially, state and federal forces operated at cross purposes when it came to clearing the
gold mines. For federal troops it meant expelling whites not connected to the Cherokee; for the
Georgians it meant clearing everyone, white or native, so the state could assert its authority.
When Gilmer had asked for Wager’s intervention in the backcountry, he also made it clear that
the state would do its part to prevent further intrusion. In spite of a more conciliatory approach
to Indian policy, Gilmer still remained uncomfortable employing force to maintain the integrity
of the state’s border. When the state did try to help, its officers only found themselves in
precarious situations. Those on the ground, however, did not express the same degree of
uncertainty. In Hall County, an overzealous militia commander ordered his troops into the gold
region and began arresting miners, both white and Cherokee. Instead, the militiamen found
themselves in the custody of federal troops who arrested the Georgians for violation of the
intercourse acts. Lieutenant Trenor of the U.S. Army observed a “party of armed men mounted
on horses” passing his camp. When he enquired their business in the gold region, he learned they
were a local militia “who were . . . about to make the Natives and other persons legally entitled to
remain within the Indian boundaries and to enjoy the rights and privileges of a Native, desist
from searching for Gold.” Lt. Trenor saw this as contrary to his orders and an act of intrusion.
When Colonel Hardin, the regiment’s commander, declared that he was under direct orders
from the deputy sheriff to uphold the extension law they continued on their way. Lt. Trenor did
12 Archibald R.S. Hunter to George R. Gilmer, July 5, 1830, Cherokee Letters, 1:221; William Rutherford to
George Gilmer, August 25, 1830, Georgia Military Affairs, 6:226.
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not think the state troops had the authority to arrest Indians on native ground, so he and his men
chased after the Georgians. The state militiamen had already confined a few Indians when the
federal troops overcame them at Pigeon Roost. The nineteen militiamen and deputy sheriff soon
found themselves in the custody of U.S. troops.13
It became evident to Lt. Trenor that he had potentially begun a problematic showdown
with state forces and marched Col. Hardin and the deputy sheriff to his superior. Even Governor
Gilmer was caught off guard when he heard reports of Hall County’s militia going into the gold
region. His entire strategy had been predicated on using state forces to prevent more whites from
intruding and not expelling those already there. “I have just received intelligence that the militia
of Hall County are about to be marched into the country occupied by the Cherokees for the
purpose of making prisoners of those who are engaged in digging.” If that proved true, he
ordered the release of any Indians who had been arrested. He instructed a colonel in the state
militia to inform Colonel Hardin “that the governor alone,” and not the deputy sheriff, “can call
them into the service of the state, except in cases of sudden invasion or insurrection.” When
Gilmer learned that the militiamen had been released he expressed relief. “It is desirable that the
most cordial cooperation should exist between the U States and state government upon the
subject of our Indian affairs.”14
Even if the governor desired state and federal forces to work in conjunction with one
another, federal troops had orders to uphold the intercourse laws on their own. After June, when
13 Lieutenant Trenor to Captain F.W. Brady, June 23, 1830 in “Letters Received by the Office of Indian
Affairs, 1824-1881,” Roll 74, M234, RG 75, NARA.

George R. Gilmer to Yelverton King, June 28, 1830, in Governor’s Letter Book, Drawer 62, Box 64, GDAH;
George R. Gilmer to Yelverton King, July 5, 1830, Ibid. Gilmer had carefully considered his options when it came to
calling up the militia. He consulted at least one state supreme court judge, J.W. Jackson, who informed him that if
intruders intended to trespass on the public property he could consider it an insurrection, which would require him
to muster the militia. The problem because defining an insurrection, which Jackson considered “an assemblage in
strength.” See J.W. Jackson to George R. Gilmer, August 7, 1830, Box 49, Folder 9,Telamon Cuyler Collection,
Hagrett Rare Book and Manuscript Collection, UGA.
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they received reinforcements, the federal troops could more effectively bring order to the
backcountry. The Secretary of War ordered a company of artillery from Charleston, one infantry
company from Augusta, and another company from Ft. Mitchell to assist the initial detachment
in clearing the gold region of overzealous intruders. All told, this gave Wager 286 men to bring
some semblance of order to the gold mines. Arriving at the beginning of September, the
reinforcements allowed the previously overwhelmed command to pursue a more aggressive
stance toward the intruders.15
In the middle of September, Wager wrote to his superiors on the conduct of his men.
With a larger force, the 4th scoured the hills and hollows of the Cherokee Nation more
effectively. He instructed his men “to arrest all persons suspected of being in any way engaged in
the gold business,” which he did not limit to mining. “[D]igers, buyers, pedlars, [and]
shopkeepers” all faced expulsion for intruding upon Cherokee land. On his first foray with a
larger force, Wager and his infantry managed to arrest over two hundred intruders. After
confining the prisoners for the evening, Wager sent two officers and fifty men to escort the
intruders beyond the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation “where they were dismissed.” The
remaining troops did not rest on their laurels. Wager divided his forces, fanned them out across
the gold region, and gave them orders to “destroy the machinery, burn the huts & arrest all
persons lurking in the neighbourhood.” This action corralled another fifty intruders, who
received similar treatment. Another report confirmed the actions of the troops: “The policy
pursued is, to destroy the provisions, camp equipage, working utensils, or whatever else is found
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belonging to the diggers.” Once apprehended by federal troops, the intruders “are conveyed to
the nearest ferry, and put across the river free of charge.”16
By the end of September, Wager confidently reported that the number of intruders
arrested and expelled exceeded five hundred men, while those who fled before the troops could
apprehend them “amount[ed] to thousands.” At the Chestatee mines, Wager encountered a
polyglot population that would have upset Georgia’s order-obsessed leaders. Noting the “motley
appearance,” of the miners, he and his men encountered all sorts in the unorganized gold region,
from “whites, Indians, halfbreeds, and negroes, boys of fourteen and old men of seventy” to more
prestigious individuals like “two Colonels of Georgia Militia, two candidates for the legislature
and two ministers of the Gospel, all no doubt attracted thither by the love of gold.” Such a
diverse lot also gave the troops difficulties. Wager warned Major General Alexander Macomb,
the commander of the U.S. Army, that his men had to resort to more brutal measures to round
up some of the trespassers. “It was impossible in every instance,” Wager began, “to use the
mildest measures” to detain the intruders. Some “were treated with more harshness than met my
approbation,” especially when the soldiers “were not under the eyes of their officers.”
Mistreatment tended to occur when the intruders ran away from the advancing soldiers. Wager
defended the harsher methods employed by his men, especially once the intruders grew
accustomed to the “gentle means hitherto employed.” As the intruders realized they faced no
physical threats from the troops they grew “so bold as to laugh at the idea of being driven off by
the military and many of them became quite obstinate and impudent.” The growing resistance of
the intruders convinced Wager that his men had best begin using more forceful measures to

16 Wager’s report quoted in Otis E. Young, Jr.,“The Southern Gold Rush, 1828-1836,” Journal of Southern
History 48 (August 1982): 385; Augusta Chronicle, September 25, 1830, 2.
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compel obedience. Once the troops became more physical, the intruders “commenced flying to
the woods and mountains.”17
Though perhaps some Georgians resented the presence of federal troops—especially
politicians grandstanding on a state’s right platform—others commended the efforts of the troops
for achieving some control over the gold mines. In Augusta, a traveler “inform[ed] us that he met
at least one hundred [intruders] on the road in one day who had been thus expelled from the
territory, or taken the hint from this gentle specific administered to others.” Hugh Montgomery
was especially pleased with the results of the operation, informing Governor Gilmer that the
intruders fled the mines “Like Blackbirds before the Bayonet,” when confronted by a detachment
of determined U.S. troops. Others, however, still derided the efforts made by plodding
government troops, and championed the quick-footed frontiersmen. “Even if a body of troops
should be sent against [the intruders], they would shelter themselves in the fastnesses of the
country, and the moment the backs of the troops were turned, would be found pillaging in their
rear.”18
When a state court judge, Augustin Clayton, ruled that the extension law was
unconstitutional, further problems resulted. The state government largely ignored Clayton’s
ruling, and disregarded it completely in the fall when voters rejected Clayton in favor of a more
vocal proponent of the rights of the state. More seriously, many miners did return to the mines,
“accordingly armed . . . to drive off all the natives.”19 The Cherokee complained when this

Major Philip Wager to Major General Alexander Macomb, September 30, 1830 in James W. Covington,
ed., “Letters from the Georgia Gold Region,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 39 (December 1955): 407-408.
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19 The decision in which Clayton contested the extension law, specifically the provision that prohibited the
Cherokee from digging for gold, was Georgia v. Kannetoo. The furor resulting from the trial cost Clayton his seat,
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occurred, claiming that the U.S. troops were more concerned “in the exercise of this state right”
rather than fulfilling their treaty obligations and protecting the Cherokee from the intruders. For
the most part, the Cherokee were correct in assuming that the state and federal forces had opted
to cooperate. After the U.S. forces had arrested the militia from Hall County, the hostility turned
to cooperation. Federal troops, rather than dump intruders across the Chattahoochee River, now
escorted them to county courts where they were tried for trespass. By the end of summer,
however, state and federal forces began cooperating to impose order. Usually that cooperation
involved federal forces arresting intruders but taking them to state courts to stand trial.20
The increased force used by the federal forces helped them clear the mines, but it also
caused borderland whites to resent their presence. However successful U.S. forces may have
been, their tenure in the backcountry proved fleeting for three reasons. First, despite the fact that
some Georgians felt that the actions of the troops had a salubrious effect the backcountry, others
saw their actions as poisonous to the republic because it favored one group of whites over
another. Because Wager only had orders to remove intruders from the backcountry, only white
Georgians or those who were not on Montgomery’s list suffered any inconvenience as a result.
When troops came across whites connected to the Cherokee—which meant intermarried whites
or métis Cherokee who appeared white—at the gold mines, they took no pains to remove them.
After all, they were digging on Cherokee land.

that he had been a victim of the state’s bifurcated politics, which caught the Cherokee in the middle of political
wrangling. He informed Ross that “the two great parties in Georgia in their struggle for power had always made
[Cherokee policy] a party question and thereby the Cherokee were placed, as it were, between two great fires.”
Quoted in Tim Alan Garrison, The Legal Ideology of Indian Removal: The Southern Judiciary and the Sovereignty of Native
American Nations (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 119.
20 J.W. Brady to John H. Eaton, June 28, 1830, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 18241881, Roll 74, M234, RG 75, NARA; Elijah Hicks et.al to Captain Brady, June 26, 1830 in ibid.
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Georgia’s politicians disagreed, especially after June 1 when the extension law went into
effect. Many Georgians, especially those who had been removed, believed that such a show of
favoritism by the federal government was inconsistent with the rhetoric of white male equality.
B.L. Goodman, a self-styled “intruder on Indian land” desired to report to the governor the
extent of “the spirit of indignation” permeating the backcountry. As Georgia’s intruders left the
gold region they came across “white men of the [Cherokee] nation engaged in working the lots.”
Such a “hue and cry” arose from the intruders that he “feared that mobs may be got up that may
cause blood shed.” Goodman even reported that one militia captain had “gone so far as to call
up his Company together prepatory to the removal of the Indians.” An associate of Goodman’s,
Peter J. Williams also wrote to Gilmer. Williams expressed considerable distress over the
discrimination shown by the federals. After he had been ejected from Indian country, Williams
met several miners making their way back into the gold region, convinced that they had “as
much right to dig as the white men in the [Cherokee] Nation.” Rather than an indiscriminate
approach, Wager’s men had selectively cleared the mines. Once the intruders had been driven
off, the mines “were immediately taken possession of by the Indians and the whites connected
with them, and that they were permitted to take the gold . . . without any resistance from the
troops who had disposed the citizens of the state.” Gilmer warned President Jackson that
bloodshed may soon follow because of the way Wager had gone about ordering the backcountry.
Without redress, “There is much reason to apprehend that the Indians will be forcibly driven
from the gold region, unless they are immediately prohibited from appropriating its mineral
wealth.” Goodman summed up the spirit of indignation and state’s rights when he declared that
white intruders would continue to dig “unless stopped by the executive power of Georgia.”21

P.L. Goodman to George R. Gilmer, June 7, 1830, in Covington, ed., “Letters from the Georgia Gold
Region,” 402-403; Peter J. Williams to George R. Gilmer, June 17, 1830, in ibid., 403-404; George R. Gilmer to
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To the intruders, however, the use of violence did not upset them as much as the
discrimination they faced at the hands of federal troops. They protested the ways in which the
troops categorized whites. When Wager’s troops removed white Georgians but allowed white or
métis Cherokee to remain at the mines, his decisions injured the pride of many of the intruders.
By taking such an approach, the federal troops had essentially created and enforced a hierarchy
among the gold miners and placed those from Georgia at the bottom. The actions of the federal
troops flew in the face of the frontier egalitarianism and the prevailing mood of Jacksonian
democracy. By allowing whites within the Cherokee Nation to take gold, the federal government
had, through the actions of its troops, demonstrated their low opinion of Georgia’s frontier
residents. Despite the fact that they had no right to the gold, once the offended intruders faced
expulsion from the gold region they cried foul. Only the protestations of “men of Influence and
standing” among the intruders prevented them from having “mischief done” to the Indians.22
Second, the way in which Georgia conceived of the Cherokee Nation fundamentally
changed once the extension law took effect on June 1, 1830. Prior to its enactment, Georgians
reluctantly saw the Cherokee Nation as somewhat autonomous, an unsustainable imperium in
imperio that relied upon the federal government to not only enforce the various intercourse laws
regulating commerce, but dependent upon federal troops to maintain its borders. After June 1, a
striking reformulation occurred that transformed Georgia’s relationship to the Cherokee and in
how they thought about the Cherokee Nation. The law itself permitted for the border counties to
extend their legal jurisdictions into the Cherokee Nation, which meant that white sheriffs and
Andrew Jackson, Gilmer, June 15, 1830, Governor’s Letter Book, November 10, 1829-June 29,1831, GDAH; Gilmer;
Sketches, 267; P.L. Goodman to George R. Gilmer, June 17, 1830, Roll 74, M234, NARA. Gilmer also declared
federal actions against the right of the state in a letter to President Jackson: “the Government of the U States had no
authority to enforce the non-intercourse laws.”
22 Peter J. Williams to George R. Gilmer, June 17, 1830, in Covington, ed., “Letters from the Georgia Gold
Region,” 404; P.L. Goodman to George R. Gilmer, June 7, 1830, in ibid., 402-403.
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juries were responsible for applying civil law in the backcountry. No longer seen as a state-withina-state, Georgians effectively nullified federal legislation recognizing sovereign Cherokee territory
and claimed it as their own.
Augustin S. Clayton may have rejected the premise of the extension law, though he still
recognized the untenable position of the natives when he referred to the gold region as the
“Cherokee nation” in a letter to the governor but corrected himself and termed it “the states
property.” Another jurist, J.W. Jackson concurred. “The Indian title is permissive—at the
permission of Georgia alone—the, soil, and the mines within it, are Georgia’s.” Gilmer began
calling the gold region “public property” owned by the state. Such a reformulation allowed state
officials to act as though they had sovereignty over the territory formerly known as the Cherokee
Nation. Understandably, the Cherokee fretted over such a possibility. Elias Boudinot warned the
readers of the Phoenix in the final issue of May 1830. “Before the next number of our paper shall
be issued . . . the extension of [the state’s] assured jurisdiction over the Cherokees and the
execution of her laws touching the Indians, will have arrived.” Once this occurred, the Cherokee
understood how difficult their lives would become. “One thing we know, there will be suffering.
The Cherokees will be privy to the cupidity of white men—every indignity and every oppression
will be heaped upon them . . . [H]ow will it be when full license is given to the oppressors?”23
Such a reformulation of the Cherokee Nation in the minds of Georgia’s leaders allowed
them to treat the territory differently. It allowed the governor to maintain a state’s right footing
when dealing with the president. “[T]he government of the U States had no authority to enforce
the non-intercourse laws,” Gilmer informed the president, even though the governor had asked
23 Augustin S. Clayton to George R. Gilmer, July 23, 1830 in Georgia Military Affairs, 6:27; J.W. Jackson to
George R. Gilmer, August 7, 1830, Folder 9, Box 49, Telamon Cuyler Collection, UGA; on Gilmer’s view of the
gold mines as public property, see his annual message to the legislature delivered December 4, 1830 in Gilmer,
Sketches, 289; Cherokee Phoenix, May 29, 1830, 3.
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federal troops to do precisely that. Further complicating matters, Gilmer told his officers
operating along the frontier that they in fact could not arrest Cherokees digging for gold. “It is
not considered a criminal offence for the Indians to dig for gold in the lands occupied by them
and that they are not liable to an arrest.” Gilmer, therefore, used this reformulation when it
served the interests of the state and his party, especially in dealing with the president. However,
he realized that such a strong tone in the gold region could precipitate bloodshed and therefore
cautioned his men. So he vociferously stuck to the extension law when it came to matters of
federalism, but was less certain of its efficacy in private dealings.24
The state legislature, though, had few qualms about the nature of state authority in the
“public property.” In the winter of 1830 the general assembly enacted the supremacy law, which
explicitly criminalized the Cherokee National Council and prohibited it from meeting and
carrying out the laws of the Nation. Any person who had been authorized by the Cherokee
government to collect tolls at turnpike gates and ferries had to cease their operations, which
interfered with the Cherokee’s ability to control their boundaries. The supremacy law was
unenforceable because it directly contradicted the treaties made between the Cherokee and the
U.S. government, though Gilmer had every intention of following the letter of the law. Rather, it
served as a brash statement by the legislature on state sovereignty. By criminalizing the acts of
John Ross and the rest of the Cherokee government, the law permitted the state to declare its
sovereignty over Cherokee lands and the supremacy of Georgia’s laws. The legislature went
further with the supremacy act by prohibiting all whites from residing in the backcountry unless
they had sworn an oath to “support and defend the Constitution and laws of the State of
Georgia” or were employed by the United States government. The law also permitted the
24 George R. Gilmer to Andrew Jackson, June 15, 1830; George R. Gilmer to Yelverton King, June 28,
1830, both in Governor’s Letter Book, GDAH.
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governor to appoint an agent who could then rent out lots to whites that had belonged to
Cherokee families who had previously emigrated to Arkansas. Though it did not go into effect
until March 1, 1831, it precipitated a constitutional showdown.25
The supremacy law also limited the number of miners and other white troublemakers
residing in the backcountry, and for the first time, the state formulated the proper deportment it
expected from whites who received residency permits. Not only did potential residents have to
swear to uphold the state constitution, but they also had to promise to “uprightly demean”
themselves “as a citizen.” By explicitly stating the type of behavior the state expected from its
citizens, it implied that those who behaved poorly could not claim citizenship. Therefore, the
“disorderly sort” and other troublemakers residing in the backcountry were not entitled to the
benefits enjoyed by other white citizens. Any violators of the law’s provisions would stand trial for
a high misdemeanor, and, if convicted, would “undergo an imprisonment in the Penitentiary at
hard labor for the space of four years.” In effect, the state had given itself leeway to act against
miners in its efforts to shape the gold region.26
In conjunction with the supremacy act, the state sought to announce its more forceful
articulation of state sovereignty by requesting the withdrawal of federal forces. Gilmer knew that
if President Jackson complied, it would signal that the state had assumed suzerainty over the
Cherokee territory, its inhabitants, and, more importantly, the implementation of the intercourse
laws. In a letter to the president, Gilmer laid bare his frustrations with the current state of affairs.
Having sent a proclamation into the backcountry preventing anyone, white or Cherokee, from
taking gold from the “ungranted lands,” Gilmer complained, “Before these proclamations
“An Act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power. . .” Acts of the General Assembly of the State of
Georgia (1830), 114-117, quote from 115. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/sspcgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?session id=7f000001
&type=law&byte=10514952&lawcnt=1&filt=doc (Accessed November 14, 2010).
25
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reached the part of the state occupied by the Cherokee, the U. States troops had driven from it
all persons except Indian occupants.” Though his objection appeared to disapprove the efficiency
of the Army, he instead was protesting Jackson’s “exercise of power,” which he did not find
constitutional especially in the wake of the extension law.27 A scant five months after he had
personally requested the assistance from Wager’s troops from Ft. Mitchell, Gilmer now informed
the president that such an action went against his constitutional scruples. By the end of October,
when U.S troops had largely cleared the mines of intruders, Gilmer wrote to Jackson formally
asking for a withdrawal of federal troops. Since the enactment of the extension law, Gilmer
argued, the federal government could no longer enforce the intercourse act within the state’s
“rights of jurisdiction.” Though Gilmer recognized that Jackson had sent the troops for “the
preservation of peace,” a gesture Gilmer “truly appreciated,” he still had to ask the president to
“withdraw the troops as soon as it can be convenient.” Jackson did not tarry, and by the
following month the troops had been sent to their winter quarters.28
The final reason for the hasty withdrawal of the federal troops originated with Old
Hickory himself. At different times throughout his presidency he advocated the rights of the
states, though Jackson also expressed an ardent nationalism. He also harbored many of
Jefferson’s sentiments regarding the expansion of the yeoman’s frontier. In Georgia, he had the
chance to put both of these beliefs into practice. In his annual message to Congress in December
1829, Jackson asked Congress to appropriate funds that would subsidize the removal process.
Though it created a political imbroglio, especially among northern evangelicals and abolitionists,
the following year Congress set about drafting legislation that would allow natives living east of
27
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the Mississippi to “voluntarily” exchange their land for a like amount of acreage in territory
beyond the river. By the end of May, Congress finalized the legislation and Jackson signed the
Indian Removal Bill into law on the last day of the month. The bill also appropriated a half
million dollars for the express purpose of removal.29
Jackson’s insistence on removal by federal officials did not necessarily mean that he
thought the federal government should take the lead on the question of Indian sovereignty. Thus,
when Gilmer contacted the president and requested the withdrawal of federal troops in October,
the president complied. At his behest, Secretary of War Eaton ordered those forces stationed in
the Cherokee Nation to strike from Camp Eaton and enter winter quarters and each company
returned to its normal base of operations. Having them return to their winter quarters was a
clever and open-ended way for Jackson’s administration to appease both the Georgians and the
Cherokee. The troops were leaving, much to the chagrin of the Cherokee, but because they had
not been ordered off permanently, if left the possibility for their return in the spring. Gilmer
claimed credit for the withdrawal of troops but did not ruminate on the possibility of their return.
He understood that the federal government, under Jackson, would no longer enforce the
intercourse acts within Georgia. In effect, Jackson had devolved Cherokee affairs out of the
hands of the Office of Indian Affairs and into those of Georgia’s elected officials. Despite the fact
that Jackson had consented to the troop withdrawal, he had not left his administration
completely helpless to enforce order or prevent intrusion. As late as 1835, small umbers of federal
29 For the text of the Indian Removal Bill, see Register of Debates, House of Representatives, 21st Congress, 1st
Session, 1135-36. The historiography of Jackson’s motivation behind Indian Removal is varied and contentious.
Elliot Satz contended that Jacksonian policy was just another means of “control and management” of an ethnic
other. See his, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era (Lincoln: Unversity of Nebraska Press, 1975), quote from 292.
Ronald Takaki declared Jackson the “metaphysician of Indian-hating” who engaged in “self-deception” regarding
his position on Indian Removal in Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1979), 92-107. Stuart Banner detailed legal precursors to Removal and equated Georgia’s actions to extortion. See
his How the Indians Lost their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), especially
201-227. Jackson’s defenders claim that his actions prevented the extinction of the Indians. See, especially, Robert
V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars (New York: Penguin, 2001), 278-281.
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troops from Ft. Mitchell still patrolled the Cherokee border. The governor of Georgia could
request their aid or compel them to leave. Lewis Cass, the Secretary of War, wrote to Governor
Wilson Lumpkin explaining this relationship. “The commanding officer of the United States
troops, now at Fort Mitchell, has been directed to march into the Cherokee country, whenever
you inform [him] that his services are no longer required where he is now.” Further, Lumpkin
could withdraw those forces “by communicating [his] views to the Commanding Officer.”30
To prepare for removal, Jackson authorized the Office of Indian Affairs to begin
conducting “voluntary removal.” Though Cherokees had begun moving to Arkansas in 1794, it
was not until the ratification of the Treaty of 1819 that Indian agents began to encourage and
pay for voluntary removal to that territory. Even then, the Cherokee hesitated to enroll. In 1830
about 500 Cherokees arrived in Arkansas, many of them making the journey on their own
keelboats. By the end of 1834, federal enrolling agent Benjamin F. Currey had convinced more
than 1,000 Cherokee to take federal assistance and leave for Arkansas while another 200 did so
under their own expense.31
By October 1830, it seemed that the federal government’s martial interposition between
the state of Georgia and the Cherokee Indians had come to an end. In its place, the government
had decided upon a strategy of Indian removal. Though the switch in policy came from President
Jackson and his drive to secure as much land for the burgeoning white republic as possible, it also
represented the shift in state policy. The Cherokee realized that Georgia’s empowered stance
combined with Jackson’s insistence on Indian removal placed them in a tenuous position that
30
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imperiled their nationhood. To stay Georgia’s extension law and to compel the federal
government to uphold the intercourse acts, the Cherokee determined to file suit against the state.
On the advice of several northern supporters, the Cherokee hired former Attorney General
William Wirt to bring their case to federal court. As a result, federal interdiction to preserve
Cherokee boundaries moved from direct troop involvement to the courtroom and precipitated a
shift in federal policy away from acculturation and towards removal.
Wirt brought two cases before the Supreme Court, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester
v. Georgia. In Cherokee Nation, Wirt attempted to have the Supreme Court issue an injunction
against Georgia’s extension law thereby preventing it from asserting state law in Cherokee
territory on the basis that the Cherokee Nation, through numerous treaties with the federal
government, was a sovereign, foreign power. Chief Justice John Marshall and most of the Court’s
seven justices disagreed. Rather than an independent state, Marshall declared that the
relationship between the Cherokee to the United States “resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.” Through his decision, Marshall was attempting to delineate the nature of the federalIndian relationship as it pertained to the Cherokee, and while he was willing to deny them their
injunction he readily admitted that the federal government, and not the states, controlled Indian
policy. In spite of its insistence that Georgia had no right to extend its jurisdiction over the
Cherokee, the court was powerless to prevent it. According to Marshall, the bill of injunction
filed by Wirt would have required the court “to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain
the exertion of its physical force.” Such an act, according to Marshall, lay outside of the court’s
purview and would have constituted a gross misapplication of the court’s power. “The propriety
of such an interposition . . . savours too much of the exercise of political power to be within the
proper provinces of the judicial department.” It also recognized that Jackson had withdrawn
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federal troops and that Georgia held the preponderance of power in the borderlands, as well as
the political will to exercise it.32
Once Governor Gilmer requested that President Jackson withdraw federal troops, it
became evident that the state would take up the mantle of ordering the frontier. With the various
provisions of the supremacy law soon to go into effect, the state had all legal authority it felt
necessary to begin a campaign of regulation against miners and Cherokee residents alike.
Though the federal troops had proved mostly effective at clearing the mines, their efforts at
limiting the liberty of white men proved a divisive strategy that only enflamed state’s rights
partisans. As soon as Jackson sent Major Wager’s 4th Infantry into their winter quarters, the
owner of the garrison, Jacob Scudder, received word form the governor that the state had
requisitioned the use of Scudder’s property to house a newly created state militia force. “The
Legislature now in session has authorized me to raise a Guard for the protection of the gold
mines, and enforcing the laws in the Cherokee territory,” Gilmer informed Scudder. Noting that
the “quarters erected by the U.S. Troops have been placed in your charge,” Gilmer apprised
Scudder that the new Guard would garrison at the fort on his property.33 With the creation of
the Guard, the state sought to do what the federal government could not: provide order to the
gold region and hasten the removal of the Cherokee.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE GEORGIA GUARD AND THE POLITICS OF ORDER, 1830-1832
For the federal government in the nineteenth century to remain out of sight, state
governments had to assume a variety of functions and powers. Having requested the withdrawal
of federal forces in October 1830, Governor Gilmer needed a way for the state to assert its
sovereignty and regulate the social environs of the Cherokee-Georgia borderlands. The
legislature by 1830 had already passed a series of laws that supplied legal jurisdiction over the
Cherokee Nation; Gilmer needed a way to make backcountry inhabitants obey the laws. In that
same legislative session, the state general assembly authorized the governor to create a military
force called the Georgia Guard that would, theoretically, work in concert with civil authorities.
When it mustered into service in January 1831, the Guard consisted of a scant forty men; its
impact, moreover, belied its small size. Charged with protecting the gold mines, the Guard
concentrated its efforts on intruders and native miners. Quickly, though, it became a vehicle for
the governor to wage a campaign of intimidation and coercion against Cherokee leaders and,
more controversially, ministers spreading the Gospel among the Cherokee. The Guard’s actions,
like those of the federal troops, quickly became liabilities. Especially bothersome were its violent
actions against white citizens. To capitalize on the Guard’s ruthless behavior, the Clark faction
declared the Guard anathema to republican virtue and egalitarian principles. Gilmer did not
ingratiate himself with voters either, when he declared the gold mines off limits to white citizens
so he could implement an expansive policy of internal improvements. Gilmer’s seemingly aloof
policy made him appear out of touch with the electorate and its desire for land. Further, by
overlooking the Guard’s use of violence against whites, Gilmer appeared to favor the rights of the
Cherokee over Georgia’s—a perception that hurt his political career.
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In the autumn of 1830, a state militiaman and self-proclaimed “humble individual” who
only wanted to serve the “Common good,” wrote to Gilmer with the intent of convincing the
governor that the gold mines needed a military force to secure their treasures. “[T]ill Some
Troops under [Georgia’s] own authority are put out, for the individual purpose of Surpressing all
Whether Indian or White man,” intruders would continue to plunder the mines and nearby
residents would continue to fear Indian attacks. The letter’s author, Charles H. Nelson, had no
compunction stating that the presence of the federal troops served as more of a “protection than
a detriment” to the intruders because they had no knowledge of the backcountry. The “hordes of
Lawless white[s] that infested the Territory,” according to Nelson, needed only to “find a place of
Some Secrecy (and they are abundant) to pursue their depredations.” Employing troops from
Georgia in the gold region would fill any gold seekers with “greater terror,” and compel them to
“respect that authority for which they now feel so much Contempt.” Nelson argued that a force
of two hundred mounted men would suffice. Gilmer heeded most of Nelson’s advice—aside from
the vast number sought by the overeager man—and even named Nelson a colonel and subcommander of the newly minted Georgia Guard, a decision he would later regret.1
With the passage of the supremacy law in December 1830, the state legislature, backed by
the governor, announced their willingness to bring order to the backcountry through the use of a
military force. Encouraged by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the
state’s new formulation of sovereignty did more than extend jurisdiction into the backcountry.
The law also sought ways to outlaw the Cherokee government and regulate the people living in
the gold region. The supremacy law proclaimed it unlawful for anyone “under pretext of
authority from the Cherokee tribe,” to convene “for the purpose of making laws, orders, or
1 Charles H. Nelson to George R. Gilmer, October 20, 1830 in J.E. Hays, ed. Georgia Military Affairs WPA
project no. 5993 (Atlanta: Georgia Archives, 1940), 6:43-44. Other backcountry residents connected to the state
militia also called for a similar force. See Samuel A. Wales to George R. Gilmer, July 27, 1830, ibid., 6: 219-220.
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regulations.” The law further empowered the state to eject all whites residing in the gold region
unless they swore an oath upholding the state’s constitution and acquired a residency permit
from the governor or his designated agent. The last provision did not extend to any white women
or white men under the age of twenty-one, federal agents or employees, or those who rented
Cherokee land legally from the state. Those arrested for disobeying the law faced a stint in the
state penitentiary doing hard labor.2 In the battle over sovereignty in what Georgia considered its
land, Gilmer had confidently seized control by criminalizing the efforts of the Cherokee National
Council in its efforts to retain suzerainty over its territory. The sprawling directive offered to the
governor by the legislature, however, proved difficult to fulfill, especially since federal troops had
been withdrawn at the governor’s request.
To enforce the law, the legislature empowered Gilmer to create a military unit for the
“the enforcement of the laws of force with the Cherokee nation.” By designating the supremacy
law the “laws of force” the legislature did not attempt to hide its strategy for asserting state
sovereignty, but it did attempt to build safeguards into the legislation so a backcountry military
force could not act in unauthorized ways. Gilmer had previously declared that he wanted civil
law to create order, but the sheer scope of the intrusion made that goal unrealistic. With the
legislature’s cooperation, the supremacy law relied upon force first and civil authority second. To
carry out the supremacy law, the legislature requisitioned $20,000 for a sixty-man militia unit
called the Georgia Guard “for the protection of the gold mines,” a catch-all phrase that furnished
the Guard with expansive police powers, including the regulation of white intruders until civil

2

“An Act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power….” Acts of the General Assembly of the State of
Georgia, December 22, 1830, 114-117. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/sspcgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?session id=7f000001
&type=law&byte=10514952&lawcnt=1&filt=doc (Accessed August 28, 2011).
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authority could provide permanent order. The final version of the legislation took effect on
March 1, 1831.3
To allow the Guard more leeway when it came to protecting the gold mines, the
legislature passed another law that criminalized digging for gold, employing others to dig for
gold, or carrying gold away from the mines. This made anyone even remotely connected to the
illicit mining of gold culpable and exposed offenders to the Guard. To protect the gold mines, the
Guard first had to clear it of anyone, white or Cherokee, who sought to prospect. When it began
policing the backcountry population in and around the gold mines, the Guard hunted down
intruders whom they suspected of taking gold and intimidating anyone they saw as a threat to
state sovereignty. In particular, the Guard targeted Indian leaders, especially mixed-race ones, as
it sought to convince its victims that removal was their best and safest option. The protection of
the gold mines gave the Guard latitude in who it considered a threat to state sovereignty and who
it would deem an intruder. In other words, the Guard had carte blanche to regulate the
backcountry population as it saw fit. Regulation through force, intimidation, and violence, state
leaders hoped, would bring order to a turbulent setting. Of critical importance, the legislature
envisioned the Guard as a force that would bolster civil authority but not replace it as the prime
source of law and order. The Guard, therefore, was partnered with civil law, but placed in a
subservient position. The agent appointed by the governor to lead the Guard was also limited in
his authority. The legislation restricted the agent and created his duties specifically “for the
purpose of assisting in the enforcement of the laws of this State,” not superseding them.4
Over the next five years, the legislature authorized the creation of four different Georgia
3

Ibid.,116.

4 On the requisition of funds, see “An Act to authorize the governor to take possession of the gold, silver,
and other mines…” Acts of the General Assembly, December 2, 1830, 154-156. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu /ssp/cgibin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte=10611279&lawcnt=1&filt=doc (Accessed August 28, 2011).
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Guards. Each iteration of the Guard had a different commander and the membership changed
regularly. Over time, the location that the Guard patrolled also changed to meet the exigencies
of frontier settlement. For example, the first Guard focused its efforts near the gold mines in what
would become Lumpkin and Forsyth Counties. By 1835 and 1836, the Guard had shifted its
operation to Murray County for political reasons, mostly because the Cherokee capital of New
Echota was located there, and it proved a convenient way to keep tabs on—or coerce—native
leaders. It is important to recognize that the Guard was not part of the Georgia militia system.
Though its second commander, John Coffee, held the rank of major general in the Georgia
militia, the Guard received funding and manpower from different sources. Recruits in the
Guard—with the exception of the commanding positions, which were gubernatorial
appointments—joined up voluntarily. Unlike regular militia companies that drew men from local
captain’s districts in each county, each Guard company counted soldiers from all over the state in
its ranks. Because the commanders were political appointments, each company of the Guard
became a vehicle for state policy and therefore viewed as highly politicized fighting forces. In the
end, 1836, this proved its undoing and convinced the legislature to deny funding to any future
units and to rely instead on county militias.
The first Georgia Guard created by the legislature began recruitment efforts on January
1, 1831. In two weeks’ time, the roster had been filled and the forty recruits headed north to
establish their headquarters. The men had an easy first few weeks, though that soon changed.
They inhabited Camp Eaton—the barracks constructed by the federal troops at Scudder’s Inn—
and in a move that signaled Georgia’s assumption of military power in the backcountry, the
Guard rechristened their barracks Camp Gilmer. Of the forty men enlisted with the Guard,
nineteen came from areas that did not adjoin the Cherokee nation. Including Sanford, three men
came from Milledgeville and the rest of Baldwin County while Wilkes County, the home of
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Charles H. Nelson, supplied six additional recruits. Clarke and Jackson Counties combined to
send ten men into the Guard. The majority of the men serving, however, came not from more
established counties, but from border counties. Sixteen men enlisted from Hall County, another
five from DeKalb and Gwinnet. That most of the men who joined the Guard lived in close
proximity to the Cherokee should not be surprising. What does warrant mention, though, is the
high number of men who had to travel long distances to join up. More than likely, these men had
already moved to Hall County when they enlisted, drawn by the availability of cheap frontier
land, though some may have come at the behest of the commanders as a way to reward their
friends with important positions that could lead to wealth later on in life.5
Indeed, such a selective and important service like the Guard had obvious benefits. Those
in command stood to benefit the most from their service. The Guard’s command consisted of
John W.A. Sanford, a rich planter from outside of Milledgeville who secured his post as
patronage for his staunch support of the governor. Sanford acted as more of a quartermaster
than military commander and rarely commanded troops in the field. That task fell to Charles H.
Nelson, whom Gilmer would later characterize as a “brave but violent man.” Both Sanford and
Nelson wanted to please the governor and therefore took a hard line when it came to clearing the
gold mines. Sanford later won a Congressional seat and served as a major general in the Creek
War, a position also held by Nelson.6 The enlisted men benefitted as well. Of the forty men
enlisted in the Guard, eighteen won gold claims and nine won land claims, which meant that 68
5 For the roster of Sanford’s Guard, see John W.A. Sanford Letter Book, Drawer 21, Reel 53, Georgia Division
of Archives and History, Morrow, GA.

George R. Gilmer, Sketches of Some of the First Settlers of Upper Georgia…. (Americus, GA: Americus Books
Company, 1926), 297. Sanford and Nelson enjoyed other positions of authority after their time with the Guard.
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chastened, resigned. On Sanford’s career after the Guard, see Athens Southern Banner, November 23, 1833, 3, April 19,
1834, 2, and October 18, 1834, 3. Nelson earned a fierce reputation as sub-commander of the Guard and during the
Creek War, a reputation that earned him an appointment as the keeper of the penitentiary. See Macon Telegraph,
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percent of the enlisted men enjoyed the support of the state. Sanford proved truly fortunate in
the 1832 land and gold lotteries, winning one of each. In comparison, only about 21 percent of
all participants state-wide won a land lottery draw while fewer than 27 percent of participants
won a gold claim. Many of the guardsmen bettered their situation in the decade after 1830
thanks in large part to their success in the lottery. The 1832 land and gold lotteries were marred
with corruption, so it is not entirely implausible that the guardsmen had an unfair advantage over
those who did not serve, though no documentary evidence corroborates this.7
One could argue, as Sanford did, that it was not military service that propelled members
of the Guard to success, but traits already present exhibited by their willingness to enlist. In a
letter to the governor reporting on his early progress in recruitment efforts, Sanford noted the
constitution of his troopers, especially their “hale and athletic” countenance. Further, each
recruit had to supply testimonials of their good character. Most important to Sanford, each of the
men had an abundance “in that most essential requisite of the soldier—courage.” The
commander of the Guard also had the benefit of choice when he selected his soldiers. Noting that
a flood of recruits offered their services “with astonishing eagerness,” he had the luxury of
choosing only those who exhibited the “best character.” Character separated the guardsmen
from other civilians, especially intruders who had been characterized as degenerate and nearsavage white men. In the honor-bound world of the frontier South, the character of a man

7 In addition to the eighteen enlisted men who won gold claims, another two were potential winners but
they had common names that did not distinguish them from others. Similarly, of the nine possible land winners, at
least one other guardsman could have been a lottery winner. For land lottery winners, see James F. Smith, The
Cherokee Land Lottery in Georgia (1991; New York: Harper & Bros., 1830). A compilation of gold lottery winners has
been compiled by the noted local historian S. Emmet Lucas. See his The 1832 Gold Lottery of Georgia: Containing A List of
the Fortunate Drawers in Said Lottery (Easley, SC: Southern Historical Press, 1988). By 1840, Nelson had been appointed
as warden to the state penitentiary. For the overall numbers of participants in the 1832 lotteries, see David Williams,
The Georgia Gold Rush: Twenty-Niners, Cherokees, and Gold Fever (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 52.
Noted for its corruption, it would not have been impossible for lottery officials, at the behest of state leaders, to
reward guardsmen with winning draws, though aside from the high proportion of winners no evidence corroborates
these findings.
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counted for much.8
From its inception in January 1831, the Guard wholeheartedly set about its task of
protecting the gold mines. Only a few days after it mustered for duty, Sanford sent Col. Nelson
and a squadron of fourteen guardsmen on a march to the upper mines “with instructions to
destroy every species of gold-digging machinery, to raze every camp or building heretofore
occupied by the miners, and to drive from the Nation all that class of people” still intruding on
the gold mines. On January 17, Nelson and his small detachment returned to the newly minted
Camp Gilmer at Scudder’s Mill and brought with them troubling news. In his report to the
governor, Sanford applauded Nelson for the completion of his march, but regrettably, had to add
that Nelson and his men ran afoul of “difficulties of the most serious and embarrassing nature.” 9
Once Nelson and his men entered the gold region, they arrested eleven white men
engaged in mining. En route to their headquarters to return the prisoners, they met unexpected
resistance. The “friends and former associates” of the arrested men “resolved upon their release”
and laid an ambush for the Guard as it headed back across the Chestatee. Sanford’s account of
the event at this point became confused. He first intimated that the ambush happened by
surprise, and Col. Nelson only became informed of the melee when “the Sergeant commanding
the rear, brought intelligence of it being attacked.” In the same letter, Sanford made it appear
that rather than a surprise attack, the guardsmen, with their prisoners in tow, passed through a
gauntlet of miners, fifty or sixty in number, who had placed obstacles in the river. Ordering his
troops not to provoke the miners, Nelson advised his men to maintain “a cautious and
circumspect deportment.” This last statement from Nelson, however, showed that the miners
8

John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, January 15, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book, GDAH.

9 John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, January 15, 1831; John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer,
January 22, 1831, both in ibid.
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probably had been waiting on the Guard’s return and anticipated a trooper to provide
provocation.10
Maintaining composure proved difficult for the guardsmen, especially in light of the
actions of one particular miner. Called “the vilest of the vile” by Sanford, this miner proved
adept at raising the ire of the Guard when he “professed the utmost contempt for Georgia, her
laws, her officers, [and] denied her jurisdiction over this territory.” Such an affront to the state’s
integrity angered one of the guardsmen, who moved to silence the intruder. Sensing the attack,
the assembly of miners, “as if by preconcert,” began hurling rocks, sticks, and “every species of
missile” they could find at the Guard. In the ensuing fight, the man who had verbally abused the
state received several bayonet wounds. Sanford expressed remorse when he learned that the
wounds were not mortal and the intruder “was not likely to experience the fate so richly merited
by his infamous life.” Perhaps the intruders began the encounter at Leather’s Ford, but they
certainly came out on the losing side.11
The intruders, after suffering at the hands of the Guard, sought the protection of civil
authorities. Soon after the fight at Leather’s Ford, the miners abused by Nelson and his
contingent swore affidavits before a judge, the first step in filing charges against individual
guardsmen for their actions in the brawl. The miner’s version of events differed greatly from
those in Sanford’s official report. Mark Castelberry, an intruder in the backcountry, swore an
affidavit before a Hall County justice of the peace that offered an alternate interpretation of
events at Leather’s Ford. The Guard, in Castleberry’s account, began hostilities when another
intruder, Ligon, the so-called “vilest of the vile,” inquired of Sergeant Henderson as to the fate of
the prisoners being hauled off. Henderson and the men under his direct command had lingered
10
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behind their comrades to “get their Canteens or Flasks filled with spirits” and did not want to
answer the man’s question. When one of the guardsmen replied that Ligon could not ask
questions, he replied testily that “he would speak when he pleased.” To quiet the dissent brewing
among the miners, Henderson threatened to “blow a load thro’ Ligon” and presented his cocked
musket, aimed squarely at Ligon’s head. Ligon backed down, claiming that he did not have a
musket with which to defend himself; Henderson rode off to find his superior officer. When
Henderson, Nelson, and the rest of the Guard returned, the miners had crowded together while
the guardsmen searched for Ligon. In his stead, they found a man who resembled him and
Nelson and the rest of the troops “thrust him with their Bayonets severly three or four times and
ordered the old man to surrender.” When he refused, the wounded old man, Taylor, was stabbed
again at Nelson’s order. Despite his wounds, Taylor turned and ran toward the safety of the
crowd of intruders, so Nelson commanded his men to fire. One of the musket balls struck Taylor
who cried out that he “was a Dead man.” However, once the Guard continued on its path the
intruders found that Taylor had survived the Guard’s “butchering.”12
The two different versions of the violent encounter at Leather’s Ford showed the
confusing nature of life in the backcountry. Sanford certainly had a reason to make it appear that
the miners had planned their attack against the Guard; the miners had motive enough to claim
that they had been the innocent victims of the Guard’s abuse. Such obfuscation served neither
side, for it set the civil authority against the Guard and made the Guard more direct in its

Affidavit of Mark Castelberry, January 26, 1831 in Georgia Military Affairs, 6:84-85. One report from Hall
County, sent to the governor by “a great many of the most respectable men in this county who think you should be
fully apprized of the conduct of the Guard…toward the people of this county,” supported the information presented
to the governor in the affidavit. See Robert Mitchell to George R. Gilmer, January 28, 1831 in J.E. Hays, ed.,
Cherokee Indian Letters, Talks and Treaties, 1786-1838 WPA project no. 4341(Atlanta: Georgia Archives, 1939), 3:266.
Gilmer inherently rejected the information presented in Castelberry’s affidavit, and encouraged a backcountry
lawyer to forego conducting an investigation into its accuracy, and instead urged him to focus on uniting “the people
in protecting the gold mines.” See George R. Gilmer to Robert Mitchell, February 3, 1831 in Gilmer, Sketches, 300.
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dealings with the intruders. What is certain is that the Guard came away the victor at Leather’s
Ford because of superior leadership and weaponry. It did not hurt that they had the full force of
state law behind them. When Gilmer learned of the actions at the Guard, he did nothing to
punish his hand-chosen commander and gave little credence to the complaints of the intruders.
The violence wrought by the Guard appeared to bother the guardsmen little. The stern
actions taken at the ford brought a brief reprieve to Sanford and his men. “Its good effects have
already been experienced, for I understand that no less than seventy of these desperate and
abandoned wretches have suddenly disappeared from their former haunts,” he informed the
governor. If the intruders appeared less than willing to take violent measures against the Guard,
they channeled their frustrations into public and political protest. In spite of the apparent retreat
witnessed by Sanford, the Guard’s duty became more difficult because a “hue and cry against the
guard for its conduct” had spread “far and wide thru the country.” Other Georgians agreed and
warned Sanford regarding the Guard’s precarious situation. In Hall County, Hines Holt Jr.
apprised Sanford of the “hostile feeling twords the guard in this County,” but urged Sanford to
continue his firm stance against the intruders. “[T]he most rigid & uncompromising course will
be the most speedy & effectual method of allaying it.” More appalling to Holt, however, was the
way in which the Guard’s actions led backcountry residents to disparage “the Legislature who
passed the Laws, the Gov. who sanctioned them, and the Guard who were endeavoring to
support them most outrageously vilified & abused.” The direct connection between the
legislature and the Guard politicized its violence against whites. 13
In an attempt to regain some support from voters, Gilmer and his supporters employed
familiar tropes to justify the actions of Sanford’s Guard. The most familiar rhetorical tactic

John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, January 22, 1831 in John W.A. Sanford Letter Book, GDAH;
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employed by the Troup faction concerned the character of the “disorderly sort,” though they
added new flourishes by concluding that the majority of the intruders did not originate from
Georgia but from the surrounding states. Sanford reassured Gilmer that those who did not obey
the supremacy law “are generally considered the refuse [of] Society of the neighbouring States
the abandoned and profligate, embodying in the beggarly elements of vice and Corruption, and
all alike reckless of Character.” Gilmer concurred in Sanford’s opinion on the origin of the
intruders and wrote to one supporter about the nature of the miners and why he felt the state
could utilize increased force. “A large part of those from other States were so employed,” and
they constituted “the most dissolute and abandoned class of society.” “Such persons,” Gilmer
argued, “cannot be restrained from continuing to search for gold, notwithstanding the
prohibition by law, but by force and punishment.” For Gilmer and Sanford, military force was
justifiable against a class of whites who did not deserve the rights granted to law-abiding citizens.
Likewise, the fact that many of the intruders reportedly hailed from other states helped convince
the governor that the disorderly needed a firm administration of state law.14
Sanford confirmed the “extreme repugnance” expressed by frontier whites to the
presence of the Guard and warned the governor of the likelihood of a violent outburst.
“[N]othing, in my opinion, prevents its violent manifestation, but the paucity of their number.”
In a letter to all of the state militia commanders in the border counties, Gilmer encouraged the
formation of militia companies to aid the Guard with the expulsion of “vicious & refractory white
men” residing with the Cherokee, who, because of their poor character would no doubt resort to
violence when confronted by the Guard. Gilmer even wrote to Charles H. Nelson to help sustain
his commander in the face of withering criticism. In periods of “high party excitement” Gilmer
14 John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, January 22, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book; George R.
Gilmer to Robert Mitchell, February 3, 1831 in Gilmer, Sketches, 299.
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warned, “all public men, especially if their stations are elevated on employment connected with
important interests,” should expect “abuse & calumny.” In spite of the public criticism, men of
their standing “should be wanting of patriotism if such treatment drove us from serving our
country.” By supporting Nelson, Gilmer acknowledged the commander’s usefulness despite his
violent tactics.15
The Guard’s presence in the backcountry, designed to preserve the common peace,
instead destabilized an already precarious region. As opposition continued to mount against the
Guard, Sanford and Gilmer struggled to salvage its reputation. Sanford reassured Gilmer that he
and his men would continue to carry out their charge despite “popular clamor or vulgar
misrepresentation.” As the weather in January and February worsened, Sanford could only take
solace in the fact that the Guard had achieved some measure of support in the backcountry. The
Guard’s conduct “as far as it has been rightly understood or properly explained has received the
decided approbation of the most orderly and respectable portion of the community.” Sanford’s
meaning was unmistakable. The “orderly” portion of the white frontier population who observed
the law and resisted the temptation of digging for gold appreciated and supported the actions of
the Guard. Those who sought to break the law spread false information regarding the Guard’s
activities and therefore deserved prosecution under the supremacy law. Only when the frontier
population respected the law and those who enforced it would the borderlands know order.16
Sanford’s attempt to coerce respect for the law became increasingly difficult because of
uncooperative weather and a cadre of intruders who had no intention of being denied quick
riches. After the incident at Leather’s Ford, the Guard continuously patrolled the gold region.
John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, January 29, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book; George R.
Gilmer to General William Ezzard, et al. January 15, 1831, Governor’s Letter Book, November 10, 1829-June 29, 1831,
Drawer 62, Box 64, GDAH; George R. Gilmer to Charles H. Nelson, March 10, 1831, ibid.
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Through February and March, however, it had little success apprehending intruders. Much of its
frustration stemmed from the wariness of the miners. They had become astute observers of the
Guard’s movements, and their network allowed for rapid communication to warn gold-diggers of
the Guard’s approach. In one expedition in early March, Nelson and a squad of guardsmen had
difficulty rounding up any intruders because of the “vigilance of their spies, who watched our
movements and conveyed intelligence of them to the gold-diggers.” Even under cover of
darkness, the network of spies screened the Guard’s probing maneuvers and managed to help
one large gathering of intruders slip through Nelson’s trap. When they arrived in the intruder’s
camp, the troopers found only emptiness and silence: “Not a light to be seen—not a mattock to
be heard—nor a human being to be found,” lamented Sanford.17
Aside from using force to expel miners, the Guard also concentrated its efforts on
maintaining state boundaries and renting out Cherokee land to white settlers. In December
1830, the legislature passed a law instructing the governor to prepare for a land lottery that
would give away the remaining Cherokee lands within state lines. Surveyors dispatched into
Indian country to plat the land into districts, sections, and lots received protection from the
Guard. Once the survey had been completed, the law stipulated that the state hold a lottery to
award the land to the citizens who had resided in Georgia for at least four years. Though the
lottery would not occur until October 1832, Gilmer hoped that by starting the process, he could
once again find common footing with his constituents.
The 1830 lottery act, like its predecessors, was designed to strengthen the agrarian nature
of the state, which, most Georgians agreed, would perpetuate the republican nature and virtuous
character of the people. The majority of the 1830 legislation dealt with the qualifications for
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surveyors, the oaths they would take, and the penalties imposed on those who would attempt to
stop them. Section 13 stipulated the number of draws open to each state resident and added
additional draws for Revolutionary War veterans, widows with dependent children, and orphans.
Although the legislation was very inclusive, it also prohibited certain people from participating in
the lottery. Controversy arose when the legislature denied draws to anyone “either directly or
indirectly concerned or interested with a certain horde of Thieves known as the Pony Club,” or
individuals who “may have dug gold, silver, or any other metal,” or those who hired other people
to do so. The lottery legislation also included stipulations that prevented members of the
“disorderly” population from legally enjoying the promises of Cherokee land. To ensure that no
Cherokee could retain their land, the legislature stipulated: “That no person or persons who are
residents on any part of the lands contemplated to be disposed of by this act, shall be entitled to a
draw or draws under any of its provisions.” The lottery legislation placed disorderly whites and
Cherokees into the same undesirable category; neither proved fit for citizenship in a republic.
Such a formulation also signaled the approach Gilmer would take in regulating the backcountry.
Rather than focusing solely on disorderly whites, he would also send the Guard after the
Cherokee.18
The Guard and its commander had other links to the perpetuation of an agrarian
republic and the common peace. Before the state held the lottery, the commander of the Guard
rented out fractional lots in the Cherokee Nation to white citizens. Most of Sanford’s time, in
fact, involved renting land and keeping the peace between Cherokee residents and their new
neighbors. “I have, as Agent on part of Georgia been directed by His Excellency the Governor to

18 “An Act to authorize the survey and disposition of lands within the limits of Georgia….” Acts of the General
Assembly of the State of Georgia, December 21, 1830, 127-143. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legisidx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte=10543155&lawcnt=1&filt=doc (Accessed October 18, 2010).
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rent certain Creek and Cherokee improvements laying within its limits,” Sanford wrote to the
Cherokee Agent Hugh Montgomery. Only three months into his tenure as commander of the
Guard, Sanford had netted $7,570 for the state by renting out fractional plots. By the end of
1831, over 208 separate families moved into the backcountry. The land was only rented to men,
though 134 had wives and they brought with them 610 children. In all, over 950 Georgians
rented land from the state and moved onto Cherokee land. While the vast majority farmed,
others made their livings as merchants, blacksmiths, mechanics, millers, wheelwrights, and one
man as a shoemaker.19
Of course, the land rented out by Sanford to prospective freeholders was still claimed by
the Cherokee, and many of the plots paid for by white Georgians still had Cherokee residents.
Land that lacked native residents but contained improvements made by its previous inhabitants
was not open for white settlement, though Sanford admittedly disregarded that portion of the
law. It should be noted that for years, both U.S. and state leaders had encouraged Indian
removal because of the Indians’ “wastefulness” regarding land use. Now the state profited
handsomely from improvements made by Cherokee farmers and rented out to whites. Not
satisfied with Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia regarding the status of the
Cherokee as a “domestic, dependent nation,” the state’s rights jurist Augustin S. Clayton sought
to strengthen the governor’s legal position when it came to appropriating Cherokee land.
Proclaiming that the Cherokee had no right to the land because of their inefficient agricultural
practices, he urged the governor to consider the relationship between the state and the Cherokee
as that between “Landlord & tenant.” Because the Cherokee could not claim fee simple

19 John W.A. Sanford to Hugh Montgomery, January 27, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book; John W.A.
Sanford to George R. Gilmer, April 1, 1831, ibid. For the list of families who rented land from Sanford (as well as a
homemade remedy for diphtheria), see the last five pages of the John W.A. Sanford Letter Book.
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ownership of the land and because their “ordinary method of cultivating lands” proved wasteful,
they could not claim the land according to the law of nations. So on the one hand, Georgians felt
entitled to Cherokee land because whites practiced a superior form of agriculture, but the state
simultaneously engaged in a campaign of renting out Cherokee improvements, including plowed
fields, corn cribs, homesteads, orchards, and fenced pastures, to white farmers who would benefit
from the hard work of the supposedly inferior native farmers.20
The model of “landlord and tenant” put into place by Clayton allowed the Guard to evict
those who were not paying rent to the state—namely, the Cherokee—but also poor whites.
When the weather turned warmer, a portion of the Guard, this time led by a different officer,
Sergeant Jacob R. Brooks, resumed operations to expel the enemies of white republican order.
Once again, the Guard sought to expel those of poor character and explicitly targeted the
remnants of the Pony Club. Vowing to “expel the Pony Club from the Cherokee Territory,”
Brooks announced publicly his intentions to remove white families who could not claim “GOOD
CHARACTER” and vowed to protect the Indians “from the aggressions of Bad White men.”
The Cherokee Phoenix soon attacked Brook’s position. After all, the paper claimed, the Guard had
hand-picked those who could rent the improvements and intimated that the state was responsible
for the longevity of the Club. “Has the Club been rooted out of the territory? Have they not
rather been introduced into the nation?” Brooks’s insistence on going after the remnants of the
Pony Club and other frontiersmen of poor reputation again prompted the Guard to regulate the
backcountry.21
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The Guard not only sought out the Pony Club, but also any other whites who violated
state law. In August, the governor received a report that made him think about whites from out
of the state. “Since the state has extended her jurisdiction,” warned one concerned backcountry
resident, “the violation of her Commercial laws is a matter of every day occurrence.” The
supremacy law required all merchants who wished to trade within the Cherokee Nation to
acquire a permit. The nominal licensing fee had more to do with Georgia’s insistence on
sovereignty—and therefore the intercourse laws—and less to do with making money from the
fees. Savvy merchants from Tennessee realized their advantage and swung itno action. An
assortment of “[p]eddlars, waggoners, citizens . . . from Tenn[essee] are constantly in motion
violating the laws of Georgia” because they crossed the border, set up their shops in Georgia
without acquiring the proper permits, and sold “all manner of produce and Merchantdz foreign
and domestic . . . they durst not sell at home without paying a high price for license.” As a result,
Sanford had to spread his forces thin so he had less control over his men and the officers. By the
end of the month, his men had constructed, or commandeered, rather, two smaller posts in
addition to their headquarters at Scudder’s Mill, including one that had previously served as a
station for missionaries. Hoping that less centralization would help his men better patrol the
“circumjacent & intermediate country,” Sanford soon came to see the distance between him and
his men as a detriment because he lacked direct control over their movements. Still, the new
strategy proved effective. A week later, Sanford reported to Gilmer on the Guard’s successes.
Since their arrival at the new posts, the Guard had entirely stopped trespassors upon the mines.22

22 W. J. Tavern to George R. Gilmer, August 6, 1831 in Gilmer, Sketches, 279-280; John W.A. Sanford to
George R. Gilmer, August 22, 1831, Georgia Military Affairs, 6:85b; John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, August
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The Guard’s improvisation showed that Sanford had some sense of military tactics. No
doubt the governor resented the intrusion more than the loss of revenue from unauthorized
merchants, but he likely applauded the news that they had been ejected. The threat from out-ofstate merchants, though minor and nonviolent, posed a threat to the state’s pretense of
sovereignty. By August, when the Guard focused its attention on the merchants, official
communication between the governor and the colonel lacked any sort of detail regarding the
Guard’s actions. With less oversight from their commander, it stands to reason that the
guardsmen took liberties when they carried out their duties. If his communiqués failed to
mention how the Guard specifically dealt with the merchants or with other intruders, it meant
that Sanford either did not know, or, more likely, did not let the governor know as a precaution.
The lack of detail in his report quite possibly arose from attempts to obfuscate what had occurred
to limit backlash against his unit.
From January to August 1831, the Georgia Guard had set out to regulate the social world
of frontier whites. Having clashed with miners at Leather’s Ford, chased reported intruders all
across the backcountry, rented out lots to settlers from Georgia, and expelled hapless merchants
from Indian country, the Guard had effectively done its duty. However, white intruders did not
constitute the Guard’s sole set of responsibilities. Sanford and his men increasingly came into
contact with Cherokee, especially as they ramped up their efforts to install white citizens on
fractional lots. According to an early summer report in the Milledgeville Federal Union, the Guard
had practiced “undue and unlawful severities over the Cherokees, and others residing on the
Cherokee soil.” The paper’s editor attributed such behavior to a lack of oversight by the
government because of the distance between it and the Guard. He never enumerated, however,
what the abuses entailed. Without details from his commander, Gilmer could not mount a
sufficient defense of the Guard. Rumors that an out of control military force, acting on its own
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accord in ways “not sanctioned by the government,” proved worrisome. If accurate, the Guard’s
“improper violence” offended the “honor of the State, as well as the principles of humanity,” and
required the punishment of the offenders.23 Sanford balked at such claims in an August 1
response. His account of the Guard’s movements made them seem nothing short of demure. The
mines “have been visited” by the Guard, Sanford wrote, “and have been found generally free
from intrusion.” He reiterated that the Guard would not lower its vigilance or patrols as it
worked to limit the intruders from operating at a “greater magnitude.” In spite of Sanford’s
insistence that the gold mines were free from intruders and that his men had acted appropriately,
political opposition to their actions continued to mount.24
One issue that usually did not draw much mention in the public debate was white
violence against the Cherokee. Backcountry violence was normally noteworthy only when
“savages” murdered innocent white settlers. So when the Federal Union mentioned the Guard’s
violence against the Cherokee, it meant that something noteworthy had occurred. While the
Guard pursued white intruders, it also took actions against native inhabitants whom the state also
prohibited from mining. Georgia’s leaders did not shy away from their intentions, either. In a
letter to Gilmer that the Phoenix reprinted, Sanford laid out the best-case scenario for the
Cherokee. Knowing that the Cherokee leaders, “conscious of their own impotency,” had to rely
upon the Supreme Court to assert their nationhood, Sanford predicted that the Cherokee
leadership, “rather than longer submit to our dominion,” would instead look to a land “where
they can without trouble or molestation exercise their own” authority. To ensure such an
outcome, Georgia had to continue its present course, which had increased the “disquietude in

23

Milledgeville Federal Union, July 21, 1831 2.

24

John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, August 1, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book, GDAH.

157

their ranks” to the “utter dismay of their counselors.” The Guard did more than patrol the mines
hunting for intruders. Its actions showed that it actively sought to make life as difficult as possible
for the Cherokee in order to convince the Cherokee that removal was the best option for the
survival of their nation and way of life.25
The Cherokee did not remain idle as they waited for the Supreme Court to make a final
ruling on their sovereignty. Even though they claimed sovereignty, the supremacy act had
outlawed any meeting of the National Council and prohibited the Cherokee from enforcing
national laws. The Guard, furthermore, often appeared in Cherokee towns and villages and
prevented the Cherokee from exercising any authority. Such appearances were not random, but
concerted efforts by the Guard to exert Georgia’s supremacy over the native inhabitants. In early
February 1831, Col. Nelson led a contingent of the Guard into the Cherokee village of
Coosawatee, where he appeared “in his military costume, with his sword hanging at his side.”
The armed company “in such military array, with muskets, pistols, swords, and all the
implements of warfare, even to a drum dangling at the side of one of their number,” sought to
tear down a toll gate on the federal road, but instead arrested the operator. The Cherokee
Constitution of 1827 authorized native agents to collect tolls on roads leading into the Nation.
Such structures implied sovereignty, a notion the state could not allow. “These are fearful times
indeed,” warned Elias Boudinot, “if an honest citizen, attending to his business in his own
premises, and in time of peace, may be invaded by an army!” In October, the Guard rode to
New Echota hoping to catch members of National Council. The Guard, though, had been
misinformed; the Council convened in Tennessee.26
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To register their discontent with the lottery and the fact that the state planned on
disposing native ground to whites, the Cherokee sought to exert some control over who could
pass through their territory. When the first surveyors lugged their instruments into the
backcountry, the Cherokee found and arrested them—a direct violation of the state law. Other
surveyors also ran into trouble with Cherokee patrols, but by the beginning of July all but seven
of the thirty-two surveying teams had reported back to Milledgeville, where they complained of
“high mountains and big rattlesnakes,” but little else. One surveyor, F.A. Brown, did run into
trouble when he met up with the Cherokee leader, David McNair. As the two men walked down
the federal road, deep in conversation, the pair passed three more Cherokee men, all of whom
appeared armed and, Brown assumed, “horse hunting.” Instead, McNair and the three men
arrested the surveyor. “Brown, you know that this land belongs to us,” McNair warned him,
“and that Georgians are taking it from us: No power on earth has the right to do this.” Claiming
that he had orders from the National Council to arrest the surveyors, McNair took Brown and
his aides into custody for violating the intercourse laws that prohibited the surveying in Indian
country. Though he asked to be taken to a county court in Georgia where Brown knew he stood
a good chance of a release, the Cherokee instead took him to Athens, Tennessee, where he went
before a magistrate. The state judge rightfully recused himself from making a decision on a
question of Indian policy and sent Brown to a federal judge in Knoxville. Prior to his departure,
a superior court judge intervened and ordered his release because, he argued, Tennessee’s courts
did not have jurisdiction for an event that occurred in Georgia. Gilmer did not order the Guard
to arrest McNair and his cohorts, even though the law authorized him to do so.27

27 F.A. Brown to Wilson Lumpkin, September 15, 1831 in Georgia Military Affairs, 6: 163-172; Macon
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Though the governor expected the Guard to use force to regulate the gold country, he
did not initially have a clear idea of which Cherokees should face the Guard’s scrutiny. By
February he had settled upon a strategy. Gilmer did acknowledge that the Guard should “keep
the Indians quiet,” but also recognized that “[t]heir rights should not only be respected, but
protected with vigilance from violation.” Gilmer then directed Sanford to assure anxious
Cherokee leaders that the “disposition of the State” focused on the “arrest of every white man
who may commit crimes affecting” the Cherokee. Admitting that some Cherokee had rights that
needed protecting may have surprised many Georgians, but Gilmer’s statement was one
motivated by politics. “The State requires of the Cherokee submission to its authority, and is
bound in return to protect them,” Gilmer informed Sanford.28 The “protection” offered by the
Guard was only extended to a certain element of the Cherokee population, those who had
submitted to state law and had agreed to enroll “voluntarily” for deportment to Arkansas. Those
Cherokee who did not submit to state authority had to face the Guard’s scrutiny. The Guard, by
February 1831, began to actively intervene in Cherokee factionalism. It repressed those who
spoke out against removal, and protected those who enrolled for emigration from the abuses of
the anti-removal faction. By using violence to divide the Cherokee polity into two distinctive
groups, Gilmer hoped that it would expedite the removal process of the entire Cherokee Nation.
For those Cherokee who resisted removal or continued searching for gold, violence
ensued. For example, in early September 1831 a detachment of guardsmen shot at two Cherokee
boys whom they suspected of digging for gold. During its pursuit of the two boys, the Guard
came across another man who promptly “took to his heels.” To prevent his escape, Sgt. Brooks
ordered his men to fire. The first two shots missed. A third struck the man and wounded him
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“dangerously.” On the same patrol, the Guard came across another man and shot him “thro’ the
body,” a wound the guardsmen “suppose[d] to be mortal.” Such flagrant actions no doubt
caused the Cherokee to reconsider their search for gold and reinforced the insecure and
untenable situation forced upon the Cherokee Nation. It also demonstrated that the Guard saw
the Cherokee as second-class citizens who did not deserve the dignity of a hearing before a judge.
When it came to enforcing the supremacy law, the Guard had become judge, jury, and
executioner.29
Attacking individual Cherokees was one thing, but for the state to achieve mastery over
the backcountry, it had to develop a strategy to deal with its leaders. For that reason, Gilmer also
instructed the Guard to gather as much intelligence as possible on Cherokee leaders to solve a
contradiction in the way he viewed Cherokee society. In one version, Gilmer saw the Cherokee
as a divided society controlled by a mixed-race elite. Gilmer “consider[ed] it of some
importance,” for Sanford to take note of the “particular history of the Chiefs of mixed blood who
are at present influencing the conduct of the Cherokees.” The governor believed that a cabal of
mixed-race Indians, who used the skills of civilization taught to them by Christian missionaries
and northern anti-slavery advocates, had long delayed removal efforts. Their chokehold on
power allowed them to control the Nation through arbitrary measures and “assumed authority.”
For Gilmer, the government of mixed-race leaders had gained power by submitting the fullblooded Cherokee into “slavish dependence,” which they had no doubt learned from their
“intercourse with vicious white men.” Contrary to that view, he likewise believed that the
Cherokee, in spite of an infusion of Anglo-American stock, remained mired in savagery and

29 John Ross to Hugh Montgomery, September 9, 1831 in Papers of John Ross (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1985), 1:222-223.
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custom. “Upon examination, it will be found that the Aboriginal people are as ignorant,
thoughtless, and improvident, as formerly.”30
In his reply to the governor, Sanford agreed that the offspring of “vicious” white men,
known for their “infamous practices” during the Revolutionary War, had indeed corrupted the
less worldly full-blooded Cherokee. Rather than join the American cause, these men had allied
with the Cherokee and emulated their deeds of “horror & bloodshed” against white families
living on the “unprotected & defenceless Frontier.” The mixed-race chiefs, descendants of
“monsters of inequity” who were “guilty of every species of crime and abomination” known to
“human society,” now sought to create a nation in the midst of the state. Georgia could not
relent its sovereignty, Sanford argued, otherwise it would permit an immoral and violent
community to subject state citizens to further outrages.31 Differentiating between a mixed-race
political and economic elite that resisted removal and a poor, benighted full-blooded population
was important for the governor’s strategy, for it showed him that the true power in the Cherokee
Nation lay in acculturated leaders who had accumulated power that they codified in the
Constitution of 1827. Even though the Cherokee elites, for all intents and purposes, had adopted
southern cultural norms—including speech patterns and racial views regarding black slaves—
their imitation was anything but flattering for the governor. White slaveholders and politicians
presided over their constituents with disinterestedness and virtue, Cherokee leaders, Gilmer
30 George R. Gilmer to John W.A. Sanford, June 15, 1831, Governor’s Letter Book; George R. Gilmer to
Andrew Jackson, June 20, 1831,ibid.; George R. Gilmer Address to the Georgia General Assembly, December 8,
1830 in Gilmer, Sketches, 287; George R. Gilmer, “Message to the Legislature,” ibid., 296. Ironically, many
supporters of the Cherokee agreed with Gilmer’s assessment of a Cherokee dialectic. Christian missionaries
reinforced the governor’s observation regarding the racial divisions within the Cherokee people, though allowed for
some nuance where Gilmer wrote with certainty. “That the Indians of mixed blood should, upon an average, be in
advance of the full Indians, was to be expected,” the ministers resolved, “& is undoubtedly true; although some
Indians of full blood are in the foremost rank, and some of mixed blood help to bring up the rear.” See, “Resolution
by Missionaries” January 1, 1831 in Jack Frederick Kilpatrick and Anna G. Kilpatrick, eds. New Echota Letters:
Contributions of Samuel Worcester to the Cherokee Phoenix (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1968), 85.
31

John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, August 10, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book, GDAH.

162

pronounced, had a “love of power” that drove them to achieve mastery over poor and ignorant
farmers. Rather than acculturated statesmen, Gilmer saw the Cherokee elites as oligarchs who
ruled over their less fortunate brethren. The irony was lost on the slaveholding governor.
Enforcing the supremacy act became the most efficient way for the Guard to undermine
the authority of the Cherokee Nation because it allowed the Guard to expel any white who had
failed or refused to acquire a residency permit from the state. Their immediate targets were
northern missionaries who supported the Cherokee ruling class and had political connections to
politicians opposed to removal. When six missionaries, led by Samuel Worcester and Elizar
Butler, refused to swear an oath of loyalty upholding state law, the commander of the Guard
bristled: “I have not faith however that any thing short of the strong arm of the Law will remove
those obstinate & incorrigible Christian pretenders.” The campaign of intimidation launched
against the missionaries, the Guard’s longest sustained operation, brought scorn down on the
state.32
Beginning in March, the Guard, with the governor’s blessing, commenced intimidating
and arresting various ministers stationed throughout the backcountry with the governor’s
blessing. On March 7, they arrested Samuel A. Worcester, marched him more than one hundred
miles but then released him on the order of a judge. Upset that their intimidation had not
convinced the ministers to flee back to their northern homes, the governor unleashed the full fury
of the Guard. “Spare no exertions to arrest them,” he urged Sanford. “If they are discharged by
the Courts, or give bail, continue to arrest them for each repeated act of continued residence in
violation to the law.” Since the ministers had chosen to ignore the laws, Gilmer implored the
Guard to “make them feel their full weight.” The Guard’s campaign of intimidation against the
32 John W.A. Sanford to George R. Gilmer, May 28, 1831, John W.A. Sanford Letter Book, GDAH; George
Gilmer to Andrew Jackson, December 8, 1830 in Gilmer, Sketches, 287.
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missionaries came to fruition in early July when Gilmer ordered their arrest for violation of the
supremacy laws. The Guard then fanned out across the Nation and took the ministers from their
homes. Having refused to swear loyalty to the state, Worcester, a Congregationalist minister, and
the other missionaries from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, found
themselves in the custody of the Guard, chained to their horses and being dragged off to stand
trial at the Gwinnett County courthouse for their insubordination. Recounting his arrest,
Worcester admitted that it began peacefully enough and that for the duration of his confinement
at Camp Gilmer, most of the Georgia Guard treated him civility and some with kindness. Most
of his abuse came at the hands of the Guard’s two primary officers, Charles H. Nelson and Jacob
R. Brooks.33
Sergeant Brooks himself arrested Worcester, but when Worcester informed him that his
wife was ill, Brooks allowed the minister to stay with his family for an additional night. The next
morning, Worcester, Brooks, and two guardsmen travelled about ten miles and delivered
Worcester to Col. Nelson. Almost immediately, Worcester noticed the changed behavior of the
otherwise pleasant sergeant. Joined by another captured minister, J.J. Trott, the two were forced
to march several miles. When a Methodist minister from Tennessee passed his arrested peers on
the road, Sgt. Brooks let loose a “tremendous torrent of curses,” which “could not be exceeded
by any thing which the most depraved and polluted imagination could deceive,” and ordered the
minister to “flank off.” When another minister, Wells, refused to depart the assemblage, Col.
Nelson beat the minister on the head with a stick. When they stopped for the night, the ministers,
chained “two by two,” passed an uncomfortable and humiliating evening. The next day, a
minister arrested from another part of the Cherokee Nation, Elizur Butler, suffered the most
33 On the first arrest of Worcester by the “representatives of a Christian State,” see Nevada Couch, “Pages
from Cherokee Indian History,” Address Delivered at the Commencement of the Worcester Academy, Vinita,
Oklahoma, 1884; George R. Gilmer to John W.A. Sanford, June 17, 1831, in Gilmer, Sketches, 314.
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abusive treatment at the hands of the Guard. They fastened a chain around his neck with a
padlock and secured it to a horse. When he stumbled in the darkness, the horse dragged him by
the neck. Taking some pity on the minister, the guardsmen placed him on the back of a horse he
shared with a soldier. The horse, eventually stumbled under its load, and the two men went
tumbling, though the guardsman, having suffered at least two broken ribs, was the worse for
wear.34
When the bedraggled ministers finally staggered into prison at Camp Gilmer, Brooks
warned them: “This is where all the enemies of the State of Georgia will have to land—there and
in hell.” The arrest occurred on July 7, and for the next eighteen days the ministers could not
leave their cell nor did they see a judge. In spite of the cruelty directed at his fellow ministers,
Worcester admitted “most of them treated us with civility and kindness.” Almost two weeks after
their arrest, they appeared before the inferior court at Lawrenceville in Gwinnett County for a
habeas corpus hearing. All of them were convicted, though they all posted bail with the exception
of a Cherokee man arrested at the same time for digging gold. Having promised to reappear in
Lawrenceville at the next session of the superior court, the ministers left the courthouse and
returned to their families and congregations.35
Even though Gilmer felt that backcountry whites were the source of most of the problems
in the gold region, he still felt ambivalent about the use of violence against them. His outlook
allowed him to extend the state’s “protection” and “forbearance” to those Cherokee who obeyed
state laws, but he had little sympathy for whites who did not behave as the governor wished. “I
owe it to the sovereignty of the State, to punish with the utmost rigor, the injurious and insolent
The entire account of Guard’s arrest of Worcester and his fellow missionaries is recounted in Cherokee
Phoenix, July 30, 1831, 1. A collection of Worcester’s letters from the Camp Gilmer jail, as well as many of his
subsequent letters, are reprinted in Kilpatrick and Kilpatrick, eds. New Echota Letters, 95-128.
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conduct of the whites who deny its power and oppose its authority,” he wrote to Sanford,
including the ministers. When the Guard used the full extent of the power granted it, though,
Gilmer became horrified when it exceeded what he saw as appropriate. When the governor read
“statements from Worcester . . . charging Col. Nelson and some of the guard with the use of
irons in confining them, and other illegal and unnecessary severe measures,” he initially
discounted the missionaries’ story because of their “flagrantly criminal conduct.” He soon
learned from a trusted source the accuracy of the report, and therefore reminded Sanford that
the use of irons did not conform to the law. In the future, the governor charged the Guard’s
leader, to remind the troops under his charge that “no other severity is authorized by the law.”
Even if Gilmer desired order and had endorsed the Guard to use its “full weight” against the
ministers, he had little stomach for the violence undertaken to secure his ideal society.36
Georgia’s politicians had long argued that the path to order lay first in the settlement of
native ground by white farmers who could then implement civil law. The nature of the
Cherokee-Georgia borderlands made that peaceful and seamless transition of authority more
difficult than Gilmer had anticipated. Instead of a more gentle civil law, he found himself willing
to implement order at bayonet point because of whites whose character and conduct he
disapproved of and could not understand. When he authorized the Guard to use its full weight
against the ministers, he soon regretted the decision because of the lengths the guardsmen went
to detain and berate peaceful men. Though perhaps it was acceptable to use irons to confine a
slave or a hardened criminal, their use on ministers appalled the public. Almost immediately, the
cry to remove Nelson and halt the actions of the Guard made it necessary for the overzealous
commander to tender his resignation. Gilmer, surprisingly, did not accept it. “I have uniformly
36 George R. Gilmer to John W.A. Sanford , September 3, 1831 in Milledgeville Federal Union, September
15, 1831, 2; George R. Gilmer to John W.A. Sanford, September 3, 1831 in Gilmer, Sketches, 324.
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found you exceedingly active and faithful in the discharge of the public service which has been
assigned to you,” he wrote to Nelson. He continued, “[A]lthough I have not altogether approved
of the means which were employed on one or two occasion, in enforcing the laws, I have never
doubted but that your object was the performance of what you considered your duty.” Yet
Nelson’s interpretation of his duty obviously differed from Gilmer’s, who reminded the colonel:
“confinement is never to be rendered severe upon prisoners for the purpose of punishment.”
Even as opposition mounted against the Guard, Gilmer did not accept Nelson’s resignation
probably because he knew it would not help his reputation in the upcoming election. Instead, his
opponents would have made light of his disloyalty to a state agent, and perhaps of valuing the
rights of the Cherokee more than the zeal and energy of a white man engaged in law
enforcement.37
The governor’s condemnation of violent tactics came too late to stem the growing
political discontent marshaled by the opposition. The “disgraceful and savage” treatment that the
ministers received by the Guard, with orders from the governor, was without peer “in the annals
of limited government.” It would have been acceptable to apprehend the ministers, for the Macon
Telegraph admitted that they were fugitives, but to “blackguard, beat, chain, and drag . . .
ministers of the Gospel” proved intolerable. Moreover, opposition to his policies transcended
state factionalism and spread to the northeast, where Christian opponents saw the Guard’s
brutality as a sure sign of southern arrogance. “At the hands of “Georgia Guards,” wrote one
editorialist in Massachusetts, the ministers “received treatment, which could be justified only
toward the most desperate of felons.” Wondering why the Guard’s officers had not been put on
trial for their abuses, the editorial declared that unless Georgia had “gone to the depth of
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degradation” it would prove impossible for “any officer of the law thus to use his authority.” The
editor had to wonder “in what state we must henceforth consider Georgia—whether as civilized
or savage.”38
Gilmer did try to extricate himself from the growing political mess by claiming that he
had limited control over the Guard. He argued that those who opposed the brazenness of the
Guard were “entirely mistaken as to my power over the Guard.” “I have no authority to punish
them whatever may be their conduct,” he reasoned, because the guardsmen “are neither soldiers
nor subject to military law.” Gilmer scrutinized the law that created the Guard and concluded
that it prevented him from punishing individual guardsmen; only citizens could file suit against
them. Even though the Guard had a distinct martial bearing, Gilmer tried to argue that his
chosen avenue for employing order did not constitute a true military outfit. The Guard, rather
than a regiment of militiamen who imposed order through martial law were substitutes for
“sheriffs and Constables” because they could act “more efficiently.” Such a fine distinction was
lost upon many of his detractors who began to see the Guard as an instrument of abuse
symptomatic of the governor’s overbearing style of rule.39
Hoping to improve his image, Gilmer sought to free the ministers who had just been
convicted in Gwinnett County. He explored “whether they or any of them are entitled to
Executive clemency,” and eventually offered the missionaries a pardon. Only four of the
ministers took his offer. Worcester and Butler rejected it and began their stint in the state
penitentiary, an outcome that “entirely satisfied” the governor. Though his military force, the
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Georgia Guard, had rather successfully protected the gold mines, it had done so in a way
altogether inconsistent with egalitarianism and white superiority. Instead, the Guard’s mission to
clear the gold mines meant that it indiscriminately carried out its charge. Their color-blind
attacks on miners, ministers, and Indians made them appear to voters, ironically, as prejudiced
because they did not carry out a campaign to instill white superiority in the borderlands. Rather
than a racial hierarchy, it had established a moral hierarchy where law-abiding citizens were
rewarded with leases and lotteries while law-breaking residents were beaten and jailed.40
By that point, mid September, the governor’s clemency came too late to do much
political good as the Election of 1831, pitting Gilmer against the Clark Party candidate, Wilson
Lumpkin, had reached fever pitch. The divisive issues separating the two candidates came down
to initiatives each supported for the direction of the backcountry economy and landownership.
More importantly, the parties squabbled over the implementation of order and the sanctity of
whiteness, two ideas tied intimately in the political discourse. During his time as governor,
Gilmer had made two proposals that raised opposition to his reelection. First, he advocated state
ownership of the gold mines. Second, he argued that Indians should be allowed to testify against
white men in state courts, if only to make it easier to convict white intruders. Such out-of-touch
proposals made it easy for the Clark Party to paint the Troupites as elitist and proponents of an
integrated, biracial society, much like the kind developing on the frontier where cooperation
rather than superiority had become custom.
Both of the governor’s proposals, interestingly, had come in October 1830 in an address
to the legislature and not during the campaign. Gilmer certainly championed landownership by
whites in the backcountry, but he wanted to deny them the right to own any land that contained
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gold mines. The governor, instead, desired to implement a plan calling for state ownership of the
gold mines. He had two reasons to do so, one economic reason and the other moral. First, he
argued that the proceeds from publicly held gold mines could do much to alleviate the problems
of the state’s poor. If the mines proved “exceedingly profitable,” he argued, “the State will be
enabled thereby to relieve the people from taxation, improve the public roads, render the rivers
navigable, and extend the advantages of education to every class of society.” Such a plan would
benefit farmers across the state. Freed from the burdens of taxation, they could spend their
money improving their land, thereby “adding to the riches of the country,” instead of having
their money “drawn from them to be placed in the public treasury.” The gold mines, for Gilmer,
could provide the state with untold riches—a panacea enabling the governor to implement a
wide-ranging program of internal improvements, education and tax reform. In Gilmer’s mind,
limiting individual ownership of the gold mines had another benefit for Gilmer: denying gold to
individuals would protect the morals of the region’s inhabitants. A gold lottery would only injure
the public good, he argued, because it would encourage people to speculate wildly. However
disagreeable the prospect of public ownership became to many Georgians, the most upsetting
aspect of the governor’s plan was the tone he took when discussing Georgia’s voters. “The
community would be highly excited by the hope of acquiring great wealth, without labor. The
morals of the country would be in danger of corruption,” not only because of the temptation to
speculate in gold mines, but because those individuals lucky enough to win would quit upright
habits. “Regular industry and economy would for a time be suspended by restless idleness, and
imaginary, as well as real and unnecessary expenditures.” If a lottery gave away gold mines to
those with poor character, the acquisition would only exacerbate their moral shortcomings and
fuel the demise of the republic. The common good required a virtuous citizenry not tempted into
prodigality by gold. Gilmer, in other words, sought to use the power of the state to save white
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men from themselves by imposing morality that would eventually create order the backcountry
and implement civil law. 41
Lumpkin’s supporters immediately sprang into action and charged Gilmer and the rest of
the Troup faction with elitism. “Oh! No—,” one editor chided the governor, “It will turn your
heads you poor folks to become so ‘suddenly’ rich!” Rather than take the gold for themselves,
poor men should “let your rich neighbor, who drives his carriage and drinks his wine, have it.”
Lumpkin’s supporters also wanted to look out for the common good, but thought that Gilmer’s
approach was more befitting a “monarchy or aristocracy—where the nobles may oppress their
subjects and wallow themselves in ease and luxury.” Such a condition, however, “does not suit a
republican people, for the very import of the form republic implies the wealth and prosperity of the
people,” and not a select few. For Lumpkin and his supporters, the fate of the republic hinged on
the liberty of white men to pursue happiness as they saw fit. They drew on patriotic themes to
connect the sanctity of private property and Lumpkin’s campaign. One editor urged the
candidate’s supporters to help Lumpkin pilot the “staunch republican-built boat,” and channeled
Oliver Hazard Perry: “DON’T GIVE UP THE GOLD MINES!” 42
The Clark Party’s offensive against public ownership of the gold mines countered
Gilmer’s moralist tones. It would not be the people who succumbed to moral decay because of
the gold mines, but government agents charged with managing the mines’s operation. Such
agents “would deem it God’s service to purloin, embezzle, and swindle the State out of the last
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particle of gold to be found in the country.” Declaring that large stores of public money in the
coffers of the state bank posed the real threat to the morality of the people because a surplus of
monies would seduce state leaders into corruption, Lumpkin’s supporters argued that the people
should safeguard the wealth and the common good. When the gold reached the Central Bank
“the work of corruption” would really begin. Estimating that the mines would produce nearly
four million dollars over the course of a decade, a corrupted governor with so much disposable
income could raise an “army of thirty thousand men” and “compel obedience” from the rest of
the state. Such a course could not come to pass. Such an endeavor as public ownership of the
gold mines would prove nothing short of a catastrophe for the state. “[A] good Executive would
endeavor to prevent an influence inimical to republicanism, so adverse to public morals and so
destructive of the true interests of the country.”43
Lumpkin also questioned Gilmer’s concern over the moral failing of the poor. Poverty did
not derive from a lack of morals, as Gilmer seemed to imply about the “disorderly” people
inhabiting the frontier, but from bad luck or unfortunate circumstances. Not a few “worthy
citizens” could use the riches of the gold mines to “carry independence, and comfort, and
happiness” into the homes of “honest and patriotic” men who just happened to be poor. A gold
lottery, one editor estimated, would spread happiness and independence to over one thousand
households. Rather than horde the gold in the hands of the state, the government should scatter
wealth, “with a bountiful broad-cast, over the whole population!” The editor of the Federal Union
reminded his readers that the interests of the government should never be separated from those
Macon Telegraph, September 17, 1831, 2. Historian David Williams categorized Gilmer’s proposal for state
ownership of the gold mines as a program “in a vein of classical socialism.” At best, such a mischaracterization lays
bare his contemporary politics; at worst, it shows a lack of understanding regarding the nature of public property
and the American commonwealth tradition. For Williams’s mischaracterization, see his Georgia Gold Rush, 48. On
public property as a legal construction designed to benefit the common good see, for example, William J. Novak, The
People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996),
115-121.
43

172

of its citizens. The “best mode of building up public institutions, is, first, to establish, on solid
foundations, the prosperity of the people.” What less fortunate Georgians deserved, Lumpkin’s
supporters cried, was a “’white man’s chance’” to better themselves and their families. A lottery
for gold claims would ensure such an opportunity and in the process they would preserve the
republic.44
When Lumpkin and his supporters claimed that Gilmer’s plan for public ownership of the
gold mines limited the opportunity available to whites, they were playing on white fears about
status and mastery that permeated the antebellum South. As controversial as Gilmer’s proposal
for public ownership proved, another of his campaign statements became his undoing. When
Gilmer addressed the state assembly in October 1830, he made a serious gaffe when he proposed
the repeal of a state law that prohibited Indians from testifying in state courts against whites.
Politicians across the state raised their eyebrows in wonder; Lumpkin and his associates pounced.
“If Indians are allowed to testify against white men, under the present state of our Indian
relations, what is to become of the white people” in the border counties, wondered the Federal
Union editor? Such a practice would put whites at the mercy of Indians in court and set a
dangerous precedent concerning the right of free blacks or even slaves to testify against whites.45
Gilmer himself never sufficiently defended his proposal, other than a brief remark that
Indian testimony would make it easier to prosecute intruders. His letters showed a growing
unease with the plight of many Cherokee families, especially those who, for all intents and
purposes, were white. In a letter to the Cherokee John Rodgers, he expressed his desire for “the
44
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State to act justly and humanely towards you and those with whom you are connected.”
Whatever misgivings he maintained about mixed-race families, he had to admit that those
“whites, half-breeds, and their children may be [ready] for the support and preservation of an
orderly and well-conducted Government, the Indians are not so, and never will be until their
present situation is changed.” Perhaps Gilmer only meant for the testimony repeal to include
mixed-race Indians, though he never specified. His silence on the issue underscored how serious
of a gaffe it had been, though he never backtracked from his stance. It was better to ignore the
proposal than to give his opponents more opportunity to declare him a governor who did not
encourage white superiority.46
Gilmer also came under partisan attack as a governor who wasted taxpayer money. The
most evident expense that Lumpkin proclaimed as wasteful was the Guard itself. As attacks
against the governor’s backcountry police force mounted, Gilmer urged Sanford to be
particularly diligent in his bookkeeping and “as economical as possible in expenditures.” Aside
from netting the state nearly $8,000 in rental payments, the Guard cost the state little. Sanford
himself made $100 per month, each of the sergeants earned $25, and each private earned $20.
The entire forty-man company that comprised the Guard as well as the pay of the commanders
totaled about $1000 each month. The bulk of the Guard’s expenses came in food and forage.
From August to October, the Guard spent $1,344 dollars of taxpayer money. The remainder of
the Guard’s expenses came for an assortment of services provided by members of the frontier
community. Sanford had to pay a $230 bill to Jacob M. Scudder for supplies he had provided,
while Samuel Leathers (of Pony Club infamy) billed the Guard three dollars “for the use of my
oxen and waggons whilst employed in the service of the Georgia Guard.” Jacob R. Brooks owed
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Doctor Whitehul $2.50 for a “surgical procedure.”47 Though the Guard’s existence was not an
easy one, they did not starve either. Viewed in light of the $20,000 appropriated by the
legislature, few could accuse the governor of profligacy. For a governor to urge the people to
continue their economical ways and then spend their tax dollars for a police force that limited the
opportunities of whites proved too much for many voters to endure.
Moreover, Lumpkin’s supporters decried the fact that Gilmer had expelled the federal
troops, who patrolled the mines free of cost to the state, and had instead inserted a costly, violent,
and tyrannical military force contrary to the laws of the Constitution. The U.S. troops, “which
were protecting the gold mines and the peace and good order of the territory,” cost the state
nothing. When the governor asked the president to withdraw the troops so that the state could
enforce its sovereignty over the Cherokee, it had replaced one military force sanctioned by the
Constitution with an “armed Guard” that only increased Gilmer’s “power and patronage.” Such
a force went against the Constitution, “which prohibits the establishment of a standing army, by
any of the States.”48
Georgia’s election of 1831 contained within it many of the hallmarks characterized by the
Second Party System. The Troup Party’s discussion of internal improvements, moral reform, and
a supposed disdain for the poor predicted its turn toward the Whig Party later in the decade. The
Clark Party’s insistence on the sanctity of private property, the equality, and, indeed the
superiority of white men easily meshed with the vision of society put forth by Andrew Jackson’s
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Democratic Party. As Georgia’s political system began coalescing into the political structure that
would shape national politics for the next three decades, it also contained within it peculiarities
all its own. For example, nullification was still an important point of contention not only because
of Georgia’s proximity to the Palmetto State, but because there was a distinctive awareness
among state leaders and the Cherokee that Georgia had nullified federal law when it passed the
supremacy act and extended its sovereignty over the Cherokee Nation. Of intrinsic importance
to state politics during the 1830s was the appropriate use of state-sponsored violence to create
order. Everyone could agree that order was necessary; no such comity existed when it came to
the use of a military unit to instill order. Like most else in Jacksonian politics, the use of military
force became a political issue that provided divergent frameworks for each party.49
As voters streamed to the polls in October 1831, they largely rejected Gilmer’s proposals
and the use of force in the backcountry. The injury to the “white man’s chance,” particularly the
governor’s penchant for moral reform through the prohibition of private ownership of the gold
mines, his proposal to allow Indian testimony in state courts, and the use of a military force as a
political tool, all spelled certain defeat for Gilmer. In the border counties, especially, voters
rejected Gilmer’s ideas regarding state ownership of profitable gold mines, the equality of Indians
to whites, and the governor’s attempts to provide moral order by limiting the prosperity of
Georgia’s families. In the six border counties, Lumpkin accumulated overwhelming majorities
that mirrored the returns in the rest of the state. Of the 7,647 votes cast in the border counties, a
paltry 2,399 went for Gilmer, just over 31 percent. Lumpkin received 5,248 votes, or nearly 69
percent of the votes cast.50 For white borderlanders, Gilmer’s vision for the Cherokee country
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clashed with their expectations. The promise of Gilmer’s republicanism—that the state’s poorest
citizens would have a free education and a modern, market-based economy all paid for by the
riches found in the gold region—was rejected handily by voters. Unlike his opponent’s
democratic posture on the gold mines and the rights of white citizens to own them, Gilmer’s
stance would only benefit those who had already conformed to state law and the precepts of a
virtuous republican citizen. By acting to protect the polity from its own vices, the republican
promise offered by Gilmer and the rest of the Troup faction denied many Georgians their path
to respectability.
The effort to exclude the “disorderly sort,” accused members of the Pony Club, and other
criminals, from having a chance at land or gold punished people for past crimes and precluded
them from enjoying Georgia’s embarrassment of riches. The lottery, for the Troup faction, was
there only to perpetuate the republican promise to those who already enjoyed the state’s largesse
and not extend it to those most in need of it. The actions of the Slicks, the Georgia Guard, and
the federal troops reinforced this view of the state’s actions. Individual citizens, along with federal
troops and state militiamen castigated those deemed unworthy of the benefits of republican
citizenship. Violence directed at the disorderly sort was a means of reinforcing the view of their
unworthiness to the state’s inheritance.
When Wilson Lumpkin took the oath of office in December 1831, he showed how little
he had learned from the mistakes of his predecessor. During the campaign, Lumpkin’s supporters
chastised the Guard and the heavy-handed measures it took to enforce law over white residents.
The new governor promised a continuation of those policies. “[T]he executive should be vested
with full power, promptly to control the agents who have been or may be selected to maintain
the authority of the laws,” in the backcountry. Though opposed to the nullifiers, Lumpkin
reiterated the right of the state to extend its authority over the Cherokee territory. Framing the
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issue as a “moral duty” to extend the state’s authority into the Cherokee territory in order to
“save that part of our State from confusion, anarchy, and perhaps from bloodshed,” Lumpkin
called on the white residents to help him extend order. “Until we have a population planted
upon the unoccupied portion of this Territory, possessed of all the ordinary inducements of other
communities to sustain our laws and government,” chaos would reign. Even though Lumpkin
gained power by opposing violence in the backcountry, he quickly took up the mantle as a
regulator. He also evinced much less concern than his predecessor over the use of violence as a
tool to impose social control over an unruly and racially diverse backcountry population. Though
his reversal may have made him a hypocrite, Lumpkin saw the pressing need for stability in the
backcountry and saw the Guard as a means to that end.51
As the new year dawned, Lumpkin made good on assuming control of the Georgia
Guard. The legislature reaffirmed the portion of the supremacy law allowing the governor to
provide for the punishment of backcountry criminals. Despite the fact that he had criticized the
Guard as an unconstitutional force and patronage tool, he willingly continued it. In late
December, he nominated John Coffee to the post of commander of the Georgia Guard. Coffee
accepted. In early January, the transfer of command occurred when Coffee appeared at Camp
Gilmer and had a civil conversation with his predecessor regarding the role of the Guard.52
The beginning of 1832 brought renewed troubles for the Cherokee, but also hope. With
Lumpkin entrenched in office, a land lottery began in October. Once the names of the “fortunate
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drawers” had been made public, thousands of them flocked to claim their winnings. This posed
innumerable difficulties for the Cherokee who were evicted from their own farms when a white
lottery winner arrived. The lottery law prohibited whites from evicting a Cherokee family from
their homes, so white families would either begin a confrontation and force the native family off
or build nearby and deny the rightful landowners use of their land. The first week of December
1832 brought a large number of lottery winners into the Cherokee Nation like “great flocks of
pigeons that hastens to the ground in search of food,” despaired Elias Boudinot. “Every lot has
been hewed and as many paths beaten” in search of the precious metals dusting the region’s
streambeds. “To this invasion of our property we protest; and we state to our readers, our right
to the lands.” Though outraged, Boudinot cautioned his countrymen: “Let us therefore calmly
await and see if the Government will not yet acquiesce . . . or whether the government will
choose to have their laws nullified by a state as the easiest mode of releasing itself from enforcing
them.”53
Boudinot’s patience, along with the rest of the Cherokee, had been stretched thin for
nearly a decade by the aggressive behavior of the state of Georgia and its citizens. When the
Supreme Court met in February, the realization of the Cherokee’s hopes came to fruition when
John Marshall and the rest of the court sustained the case brought by Samuel Worcester. The
minister’s arrest and imprisonment, the court argued, were illegal because the state of Georgia
had no legal claim to extend its sovereignty or legal structure over the Cherokee Nation. The
extension and supremacy laws, therefore, were null and void; Cherokee sovereignty had been
confirmed. The state of Georgia, however, had no intention of heeding the ruling. Instead,
Lumpkin encouraged whites to enter the Cherokee Nation in search of their claims. The
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governor went so far as to recommend to Coffee that if he could gather sufficient testimony
proving John Ross and other chiefs were conspiring to undermine Georgia’s laws, he could arrest
them and haul them to Athens for trial.54
The creation of the Georgia Guard in December 1830 sent a clear message to the
Cherokee and intruders alike. Georgia’s leaders expressed their willingness to use violence to
impose state sovereignty in the borderlands, and it would not tolerate deviation from those laws.
By connecting the undesirability of intruders and Cherokees in the white republic, the governor
took an important step in making the problem one not solely based on race. When the Guard
began acting, however, it found that implementing a white republic through aggressive means
proved just as difficult for state troops as it had been for federal forces. State-sanctioned violence
used against intruders went against the prevailing frontier ethos that stressed white male equality.
The Guard’s white victims presented a compelling portrait of the powers of the state run amok,
even to those who espoused a state’s right platform. Lumpkin had run on a platform denouncing
the Guard and the governor’s efforts to limit the “white man’s chance.” Once in office, he did
not discontinue the unit nor limit its activities in the borderlands. He too accepted the need to
employ violence against whites and Cherokees in the pursuit of order.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE GEORGIA GUARD AND THE WHITE REPUBLIC, 1832-1836

For Lumpkin to bring about the “white man’s chance” on which the governor had
campaigned, he needed to continue Gilmer’s policy of intimidating the Cherokee by employing
the Georgia Guard. He also had to ensure that the lottery winners could take up residence in the
borderlands. The best way of ensuring those goals was the continued reliance on the Georgia
Guard. Between 1832 and 1836, the Georgia Guard continued sowing discord in the Cherokee
Nation. It did so in a variety of ways. None was more important than its implementation of
federal removal policy. Often taking orders from Major Benjamin Currey, the federal agent with
oversight over voluntary removal, the Guard did its best to protect those natives who had
accepted removal from those who opposed it. The Guard further intensified its harassment of
those Cherokee who continued to take gold form the mines, or intimidated those who remained
on plots of land drawn by Georgia’s lottery winners, both of which were now considered the
private property of the “fortunate drawers.” Their efforts came to fruition when federal treaty
negotiators brokered the Treaty of New Echota in 1835. The Guard, concurrent with its
intimidation of the Cherokee, used similar tactics against whites who opposed the Troup Party.
The two strains of violence, one directed at whites, the other at Indians, had a similar purpose: to
bring to fruition a country inhabited by law-abiding whites. For the realization of the white
republic to occur, it could not contain within it those who opposed the “white man’s chance” at
land ownership and independence. Though committed to the expansion of Georgia’s
sovereignty, the Guard caused a significant degree of political strife that ultimately led to its
downfall. By the end of 1835, the legislature had disbanded the Guard but not before it aided in
the fracturing of Cherokee society and proponents of removal had signed the Treaty of New
Echota.
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Prior to its dissolution, however, the Georgia Guard set out to secure native ground for
the state of Georgia. In April 1832, the subcommander of the second Georgia Guard, William
W. Williamson, ventured into Cherokee country to ascertain the natives’ response to the Worcester
decision and their acceptance of voluntary removal. Passing through country previously
unexplored by the Guard, Williamson happened upon Amicalola Falls, a waterfall he reckoned
“the most majestic Scene that I have ever witnessed or heard of.” The sublimity of the falls not
withstanding, Williamson learned troubling portents for the extension of state sovereignty. In the
isolated mountain villages he visited, Williamson witnessed the Cherokee’s joyous response to
Chief Justice Marshall’s decision. The Cherokee leaders with whom he conversed believed
“Congress would compel the President to send an Armed force” to uphold the ruling. Williamson
warned the Cherokee against such a hope. The other states, Williamson cautioned, would not
“resque” the Cherokee lest they risk “Civil War & disunion.” If President Jackson did send an
army to “whip Georgia into her duty,” Williamson predicted that the Cherokee people “would
be swept of[f] the Earth before any assistance could arrive.” The last remark seemed to convince
at least some Cherokee leaders “that a large portion of the Georgians wanted only a small pretext
to exterminate them.”1
Williamson’s journey through the Cherokee Nation had other purposes. Ordered to judge
acceptance of a plan to encourage voluntary removal, Williamson traversed rough terrain
without a guide or a translator. Forced to “turn Indian” to complete his goals, Williamson was
nevertheless found out and “committed to jail,” ostensibly by the Cherokee Lighthorse. He did
not specify what he meant when he said he “turned Indian,” though presumably he donned
Indian attire or else sought to act in a stealthy manner to avoid detection. Williamson’s efforts to
1 William W. Williamson to Wilson Lumpkin, April 28, 1832 in Telamon Cuyler Collection, Folder 3, Box
49A, MS 1170, Hagrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia, Athens, GA.
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turn into an Indian underscored several important aspects of life along the Cherokee frontier,
both of which proved troubling to state leaders. That it was possible for a white man to shed
himself of his identity, at least visually, demonstrated the amount of acculturation and
interchange that had occurred. It also showed how pliable whiteness had become in the
borderlands: Indians who appeared white, spoke English, adopted Christianity, and owned
African slaves had imposed on less acculturated Cherokee a constitutional republic with
themselves as leaders. At the same time, whites fraternized with Indians and behaved “savagely.”
The blurring boundaries between American whiteness and Cherokee savagery made it possible
for a white man to pass himself off as an Indian and vice versa. For state leaders, this affront to
civilization had to end so that proper and natural order could resume. To achieve that end and
preserve whiteness, removal became necessary and urgent.2
State leaders had to determine what to do with whites who fraternized with Indians, as
well as with those Cherokee who had mostly assimilated. Throughout 1832 and into the
following year federal negotiators increased efforts to remove “voluntarily” individual Cherokee
from their homes and deport them to the Arkansas territory. In April, one enrolling agent,
Benjamin F. Currey, reported that over 130 Cherokee had enrolled for emigration. Currey also
noted mounting opposition to removal. “Vagabond white men are constantly intermarrying with
squaws who will oppose my terms unless they themselves can be accommodated with
reservations,” he complained to one official at the Office of Indian Affairs. In late May, Currey
once again wrote to his superiors in Washington about problems arising from his enrollment
efforts. Most of the resistance to enrollment, he reported, came from “white men intermarried
with Cherokees.” The resistance became so heated that Currey pleaded: “Can you devise any
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proceeding which can be taken to put a stop to these unwarrantable interferences?” If allowed to
use troops, he could “punish under martial law” those who interfered, because, he claimed, “all
regular constitutional government is abdicated here.”3
Though Curry linked a growing number of intermarried whites to increased disorder and
opposition to voluntary removal, the actual number of whites connected to the Cherokee was
small. An 1835 census conducted by the War Department showed that, of the nearly 9,000
Cherokee residing in Georgia, only sixty-eight whites had intermarried. A further 81 percent of
the Cherokee living in Georgia were “fullbloods” without European or American ancestry, so less
than one out of five Cherokee could point to some combination of a mixed parentage. Still, the
impression remained that whites connected to the Cherokee through marriage prevented federal
removal efforts. Part of this impression came from geographical features that preserved so-called
“full-blooded” districts. For example, most ethnographers and historians accept that traditionalist
communities, or those that had less acculturation, resided in the mountain towns in northwest
Georgia and in the region closest to the Creek country, especially near Carroll County.
Therefore, the greatest amount of acculturation occurred where the middle border counties—
Campbell, Gwinnett, Hall, and Habersham—joined native ground. Acculturation and racialmixing was more prevalent in Georgia than in Cherokee lands in Tennessee, Alabama, and
North Carolina. Of all of the mixed-race Cherokee families, nearly 54 percent lived in Georgia,
which also contained the highest concentration, 52 percent, of traditionalist households. Though

3 “Abstract No. 2: Guns, Blankets, Kettles, Tobacco & boats delivered to Emigrants,” April 1832, Letters
Received from Office of Indian Affairs, Roll 75, M234, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington
DC; Benjamin F. Currey to Elbert Herring, May 23, 1833, ibid; Benjamin F. Currey to Elbert Herring, September
9, 1833, ibid.
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the mixed-race portion of the backcountry society appeared small, Georgia’s leaders saw the
trajectory of the borderlands and sought to remedy the situation.4
Resistance to removal had less to do with opposition expressed by whites intermarried
with the Cherokee and more to do with the political schism within the Cherokee polity, though
the Jackson administration often tied the two together. Cherokee society had fractured into two
separate factions: one led by John Ross that opposed forced removal and stressed national unity;
and another, a group that saw accommodation and removal as key to Cherokee persistence. The
Jackson administration obviously sided with those who favored removal and claimed, like
Gilmer, that mixed-race elites lorded over those traditionalists who wanted to remove to the west
to continue hunting and communal agriculture. State and federal policy had thereby converged.
Both sought to intimidate John Ross and other nationalist leaders opposed to removal and to
protect accommodationists who had already enrolled or who planned on doing so.5
Uncertainty regarding voluntary removal also discourged many Cherokee from leaving
their homes. Though enrollees had access to government aid, tobacco, firearms, and food to
make the trip west more tolerable, and a promise of land upon their arrival in Arkansas, they
already had land where they were. Because of the political infighting and the undesirability of
moving, the large majority of Cherokees did not choose to relocate. When Major Currey set out
for Arkansas at the head of a contingent of émigrés in April 1832, he departed the Cherokee
agency at Calhoun, Tennessee with only 200 Cherokees, plus 40 whites, and 108 blacks. Such a
breakdown suggests that elite Cherokee slaveowners composed most enrollees. By the end of the
John F. Schermerhorn to Lewis Cass, March 3, 1836, S. Doc 120 (Serial 315 Session Vol 2) 25th Congress
Session, 535; William G. McLoughlin and Walter H. Conser, Jr. “The Cherokees in Transition: A Statistical
Analysis of the Federal Cherokee Census of 1835,” Journal of American History 64 (December 1977): 686, 694, Table
12.
4
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year, Currey had managed to relocate only 626 Cherokee. Without the aid of the Georgia
Guard, however, his total would have been much less.6
The second Guard, led by John Coffee, both protected those Cherokees who had enrolled
and forced others into enrollment camps against their will. Such a strategy helped the Guard
widen the schism between pro- and anti-removal forces within the Cherokee polity. In March
1832, William M. Davis, a federal enrolling agent, wrote to Secretary of War Lewis Cass
regarding a scuffle that occurred between the Georgia Guard and a party of militant whites from
Tennessee. At an enrollment camp in Tennessee, the Guard had been “stationed for the purpose
of keeping order,” at the behest of Benjamin F. Currey to protect the emigrants and their
property from overzealous Tennesseans. Colonel Archibald Turk, a militiaman from Tennessee,
led a group of “privately armed” men into the camp immediately preceding a church service
where they forced their way through the Guard “purposely to bring on a disturbance.” Once the
service ended, Turk “commenced a quarrel with the commanding officer of the guard” by
deriding Coffee and his men with “the most abusive epithets, threatened to drive them beyond
the limits of the state of Tennessee & presented a cocked pistol and bayonet at the breast of the
officer.” The guardsmen seized their own muskets and a standoff ensued with nervous Cherokee
families in the crossfire. Only the “great forbearance and prudence” of Major Currey and the
Guard prevented all out bloodshed from occurring.7
Colonel Turk and his armed band soon left the camp, but threatened to raise another
party to “drive the Guard back into Georgia.” He made good on his promise. The next day he
arrived with an even larger armed posse and “paraded them upon the opposite bank of the
Charles Russell Logan, The Promised Land: The Cherokees, Arkansas, and Removal, 1794-1839 (Little Rock:
Arkansas Historic Preservation Program, 1997), 25.
6

7 William M. Davis to Office of Indian Affairs, March 23, 1832, Letters Received by the Office of Indian
Affairs, Roll 75, M234, RG 75, NARA.
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river,” a threatening demonstration that served as a warning to the Georgia Guard. Major
Currey and Colonel Coffee heeded the message and decided “to forbear quelling the disorder by
force” and returned to safer territory. The “disorder” caused by Turk and his party of
Tennesseans came about because of the presence of the Guard. Even though they had crossed
into Tennessee at the behest of a federal agent, their jurisdiction did not extend into neighboring
states. The agent who recorded the brinksmanship had other ideas about who caused problems
for the Cherokee. “[A]bandoned and unprincipled whitemen, who are numerous in this country,
and who infest their camps night and day, for unworthy purposes,” posed the real problem. To
alleviate the tensions, a “strong Guard of the troops of the United States,” ought to be posted in
the Cherokee backcountry. The actions of the Guard, though, highlighted their commitment to
protecting those Cherokee who abided by state law and accepted removal, if only to usher them
out of the state as quickly as possible.8
For those Cherokee who did not cooperate, the Guard did not provide that protective
mantle. The most audacious operation conducted by Coffee, according to the Cherokee Phoenix,
was the attempted arrest of John Ross. Lumpkin encouraged Ross’s arrest, along with those of
Joseph Vann and other Cherokee leaders, because he thought it necessary in order to maintain
“the authority of the state.” The attempt failed, and the guardsmen “came off without a
prisoner.” The Phoenix also reported that Coffee and his men continued their efforts to clear the
gold mines so that lottery winners could have unfettered access to their property. One man
whom they found, Nickojack, had been shot clean through the arm and leg because the
guardsmen suspected him of digging for gold. Newspapers as far away as New York began
printing stories of the Guard’s “horrid barbarity.” In May, the Guard apprehended Teesaskee
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and his wife for gold prospecting. To secure their release, the couple had to agree to enroll as
emigrants. Instead, Teesaskee rejected the offer, so he and his wife went to prison in
Lawrenceville for an indeterminate amount of time. Another Cherokee man, Robin, also faced
expulsion from his homeland for digging for gold. When he refused to enroll, the Guard whipped
him. “The Guard tied his hands fast, and led him to a tree, and inflicted fifty stripes on his back
for the offence of digging his own gold.” Robin had the reputation of being a poor man who
worked hard for his living and managed to maintain some dignity in the affair. He informed the
editor of the Cherokee Phoenix that the “stripes were put upon him with some degree of
moderation,” which suggested either his own toughness or white male effeteness.9
In the wake of the Worcester decision and Jackson’s decision to withdraw the Army, official
U.S. Indian policy had no teeth with which to enforce removal. The Guard, as early as March
1832, became a tool at the disposal of federal officials.10 Not only could it be used to protect the
enrollees, but it could also force them into removal. The Guard filled that need for Major
Currey. No law authorized the Guard to exchange prison time for removal. Colonel Coffee and
his successor, William W. Williamson, did not stop there. The Guard turned to outright
intimidation and coercion to hasten the removal process. Jesse Raper, a white man with a
Cherokee family, had lived along the Chestatee River for twenty-four years before a man named
John Reaves, a lottery winner, expelled him. Afterwards, he inquired about enrollment with
Major Currey. Raper’s family agreed to go but only if the major swore they would be paid for
their loss of property. Promise secure, Raper and his family signed up for enrollment but soon
Cherokee Phoenix, September 15, 1832, 2; Wilson Lumpkin to John Coffee, July 10, 1832, Governor’s Letter
Book, 1832-1833, Drawer 62, Box 64, Georgia Division of Archives and History, Morrow, GA Cherokee Phoenix,
November 24, 1832, 2; New York Mercury, June 6, 1832, 5.
9

10 In August 1831, Governor George R. Gilmer reported to Colonel John W.A. Sanford that he had
received a request from the War Department asking for the aid of the Guard in helping to prepare for removal. It
was not until 1832, though, that the Guard and federal removal policy became synonymous. See George R. Gilmer
to John W.A. Sanford, August 24, 1831, Governor’s Letter Book, 1831-1833, Drawer 62, Box 64, GDAH.
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found themselves penniless and “forced into some public waggons . . . by the Georgia guard,”
bound for an enrollment camp. Rachel Rice suffered similar treatment when she was “forced
from [her] home by the troops under Maj. Curry.” From Rice’s account of her expulsion from
her property, Currey appeared to be working with the Guard and directing, or at least
encouraging, its actions.11
Hetty Vance also suffered at the hands of the Guard. Previously, Vance had watched as a
lawyer from Georgia took the slaves belonging to her late husband because the lawyer claimed
she owed him payment to administer the estate. Not content with the slaves, the lawyer soon
thereafter received a warrant for her arrest. Once Vance was released from prison, the lawyer
then contacted the Georgia Guard who arrested Vance and confined her at their headquarters
for four days. In another instance, Elizabeth Ware watched as her husband fled their home
“owing to the oppressive character of the laws of the state towards the Citizens of the Cherokee
Nation.” Anxious over her isolation and exposure, Ware claimed that she became “subject to the
abuse of the Georgia Guard,” who she believed burned down her house with all of her worldly
possessions inside.12 The Guard had begun implementing federal removal policy, but they did so
in a way that targeted the most vulnerable members of Cherokee society. Vance, a widow, had
no family or neighbors to protect her; Ware’s husband had to leave his family. The violent
actions of the Guard fundamentally destabilized Cherokee families. As uncertainty proliferated, it
only worsened the Cherokee political schism as it became ever more apparent that the Cherokee
Nation could do little to protect its weakest members.
Many of the Guard’s abusive actions toward individual Cherokees and the more extreme
11 Claim of Jesse Raper, March 11, 1842, Marybelle W. Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims, Saline District
(Tulsa, OK: Marybelle W. Chase, 1988), 39; Claim of Rachel Rice, March 14, 1842, ibid., 40.
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instances of arson reinforced the federal government’s “voluntary” removal policy. It also helped
expedite state acquisition of Indian land. As lottery winners began to move into the backcountry
to claim their winnings, many anticipated vacated land and an absence of Cherokee residents.
Arriving at their lots, most of the lottery winners instead encountered native inhabitants who did
not want to leave. Lumpkin apprised Coffee in April: “[Y]ou will in a very short time find many
of our citizens disposed to be engaged in exploring and examining the Cherokee Country with a
view of ascertaining the most valuable lands [and] mines.” Though the legislature had put
safeguards into the lottery law that prevented citizens from expelling native inhabitants from
their land, the opposite occurred. The governor went on to warn the commander about the
influx of white claimants and their potential risks to the rest of the community. “Gold digging;
defacing public landmarks; arbitrary law triumphing over the civil authority; anarchy and
confusion, cannot long remain before civil war will ensue.” Lumpkin urged Coffee to prevent
undue violations, which included individuals who mined illegally or violated “the rights of the
Indians.” Not wanting to precipitate a war, Lumpkin requested “that the deportment of every
officer and citizen of Georgia should be such as to silence the slander of our enemies.”
Unfortunately for the governor, the Guard did not excel at good deportment.13
By the end of 1832, in fact, the increased violence on the part of the Guard and the
lottery winners began to worry the governor. Lumpkin, sought to deflect blame away from the
state and toward those who opposed removal. “It is quite obvious,” Lumpkin advised President
Jackson, “that the enemies of the Union are doing all they can to give us trouble with
Cherokees.” Such flagrant partisanship led the governor to believe that Washington was rife with
conspiracy and corruption, pitting the state and the Jackson administration against an anti13 Wilson Lumpkin to John Coffee, April 24, 1832, Governor’s Letter Book, 1831-1833, Drawer 62, Box 64,
GDAH; Wilson Lumpkin to John Coffee, June 23, 1832, ibid.
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removal faction led by northern congressmen and the nascent Whig Party “who are acting in
concert with the enemies of good order & Government.” Worse for Lumpkin, newspaper editors,
even citizens from Georgia, “are at this moment engaged in the unhallowed work of faning [sic]
the embers of strife between the Cherokees & the Government of Georgia.” In some areas of the
borderlands “where but few whites have settled,” Lumpkin noted “a spirit of disregard &
insolence to our laws” emanating from the Cherokee. Though he had “so far relied upon the civil
authority of the newly organized Counties; & shall continue to do so,” he had begun to suspect
that the backcountry residents lacked “sufficient moral force” to “maintain the supremacy of our
laws.”14
When the legislature met in December 1832, it altered the mission of the Guard, reduced
it in size, and made a move to organize new counties so that lottery winners could impose civil
authority on Cherokee country. The legislature, however, did not disband the unit entirely. Part
of its hesitation to disband the Guard completely, as opposed to reducing it—and Lumpkin’s fear
for borderland settlers—arose from the mysterious death of the Bowman family. In the waning
days of December 1832, Lawson Bowman and the rest of his family met an untimely end when
they burned to death inside their cabin. The Cherokee Phoenix sought to unravel the mystery and
concluded that the deaths were unfortunate accidents, not the result of malicious behavior. What
little property remained had not been trifled with, which led the new, pro-Removal editor Elijah
Hicks to conclude that Georgia could not justify the case as one of murder. In spite of Hicks’s
argument, the Georgia Guard began a manhunt for several Indian perpetrators. When they
learned the whereabouts of their quarry, the Guard “rushed to the Indian settlement with the
spirit of Samson” to apprehend the supposed criminals. Just before Christmas, the Guard, “like a
14 Wilson Lumpkin to Andrew Jackson, April 19, 1833, Governor’s Letter Book, 1833-1835, Drawer 62, Box
65, GDAH.
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lawless storm” chained eight Cherokee men to horses and hauled them to county court for trial.
The judge, though, released them for lack of evidence.15
The commander of the Guard, William W. Williamson fervently believed that foul play
and not a fatal accident explained the tragedy that had befallen Bowman family. In his initial
report to the governor, Williamson declared that “a most daring & Violent Murder” had been
“Committed by the Indians of Salacoe town” against Bowman and his family. According to
Williamson, the “entire Family was inhumanely butchered and the Dwelling consumed by Fire,”
in an effort to hide the gruesome nature of the crimes. Though he suspected Cherokee
perpetrators, Williamson admitted that little animosity existed between the Georgians and
Cherokee residents in that area. Unable to find a motive for the murder, but unwilling to believe
that the tragedy had been an accident, he concluded: “There must have been some personal
difficulty between this unfortunate Family & the Indians.”16
To solve the mystery, the Guard arrested an Indian of “infamous character” named
George Took (or Tooke). Once arraigned, two other Cherokee testified against him and
implicated Took and a co-conspirator in the murder of the Bowman family. According to the
informants, Took and his accomplice planned on stealing property from the Bowman family, but
when they entered the house under cover of darkness Bowman grabbed his gun “and a fight
ensued.” Eventually the two Indians overpowered Bowman and killed him, his wife, child and
mother-in-law and “split open each head with an axe.” Having finished their grisly work the two
Cherokee plundered the house and sold the goods to Creek Ben, a noted fence who disposed of
the property. Held in jail in DeKalb County beginning in January 1833, Took waited for his trial
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to commence in Murray County in September. The judge postponed the September hearing
when the lawyers could not agree upon a jury. When authorities sent Took back to the DeKalb
County jail, his guards stopped one evening and rested at a farm house. Took laid down
“feigning sickness and . . . extreme bodily pain.” Writhing on the ground, he managed to slip the
shackles over his head and off his ankles and made his escape through an open door. The sheriff
offered a reward of one hundred dollars for Took’s apprehension, but by the following month he
still eluded capture. Civil authorities did not track him down for another two years, when he was
arrested in Cherokee county. During his capture, the sheriff’s deputy “was forced to shoot him,”
a doctor had to amputate one of his limbs, and members of the Georgia Guard had to patrol the
jail to prevent another escape. Even on his deathbed, Took did not confess to the Bowman
murders though did he openly admit to killing Duck, a fellow Cherokee.17
The mysterious death of the Bowman family and Williamson’s insistence that foul play
was its cause may have convinced the legislature to continue the Guard out of fear, though ten
men would have stood little chance against a real threat. Though Lumpkin feared further violent
outbreaks, he did not think the Bowmam family’s demise signaled encroaching doom. “I cannot
believe however that this horrible act has originated from any things like a concerted plan from
any considerable number of the Cherokee.” Rather than fret over Cherokee reprisals, Lumpkin
wanted the Guard to concentrate its efforts at fracturing whatever remained of Cherokee
resistance to removal.18
The legislature hampered the governor’s ability to fracture the Cherokee population
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because the budget only allowed the governor to call for a force that consisted of ten men.
Coffee’s Guard in 1832 consisted of forty men, so the reduced force meant a significant reduction
in the state’s ability to induce the Cherokee to leave. The mission of the reduced Guard changed
from protecting the gold mines to guarding “each and every Indian in his and their persons, and
also in the enjoyment of their personal property,” from any “trespass, or offence.” The new
legislation codified what the Guard had already been doing, though it prevented the Guard from
acting in such an aggressive capacity. The new legislation asked the Guard to continue that
course, but further stipulated that once the Cherokee country had been organized into counties,
the legislature would automatically discharge the Guard.19
If the Bowman mystery proved anything, it showed that if the state did want to extend
republican order over native harmony it needed courts and civil institutions to replace a military
unit that destabilized backcountry society. When the legislature had first authorized the Guard in
1830, it did so with the understanding that its mission of protecting the gold mines would
coincide with the implementation of civil authority. Sanford and Coffee, though, expanded the
scope of their mission beyond the mere protection of the mines. In 1832, the legislature sought to
reign in the Guard, for it not only destabilized the Cherokee population but also brought
uncertainty to the entire region. The December 1832 legislation that limited the Guard’s size and
changed its mission also reaffirmed the supremacy of civil authority when it organized ten
counties from Cherokee land. In each of the ten new counties, the legislation specified the place
of voting, the location of the inferior and superior court, and set the frequency of their hearings.
The citizens of each new county had to elect five inferior court justices and officers of the court to

19 “An Act to protect the Cherokee Indians…” December 24, 1832, Acts of The General Assembly of the State of
Georgia, 102-105. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/ftaccess.cgi?_id=7f000001&dbs=ZLGL (Accessed
August 1, 2011).
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settle minor disputes, as well as a land surveyor to facilitate land sales. Undergirding the
organization of each county, the militia district served as the most basic unit of local governance.
Each district elected two justices of the peace as well as a militia captain to prepare the district’s
male population for a potential attack from Indians. The ten new counties, called the Cherokee
counties, began organizing in 1833.20
Only two days after the legislature had reduced the size and scope of the Guard, the
governor notified Colonel Williamson that he had been made commander of the ten-man force.
Lumpkin informed Coffee that he appreciated the colonel’s service, but the state no longer
required his efforts. Before he let his commander leave, however, Lumpkin let him know that he
felt the legislature had made a grave mistake. “I am left without authority, or legal direction of
any kind, to protect the gold mines or fractions or put down Cherokee assumptions by the guard
or any other authority, civil or military.” The lack of authority entrenched in the Guard, he
declared, left vulnerable settlers open to reprisals. “[T]he legislature have utterly refuses to afford
this protection to the settlers in the new country, and with great and urgent reluctance at the very
last moment, appropriated the money to sustain the little guard of ten men.”21
Though the Guard had been significantly reduced, it did not abandon its mission of
protecting those “good” Indians who vouched for removal. Indeed, by February 1833, Lumpkin
had begun designating certain Cherokee residents who could keep their land. One man who the
governor stipulated as a recipient of state largesse was William Hicks, the former principal chief
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of the Cherokee Nation and a proponent of removal. After the lottery, Hicks’s land had not been
drawn so Lumpkin ensured him that he was entitled to it because of his model behavior.
Lumpkin deemed Hicks a “good Indian” who had “uniformly respected the laws and authority of
Georgia & treated her officers & citizens with kindness & respect, and is therefore entitled to our
special regard and respect.” Further placating the former chief, Lumpkin ensured Hicks that he
and his “friends” who felt similarly regarding removal would be “safe and free” from the “threats
or abuse of any and all pretended government emanating from John Ross and his followers.” In
exchange for protection, Lumpkin maintained that Hicks and other Indians who shared his point
of view on removal continue to exert their “moral influence in a peaceable and persuasive
manner.” In other words, Hicks had to vouch for removal at the great expense to his personal
security. Such a stance was simply good politics for Lumpkin. Cherokee “protection” proved an
effective of widening schisms within the Cherokee polity to further expand the white republic.22
Those Cherokee who opposed removal became exposed to physical abuse of the worst
kind. In July 1833, the sheriff of Coweta County, David Dukes, prowled across the Cherokee
Nation in search of his lottery claim and other prospects. Rumor from Coweta County claimed
that the sheriff had vacated his post because of serious debts, though the Cherokee whom he met
with had no way of knowing his pecuniary troubles. He “called” at a house occupied by two
women only identified by their surnames, Oosunaley and Foster. When he discovered that the
women’s husbands were nowhere in sight, he “attempted the monstruous crime of rape” against
Oosunaley because of her “delicate condition.” Foster grabbed the sheriff by the boot and
dragged him off her friend two separate times. When it became apparent that his efforts had

22 Wilson Lumpkin to William W. Williamson, February 15, 1833, Governor’s Letter Book, 1833-1835, Drawer
62, Box 65, GDAH; Wilson Lumpkin to William Hicks, July 6, 1833, ibid; Wilson Lumpkin to William Hicks, July 6,
1833, ibid.
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been bested, Dukes pulled out his pocket book “and offered his injured hosts satisfaction.” In
other words, he sought to pay them off. To his surprise, the woman grabbed the pocket book and
tried to destroy it. Enraged, Dukes produced a heavy horsewhip he then employed with ruthless
efficiency “until Algiers itself would sicken at the stripes inflicted.”23
The two women later went to the magistrate in the newly created Murray County, who
informed the women on the impossibility of receiving Indian testimony intended for use against a
white citizen. Elijah Hicks lamented the fact that in spite of their suffering, the two Cherokee
women had been barred from seeking justice because of the supremacy law and the color of their
attacker’s skin. Fewer Georgians had reason to believe the women’s story when Dukes himself
went to the press and published his version of events. Sheriff Dukes claimed that the women had
invited him to sit down near their house to eat apples. After nearly twenty minutes, Dukes
realized that his handkerchief was missing from the pocket of his overcoat, and, along with it, his
pocketbook containing eighteen dollars. The sheriff accused the women of stealing his money but
discovered his pocketbook, minus the money, stashed beneath a bundle of calico cloth. This sent
him into a rage. Producing his whip, he beat one women “four or five times,” until she turned
over the rolled up notes. When he tried to leave the scene, the other Cherokee woman grabbed
the reins of his horse, until Dukes struck her twice. Dukes had not finished with the two women,
though.24
Two days later the sheriff returned to the scene of the crime. While conversing with a
third Cherokee woman who spoke English, he tried to justify his previous actions and declared
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Gold Lottery of Georgia: Containing a List of the Fortunate Drawers in Said Lottery (Easley, SC: Southern Historical Press,
1988), 142; Cherokee Phoenix, July 27, 1833, 3. William U. Anderson, A History of Coweta County, 1825-1880 (Newnan,
GA: Newnan-Coweta Historical Society, 1977), 30.
23

24

Cherokee Phoenix, July 27, 1833, 3.

197

that he had acted in such a brutish way because he had been robbed. At that point, the woman
whom he had accused of stealing his money threw a stick at Dukes. Enraged, the sheriff jumped
off his horse and “gave her ten or twelve severe cuts with the whip.” 25
Dukes’s account, and unexplained return visit, made it seem that the sheriff sought to
return to the isolated farmstead to justify his crimes and lay blame at the feet of the Cherokee
women. His punishing actions were attempts to both instill mastery over the women and order
the backcountry population. The extension and supremacy laws made it impossible for
Cherokees to receive justice within the state legal system. Indeed, they had become so vulnerable
that the woman who threw a stick at Dukes exemplified Cherokee helplessness. For those
Cherokee unlucky enough to run across state agents, they probably noticed little difference
between the behavior of civil or military authorities. The Guard used violence to undermine
Cherokee sovereignty and assert mastery in the same way that Sheriff Dukes had. State policy
had become one of intimidation to wrest control of the land away from the Cherokee.
If the violence that rocked the backcountry had been over sovereignty, then the newlycreated Murray County became the epicenter of that conflict for one simple reason: it borders
contained the Cherokee capital, New Echota. Issues of sovereignty that had plagued federal,
native, and state leaders in the 1820s and early 1830s likewise plagued Murray’s officials as they
sought to extend Georgia’s version of order. For some Murray County residents living in the
backcountry, the Cherokee still exerted far too much sway in the course of county events. White
anxieties over the prospects of self-government and state superiority flared. Growing factionalism
in the county made governing difficult for Lumpkin and it cast doubts about the viability of state
sovereignty. For example, in 1833, Georgia’s electorate went to the polls to elect delegates to a
constitutional convention that sought to make congressional representation more democratic. In
25
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the Cherokee counties, the political partisanship became particularly vicious. Wilson Lumpkin
and the Clark Party, by 1833, had begun calling itself the Union Party and their sympathies
rested mostly with the national Democratic Party. The Troup Party, formerly led by George
Gilmer, called itself the State’s Rights Party, and sympathized with nullifiers in South Carolina as
well as Whigs who stressed the benefits of internal improvements. Both parties continued their
unequivocal support of President Jackson and in particular his Indian removal policy.
As Lumpkin’s policy of divide and conquer caused a rift in Cherokee political life, it
further exacerbated tensions within state politics. From the newly created Murray County, a land
agent designated by the governor to rent out fractional lots, William N. Bishop, complained to
the governor of threats to the white polity. He noted a “tolerably divided” county between an
“Indian party and the White party.” For the convention, the Union Party had run “two
respectable white men” who each won by the margin of a single vote. One of their opponents
had an Indian wife, so the name “Indian Party” stuck to the State’s Rights candidate, which
reminded voters of Gilmer’s attempt to allow Indian testimony in court. Bishop, though, had to
admit that the two victorious delegates could not attend the convention because they had failed
an “oath laid down to residence.” The law convening the reduction convention, as it became
known, required that delegates had resided in their respective county for at least a year and in the
state for seven. In other words, those “respectable white men” had lied, their neighbors had
turned them in, and they forfeited their convention seats.26
It remained unclear if Bishop fretted over the possibility of a Cherokee presence or the

William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, April 22, 1833, in Cherokee Letters, 2: 401; Macon Telegraph, January
9, 1833, 2. Lumpkin had appointed Bishop as a land agent in January 1833 “to rent . . . all fractions having
improvements thereon, in the Cherokee Territory, not occupied by any Indians.” See Wilson Lumpkin to William
N. Bishop, January 4, 1833, Governor’s Letter Book, 1833-1835, GDAH. The convention became known as the
“reduction convention,” which should not be confused with the similarly named convention in the U.S. Congress to
reduce tariff rates as a means to alleviate the nullification controversy. The state measure sought to reduce the
overall number of representatives as a way to save money and break up the power of the low country counties.
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political alliance between whites and Cherokees, or both. Whatever the case, he tried to use
violence as a solution. Frustrated by his lack of authority to rid the county of political opponents,
Bishop wondered if Lumpkin could “suggest any plan to intimidate these Chiefs[.] I should like
to be in possession of it early.” Bishop clearly linked the use of violence to political problems, a
hallmark solution for backcountry whites. Indeed, Bishop was a man on the rise who typified not
just the rough and tumble world of Jacksonian political operatives, but those who resided beyond
the pale of American influence. The backcountry beckoned to those who found equality and
prosperity lacking in other parts of the state, and it attracted men and women on the make.
Bishop did not win a lot in the land or gold lottery, but he did purchase a tract of land that
contained the buildings belonging to the Moravian mission at Spring Place. Moving to his new
home, he claimed ownership of the mission and its outbuildings. He quickly became a figurehead
in local politics and ingratiated himself with the Clark party and publicly denounced nullification.
After the two delegates withdrew from the convention race, Bishop lamented the ascendancy of
the Indian party. Fundamental to their cause, Bishop felt, was their prevention of whites from
sowing corn, thereby robbing them of their ability to support themselves and their families, in the
hopes of expelling “all citizens who are true to the State Laws and policy so that they can remain
in power.”27
By calling his opponents the “Indian Party,” Bishop drew on the fear of recent settlers
who thought Indian opposition would prevent them from claiming their land. Though Bishop
felt that the county was “tolerably divided” between the “Indian Party” that supported the State’s
Right platform and the “white party” that supported Lumpkin, Bishop confidently reported that
Lumpkin would win votes in the upcountry. “I believe we will be able not withstanding their [sic]
27 William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, April 24, 1833 in Cherokee Letters, 2: 415; Tiya Miles, The House on
Diamond Hill: A Cherokee Plantation Story (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 177-178.
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is two parties to give you a large majority next fall in this County.” He correctly predicted the
mood of the voters, who showed just how much they approved of the State’s Rights Party
rumored alliance with natives at the local level. Of the 150 votes cast in fledgling Murray County
in October 1833, 120 (80 percent) went to Lumpkin. A similar story played out in the nine other
Cherokee counties, where Lumpkin tallied nearly 62 percent of the votes cast. In the border
counties, the results mirrored those in the Cherokee counties where 63 percent of voters
supported the incumbent. That backcountry residents still flocked to Lumpkin’s banner
demonstrated their affection for the man who had rammed through the gold lottery and the
“white man’s chance.”28
The vote for the “reduction measure” occurred simultaneously. Though a similarly
named measure dealing with the tariff had worked its way through Congress, Georgians dealt
with an altogether different type of reduction: decreasing the number of representatives and
senators in the state house as a means of defraying costs and promoting more equitable
representation. Proposed by Lumpkin and the Clark Party, the measure was designed to weaken
the Troup Party’s traditional geographic base, the lowcountry. And a majority of the delegates
hailed from the Union Party. The new system created senate districts and reduced the number of
senators by half to thirty-six. It also ensured that each county had at least one representative in
the lower house, which was important to Lumpkin since he derived much of his support from
scantily populated frontier counties. The convention then awarded additional seats to the most
populous forty counties but limited the maximum number of representatives per county to four.
When Georgians went to the polls in October, their votes on the referendum mirrored their
choice for governor. Fifty-seven percent of voters in the Cherokee counties supported the

William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, April 2, 1833 in William N. Bishop Papers, File II, Box 19,
GDAH; Macon Telegraph, October 31, 1833, 3.
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scheme; sixty-one percent of border county voters supported the reduction measure. With
widespread support in the backcountry, both Lumpkin and the reduction measure enjoyed easy
victories.29
Much of the governor’s appeal came from his continued advocacy for a “white man’s
chance.” When combined with the reduction measure—which advocates saw as “resting on
principles of the purest democracy” because it apportioned representation to the free white male
population and not the “federal” count that included three-fifths of a county’s slaves—voters saw
the governor as a champion of the prerogatives of white settlers. Fourth of July revelers and
Union Party supporters toasted the wisdom of the convention for recognizing “that the free white
population alone is the proper basis of representation.” The growing support for white male
equality was a logical outgrowth of a strain of republican thinking that stressed equality. No
doubt democratic striving had more urgency in places where racialized others appeared to
threaten the rights enjoyed by the white population.30
In order to protect a white identity, the legislature did something surprising. Rather than
exclude whites who had chosen to marry a Cherokee, the legislature gave those intermarried
whites as well as acculturated natives a chance to renounce their “savagery” in favor of
“civilization.” In December 1833, the legislature required whites connected to the Cherokee or
acculturated Indians to decide on which polity, American or Cherokee, they wished to join. The
law, called the “Cherokee protection act,” stripped intermarried whites of legal rights, even if
they were state citizens, unless those individuals swore before a clerk of the superior court that
they wished to be considered white rather than Indian. Once that occurred, the head of the

29 Macon Telegraph, May 15, 1833, 3. On voting totals for both the gubernatorial race and the referendum on
the reduction measure , see ibid., October 31, 1833, 3.
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family had “all privileges which are granted to such white men,” conferred onto him, but not the
rest of his family. Such a move, however, also showed that the state government was willing,
however grudgingly, to admit biracial individuals into the white polity. Perhaps legislators knew
that no one would take them up on their offer, but the law at least gave the appearance that
incorporating biracial individuals into the white polity was something they had considered. In
spite of the seeming beneficence of state leaders, their offer of citizenship explicitly rejected the
social complexity defining the Cherokee-Georgia borderlands, which had allowed for cultural
negotiation to occur. The legislation demonstrated the desire of state leaders to assert its version
of social order in the backcountry, even if it meant the incorporation of Indians into the white
citizenry. In effect, this meant that acculturated Indians, because of their light skin tone, grasp of
English, and mastery of American customs, could have their background whitewashed.31
The so-called “Cherokee protection act” went further to safeguard what the legislature
considered an authentic Cherokee character. It also prevented whites or slaves belonging to
whites from working for a Cherokee landowner. Failure to comply with this section of the law
meant that the Cherokee landowner had to forfeit his or her land “as though such improvements
had never been occupied by such Indian.” The law voided contracts between members of the
31 “An act more effectually to provide for the government and protection of the Cherokee Indians…” Acts of
the General Assembly (1833), 1: 114-118. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid =7f000001
&type= law&byte=12995277&lawcnt=1&filt=doc (Accessed August 1, 2011). No evidence suggests that any whites
took the state up on its offer in 1833 or 1834. However, once removal commenced, some acculturated families in the
Chattahoochee community did remain in Georgia. The legislature granted them citizenship in 1840. See Sharon P.
Flanagan, “The Georgia Cherokees who Remained: Race, Status and Property in the Chattahoochee Community,”
Georgia Historical Quarterly 73 (Fall 1989): 584-609. Historians have located the beginnings of herernvolk democracy in
Jacksonian America were often characterized by white male equality. Its roots, though, predated the brand of politics
championed by the seventh president. On the republican roots of democratic egalitarianism and the influence of
race on white male equality, see, for example, Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (2006;
New York: Hill & Wang, 1990), 50-54. Other southern states, simultaneous with Georgia, had begun delineating the
bounds of white political privileges, see, for example, Lacy K. Ford, “Making the ‘White Man’s Country’ White:
Race, Slavery, and State-Building in the Jacksonian South,” Journal of the Early Republic 19 (Winter 1999): 713-737. A
more general discussion of efforts at solidifying the white republic along lines of citizenship can be found in Rogers
M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 197242.
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two races, and to hurry voluntary removal and strengthen the accommodationists, made
preventing or intimidating any Cherokee from enrolling a misdemeanor. All of these were efforts
to hurt the economically adroit group of Cherokee who opposed removal. The Cherokee
protection law, it provided the governor with the authority to designate “some fit and proper
person as agent” to enforce this law.32
White residents in the newly created Cherokee counties experienced racial anxieties
firsthand and demonstrated much less calm regarding race in the borderlands than the
legislature. Particularly troublesome, rumors of despotic Cherokee leaders interfering with
Georgia’s wholesome, benevolent civil institutions and democratic processes, caused quite a stir
in the backcountry. Warning the governor of the threats posed to the nascent courts in Murray
County, William N. Bishop, the zealous democrat, once again warned the governor of a scheme
afoot. He issued a stern warning: county officials had appointed a land agent “who is completely
under the influence of the Head men of the Cherokee.” The new land agent, Bishop added, had
an altogether “Infamous character,” reportedly passed counterfeit money, and had been
suspected of sympathizing with the reviled Pony Club. “Our chance for Legal Justice is
Doubtful,” Bishop worried. Most troubling to Lumpkin’s supporter, though, were rumors that
the land agent had plans “to drive a Large portion of our citizens from the country” with an
“Indian Possy.” Without aid from the state, “this part of Cherokee will shortly be a scene of
confusion.” Lumpkin sought to assuage the anxieties of his constituents and reaffirmed that “The
Supremacy of the laws of Georgia should be maintained.”33
Bishop never let down his guard when it came to Indians infiltrating civil offices. To
32 “An act more effectually to provide for the government and protection of the Cherokee Indians…” Acts of
the General Assembly (1833), 1: 114-118.
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safeguard Murray County from the “Indian party,” he sought measures to protect fellow settlers.
“I also wish to know,” Bishop inquired, “if we raise a volunteer cavalry company if we can have
arms without the usual number [of recruits]?” The state mandated sixty-man minimum for a
new militia company did not deter Bishop from seeking special treatment from the legislature. In
the end, however, Bishop had to follow the law and could not incorporate a militia because he
could not muster the minimum number of men. Even the primary federal enrolling agent, Major
Benjamin F. Currey, championed Bishop. He recommended to the governor the appointment of
Bishop, or someone with similar energy, (Currey also mentioned Charles H. Nelson as a
candidate for command) “clothed will full power to employ the necessary force civil or military in
a summary manner from whose decisions there shall be no appeal to inferior or superior courts.”
Bishop’s hopes were dashed when the legislature did not requisition funds for him and his men,
nor offer the Murray County militia more extensive authority when it met later that winter. No
doubt Currey’s suggestion of offering Bishop and his friends unrestricted police power unchecked
by the judiciary explained part of the legislature’s hesitancy. 34
Undeterred, Bishop spent the next two years building a strong support network in
Murray County and the rest the backcountry as white settlers became fearful of Indian attacks.
Though he suffered a setback when his militia company failed to make muster, he and fellow
backcountrymen sought ways of protecting their families and their growing communities. In May
1834, a committee of concerned citizens from Cherokee County, chaired by the up-and-coming
Howell Cobb, made a series of proposals to the governor. Exposure to “assassination & other
lowley violence” compelled Cobb to encourage other duty-bound “white settlers of this country
to adopt some strong & energetic measures upon this all important subject.” A series of nine
34 William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, April 2, 1833, in Cherokee Letters, 2:401; Benjamin F. Currey to
Wilson Lumpkin, October 29, 1833, ibid., 2: 459.
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proposals offered by Cobb’s committee suggested unyielding measures to deal with threats to
“the lives of our white citizens . . . daily and publicly made by the Indians.” Cobb worried that
civil law could not provide adequate protection to the county’s white citizens “unless aided by
military force from the state or the general government” that could “aid the civil authorities in
the executing the laws of the state.” Without that protection, white settlers would be forced into a
“disgraceful but necessary retreat” and would therefore have to “surrender . . . the country to the
original savage occupants.” Or, barring unexpected help from the government, citizens would
regulate their own affairs and resort to reciprocating actions against the Indians. If, for example,
a Cherokee murdered a white within the county and was not turned over to civil authorities,
whites residents would apprehend three Cherokee men and “put them to death as an
atonement.” Such a proposal dramatized the seriousness with which whites in the borderlands
took threats and rumors of violence, but they also had to realize how untenable such a proposal
was. It smacked of vigilantism, which many Georgians had disapproved of in the milder form
taken by the Slicks. Beatings were one thing; murder something altogether different.
Reciprocating killings would have undoubtedly caused the backcountry to spiral into a cycle of
violence that would have required the state to muster the militia. A move toward vigilantism
would also circumvent the court system and caused justice to devolve away from self-government
toward a dystopia plagued by disorder and lawlessness.35
Growing unease among settlers caused the governor not a small amount of hand wringing
as he struggled with his options. Most of the anxiety from settlers came from Cherokee
effrontery. “[D]o the people on the East of the Chattahoochie [sic] suffer large able bodied
young men to stroll about the settlements, a gang of ten or a dozen with bows & arrows shooting
35
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small birds?” wondered one resident of Murray County, John Brewster. Such a statement failed
to disguise his own insecurity at the sight of youthful Cherokee prowess, which prompted other
white settlers in Murray to move their “wives & children into some of the old country” before
returning to defend home and hearth. Aside from the “protection of white inhabitants,” Brewster
believed that a “strong system of military police” had become necessary because he feared the
return of the Pony Club thieves who “are realizing with their Cherokee confederates a handsome
profit.” In early April, a petition form citizens in Cherokee county arrived on Lumpkin’s desk
imploring the governor to “have organized & sent to our relief a Company of Mounted Men.” In
early May, Bishop had begun prodding the governor to authorize such a force, suggesting,
“Thirty Men raised in this country Mounted and Armed with Muskets could answer every
purpose.” “We are . . . in the beginning of war,” a committee of Murray County residents
predicted and requested “arms as well as men” to fend off any forthcoming attack.36
Though Governor Lumpkin sought the implementation of civil law, he had begun to
understand the precariousness of backcountry settlement. With a large Cherokee population still
living on the land that had been won by lottery winners, he had to create some way for
Georgians to impose their will. But he did not believe that war loomed. Most of the fuss came
from residents who were “extremely alarmed” at the pronouncements of a Cherokee youth who
had told white settlers that her people had begun stockpiling weapons and ammunition.37 Much
of the governor’s hesitancy—or what he called “calm and peaceful measures”—in deploying a
military force came from past experience and his fear that a martial strategy would “supercede
John Brewster to Wilson Lumpkin, May 16, 1834 in Cherokee Letters 2:489-493; Petition of Sundry Citizens
of the Cherokee Counties for the Organization of a Guard, April 10, 1835, Cherokee Letters, 3:534-536; William N.
Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, May 15, 1835, William N. Bishop Papers, File II Names, GDAH; D.R. Mitchell, John
Brewster, and R.N. Holt to Wilson Lumpkin, May 12, 1834 in ibid.
36

37 William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, June 4, 1834 in William N. Bishop Papers, File II Names, Box
19, GDAH.
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[sic] the civil authority by the interposition of the military.” Federal troops and the first iteration
of the Guard tended to compounded violent tendencies among backcountry residents and, worse,
often targeted uncooperative whites, which made such forces political liabilities. Still, with the
threat of an all-out Indian attack looming, Lumpkin proposed to meet force head on.38
To do so, he took two steps. First, he encouraged the new counties to raise volunteer
militia units so locals could more effectually protect themselves and their neighbors. “Where the
population will admit of it in the new counties,” Lumpkin wrote to U.S. Attorney General John
Forsyth, “I am endeavouring to effect the organization of Volunteer companies to be placed
under the command of prudent and intelligent men, who will be furnished with arms from our
public arsenal to meet any emergency which may possibly occur.” A show of military might
would prevent the state from being “harassed by the enemies of good order, and all civil
government.” Even though he doubted the rumors plaguing the backcountry concerning an
impending attack, the governor was not about to let white men and women suffer from a lack of
preparedness.39
It soon became apparent, though, that the good citizens of the Cherokee counties were
less interested in joining the militia and fighting in an Indian war than they were in having others
fight in their stead. With such a small population, that attitude meant that neighborhoods and
entire militia districts went undefended. Knowing that he had to at least appear prepared,
Lumpkin took the advice of Benjamin F. Currey who again pleaded for the rapid organization of
a mounted guard “to keep the peace & aid the civil authorities in the execution of the law.” The
governor still resisted a more forceful action, but he did take an important second step when he
38 Wilson Lumpkin to John Forsyth, May 30, 1834, Governor’s Letter Book, 1833-1835, GDAH; Benjamin F.
Currey to Wilson Lumpkin, November 18, 1834 in Cherokee Letters, 3: 515.
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named Bishop and Charles H. Nelson as enforcement agents to coordinate between state militia
commanders and local civil authorities to better apprehend criminals. In November, Bishop
aided local sheriffs in the hunt for a mixed-race murderer, James Graves, and a Cherokee
criminal, John Hog Smith, who had escaped from jail in Cass County. The two also expelled
Cherokee residents who would not vacate property claimed by lottery winners.40
Much of the fear exhibited by white settlers stemmed from the fact that no Guard existed
in 1834. William Williamson’s ten-man unit, the third and smallest force created by the
legislature, had not been renewed. In the December 1834 session, a select committee in the
House warned the rest of the legislature of “alarming disorders and disturbance in the Cherokee
country” that would surely lead to war if the General Assembly did not take firm measures to
prevent violence. To prevent it, legislators allowed the governor to enlist forty men for special
duty in a new Guard. Relying upon the “energy, watchfulness, and discretion” of the governor to
create a military force if the “exigency to demand it,” the bill left the timing of the company’s
creation and its oversight to the governor, perhaps as a way to distance legislators from any
political fallout from its operation. The legislature drew on republican thinking when it asked the
governor to remain watchful for the corruption accompanying a standing military force, though
it placed no limits on the amount of time or money that could be spent restoring order.41
Governor Lumpkin did not immediately muster the Guard into service, primarily because
no immediate emergency arose. The man he wanted to appoint as the commander, William N.

40 Wilson Lumpkin to Sheriff [of Murray County], November 12, 1834, Governor’s Letter Book, 1833-1835,
GDAH; Wilson Lumpkin to William N. Bishop, November 12, 1832, in ibid. See also the state legislature’s
authorization on the use of force, “Whereas, at the October term, 1834, of the Superior Court of the county of
Walker.” November 12, 1834, Acts of the General Assembly, 1:293-294. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/
legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte=14540590&lawcnt=18&fil=doc. (Accessed August 4, 2011).
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Bishop, had also become embroiled in a political scandal that made it risky to do so. Rather than
brashly appoint a supporter embroiled in a political scandal, he waited to see how political
opponents shaped their reaction to Bishop’s behavior. One Union party supporter in the
backcountry urged Lumpkin to name Bishop the commander of the Guard, but warned that he
would be pilloried for such a decision. “If the command of the guard is given to him,” one
advisor informed the governor, “you may expect to be abused for it.” It would prove a difficult
decision, but the advisor told Lumpkin to steel himself. After all, “what have you done for the
benefit of the people since you went into office for which your enimies [sic] have not slandered
you?”42
The incident that gave Lumpkin pause occurred in February 1835, when Bishop, acting
in his capacity as the governor’s agent, expelled Joseph Vann and his family from their home
near the Spring Place missionary. In that month he sent the family notice that they must leave;
the following month, he arrived at the head of twenty-five armed men to compel them to do so.
Accompanying Bishop’s posse, the lottery winner Joshua Holder, came armed with the deed he
had won in the land lottery. It soon became apparent that Bishop had no real interest in
expelling the Vann family, but a white man who rented one of their rooms, Riley Spencer.
Bishop and his men forced themselves into the house, yelling at Spencer to leave. The terrified
family huddled in an adjacent room while the Georgians commenced shooting. Spencer
barricaded himself in a stairwell; Bishop’s men fired over a dozen shots to dislodge him. One ball
struck Spencer’s musket, which splintered, the remnants of which lodged in his head. Bleeding
profusely, he demanded to know who had fired the last shot. Bishop replied: “The state of
Georgia fired that gun!” Though Bishop’s testy assertion proved partly correct, he had been
42 Z.B. Hargrove to Wilson Lumpkin, J.E. Hays, ed., Georgia Military Affairs WPA Project no. 5993 (Atlanta:
Georgia Archives, 1940), 6: 257.
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named the governor’s agent when it came to apprehending fugitives and therefore had some
authority to act on behalf of the state. He did not have the power to dislodge peaceful Cherokee
residents from their homes or their renters. Bishop’s violent outburst signaled just how
comfortable he felt using violence to solve problems and underscored just how aggressive state
policy had become when it came to expelling the Cherokee.
Such viciousness directed at a legal resident of the Cherokee country no doubt angered
Spencer’s friends, who were not inconsiderable in state politics. This obviously made the
appointment of Bishop as commander of the Guard a sticky situation for the governor. It soon
grew worse. During the fracas, Bishop encouraged his men to “kill the d---d rascal, we have no
use for nullifiers in this county.” The overt political nature of his assault on Spencer made Bishop
a liability. The violent rivalry between the two men did not end in Joseph Vann’s living room,
either. Bishop’s version of events appeared in Union newspapers, where he claimed that Riley
“was a bully for his party” whose “violence and rancor” forced him to act in such an aggressive
manner. The aggrieved land agent only hoped that his character and reputation had not been
tarnished beyond repair.43
In spite of Bishop’s troubles and the political headaches such a partisan caused for the
governor, he felt compelled to award the command of the new Guard to Bishop—perhaps as a
means of restoring his supporter’s honor. Lumpkin was also savvy enough to realize that in order
to accomplish his goals he needed someone with a fierce reputation. In May, Bishop had
salvaged enough of his reputation in newspaper exchanges with Riley’s friends that the governor
found it possible to appoint him commander of the Guard. Further, the exigency required by the
resolution to form the Guard had arrived in two ways. In early 1835, a delegation of
43 The Bishop-Riley affair garnered nationwide attention. See New-London (Conn.) Gazette, April 29, 1835, 2;
for Bishop’s version of events, see Athens Southern Banner, June 11, 1835, 1.
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accomodationist Cherokee led by Major Ridge, Elias Boudinot, and Stand Watie began meeting
with federal negotiators to hammer out a removal treaty. Tensions within the Cherokee Nation
mounted, and soon enough, turned violent. By early summer, members of Ross’s National Party
had assassinated several accommodationists. Georgians living within the Cherokee Nation now
found themselves in the midst of a violent civil strife. Second, news of a mass jailbreak by
Cherokee prisoners convinced Lumpkin that a Guard could deploy quickly and return the
prisoners to jail. Indeed, it was Bishop who warned the governor: “The Prison doors have been
broken open in Cassville—and all the Prisoners therein have made their escape . . . Our country
is now full of bloody assassins and our white Population are considerably alarmed.” The
combination of Cherokee violence over a prospective treaty and the escaped prisoners provided
Governor Lumpkin the emergency he required to muster a new Guard.44
On May 28, 1835, Lumpkin finally authorized the creation of a new Guard and named
Bishop its commander. Lumpkin’s supporters handled Bishop’s appointment delicately. The
Guard, they declared, would not override civil officers, but act in concert with them. “It will aid
the civil authority in making arrests; in apprehending outlaws . . . in arresting those who may
threaten the peace of the State, and giving security to the lives and property of friendly Indians
from the murder and rapine contemplated by Ross and his followers.” The new Guard, which its
commander called the Georgia Rangers—perhaps as a means of separating his command from
those that came before—consisted of forty men and like the Guard authorized in 1833, Bishop’s
Rangers had not been ordered to protect the gold mines, but had been called out, instead, for the
“security, relief, and protection of our own citizens and the friendly Cherokees.” The continued
focus on protecting accommodationists favorable to removal was a savvy move on the part of
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state officials and revealed the overt political nature of the Rangers. Because state efforts to divide
the Cherokee politically had succeeded and a civil conflict had ensued, the Guard could further
brutalize the Cherokee in the name of maintaining the public peace.45
Designating the Rangers a force to protect white citizens represented a major change in
the state’s stance. Instead of a force preventing white intrusion, the Rangers now had it within
their purview to protect white lottery winners and other settlers from threats by Indians. This
meant that Bishop’s Rangers had been created to harass and intimidate the Cherokee aligned
with John Ross. Not coincidentally, state authorities also began associating Cherokee criminals
with affiliation with the anti-removal force to place the accommodationists in a positive light and
paint Ross’s supporters as opponents of proper order and self-government. Acting forcefully
against Nationalist Cherokee, Bishop caused the native inhabitants to cower at news of his
movements. His aggressiveness became his downfall when he hunted down a suspected northern
abolitionist visiting John Ross at his home in Tennessee. The violation of Tennessee’s sovereignty
signaled the downfall of the Guard, but not before political opponents in the state legislature
conducted an investigation and chastised the governor for his foolishness in trusting someone
with Bishop’s reputation with so much power. The Guard showcased the corruptibility of
military power in a republic, and convinced state leaders of the necessity of using the militia as a
means of imposing order.
In spite of its expansive mission, Bishop kept his company under forty men for two very
pragmatic reasons. First, the Rangers were paid from the state’s contingency fund that the
legislature purposefully kept small. Military appropriations for 1834-1835 only totaled $6,000, so
45 Athens Southern Banner, June 25, 1835, 2; “The select committee to whom was referred the
communication of his Excellency the Governor….” Acts of the General Assembly, December 20, 1834, 1:336.
http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte=15491927&lawcnt=9
&filt=doc (Accessed August 8, 2011).
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Lumpkin had to carefully spend the money. In comparison, Coffee’s Guard in 1832 had spent
$6,534.68. Williamson’s smaller Guard, comprised of only ten men plus the commander, cost the
state $1,610.25.46 Second, Bishop had difficulty finding forty men able to serve for the long term.
In his first requisition for funds, Bishop listed forty men on his roster. However, when funds were
distributed, only thirty-nine men signed the roster. Bishop later admitted that he had problems
retaining his men and by September he could only muster thirty-six men. One volunteer in the
Rangers left because he got married, while another man who Bishop had commissioned as a
blacksmith failed to appear for duty. Bishop also reported that the majority of the white male
population in the backcountry, “Poor men generally,” could not spare the time “constantly
scouring the country to Keep under those Marauders” who threatened the public peace. Still,
Bishop admitted that even his small force would prevent “much crime and disorder.”47
Over the course of its service, the Rangers employed a total of forty-four different men.
Most of the men were young and single, and therefore not listed on census returns as the head of
their household. Further, the Cherokee counties had not been created at the time that census
takers enumerated the last census. Therefore the census presents only a rough sketch of the
Ranger’s socioeconomic status. However, other sources help reveal the background of the unit,
and perhaps their motivation for serving as well. Of the forty-four men who enlisted with the
Rangers in 1835, 19 had won a claim to land in either the gold or land lottery, while 3 (and
possibly 4 men) won both. In 1830, only 9 men in the Rangers were the head of a household and
therefore enumerated in the census. Of those men, only 2 owned slaves, and they both held the
Appendix to the Acts of the General Assembly (1833), 4, 15-16. http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legisidx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=backdiv&byte=13762569 (Accessed August 8, 2011).
46

47 “Muster Roll of the Guard….” September 1, 1835, Georgia Adjutant General’s Military Records, Frame
319, Drawer 269, Reel 12, GDAH; “We the subscribers acknowledge….” Georgia Adjutant General’s Military
Records, Frame 320, GDAH; William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, May 15, 1835 in William N. Bishop Papers,
File II Names, GDAH.
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rank of private. By 1840, 21 men were the heads of household and seven owned slaves. One
man, Alfred N. Worthy, owned 16. Much like Gilmer’s Guard, many of the Rangers had
benefitted from the state lottery program and probably sought to enroll to expedite the removal
of the Cherokee from what they considered their property. Further, the Guard was a vehicle in
which ambitious young men could advance themselves socially and economically. After all,
riding across the hilly terrain of north Georgia afforded them ample opportunity to survey land
or prospect.48
In spite of the small number of volunteers, the Rangers made a substantial impact on
affairs in the backcountry. For the most part, Bishop and his Guard did not bother white settlers,
squatters, or intruders. Instead, they spent their time discerning the movements of National Party
members and intimidating them and searched for Indian fugitives and suspected criminals,
whom they accused of aligning with Ross. The change in tactics represented an important shift in
the way state leaders thought about the backcountry. Though the Cherokee counties still had
their fare share of lawless intruders and savage Cherokee, state leaders recognized that thousands
of lottery winners and landowners had begun the laborious work of pioneering those lands for
further white settlement. By 1835, Governor Lumpkin noted the influx of white Georgians,
citizens, who needed state aid and protection. When rumors of Indian attacks circulated,
Lumpkin assured a militia general that “many of our citizens are at his moment, laboring under
the same apprehension of Indian outrage, which pervades your community.” In a letter to
Bishop, Lumpkin reminded him that his force had been sent into the backcountry “for the

Heads of households and slave ownership statistics came from the 1830 U.S. Census and 1840 U.S.
Census; land lottery winners can be found in James F. Smith, The Cherokee Land Lottery in Georgia (1991; New York:
Harper & Bros., 1830); a compilation of gold lottery winners has been compiled by the noted local historian S.
Emmet Lucas. See his The 1832 Gold Lottery of Georgia: Containing A List of the Fortunate Drawers in Said Lottery (Easley, SC:
Southern Historical Press, 1988). For the muster roll of the Rangers, see the various pay sheets signed by the
volunteers in Adjutant General Military Records, Drawer 40, Box 16, Frames 319-322.
48
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security, relief, & protection of our own citizens.” The shift from “intruder” to “citizen” had
important consequences, for it showed that state leaders had begun to see backcountry residents
as legitimate members of the state polity capable of instilling civil law.49
Still, before a white republic composed of citizens could bring effective civil institutions
into their counties, the Guard had to continue its work intimidating the Cherokee. Much of
Bishop’s time as commander of the Rangers was spent apprehending criminals who had escaped
from county jails. Convinced that a conspiracy was afoot, Bishop blamed such perfidious
machinations on Ross’s supporters. Bishop and his men “arrested several persons charged with
crime,” including suspected murderers. Bishop also dispersed the Rangers “in various parts of the
country to learn the lurking places of those Banditti or Band of Ross[’]s Murderers.” Bishop’s
scheme was not just a way to keep tabs on Ross’s agents, but a way to spy on Cherokee
opponents. He anticipated slow progress, but predicted that his methods would “decoy them off
their guard” and allow his men to rid the backcountry of its “troublesome population” The trend
of Bishop’s Rangers and the Union Party leadership was to blame recalcitrant Indians, and not
poor whites, for the problems plaguing the backcountry—problems, in their minds, with only one
solution, removal.50
Most damaging to the cause of Ross and his supporters, however, was the Rangers’s
confiscation of the Cherokee Phoenix’s printing press. Once again, the orders to raid the Phoenix’s
office came from Major Currey, who saw the newspaper as a prime source of Cherokee
resistance. In August, Currey learned from Stand Watie, the brother of Elias Boudinot, and key
member of the Treaty Party, that the National Party sought to relocate the press to Red Hill,
49 Wilson Lumpkin to General James C. Watson, May 5, 1835, Governor’s Letter Book; Wilson Lumpkin to
Col. William N. Bishop, May 28, 1835, in ibid.
50

William N. Bishop to Wilson Lumpkin, September 16, 1833 in Cherokee Letters, 2: 444-445.

216

Tennessee. Stand Watie asked Bishop to interfere in Cherokee politics by riding to Elijah Hicks’s
office and confiscating the press for the Treaty Party. Always eager to hurt the Ross faction,
Bishop complied and placed the press in the hands of Stand Watie.51
Georgians did not express any qualms at its military units implementing federal policy.
After all, in the end the state would benefit when it expelled the Cherokee. The summer of 1835
saw an important rhetorical shift in the way the popular press dealt with the Ross faction. State
leaders pegged the National Party as the mechanism of an “avaricious and faithless Cherokee
dictator” that opposed the extension of Georgia’s sovereignty at every turn, including the murder
of Indians friendly to the state, whose power had to be checked. Further, the National Party had
conspired to free prisoners held in Cass County, which demonstrated how readily they sought to
“trample down the safeguards of the law” and illustrated the fragility of civil authority in the
backcountry. One Athens editor despaired for the weakened state of authority in the Cherokee
counties: “[T]he laws administered by the ordinary officers are not deemed a sufficient safeguard
to our own citizen against the . . . hordes of ruffians devoted to an unprincipled chief.” The
attacks on the motives and character of Ross and his supporters coincided with the actions of the
Guard as it began a more forceful approach to “voluntary” removal. 52
Though the Rangers aided federal authorities, Bishop had an agenda all his own: gaining
political power in Murray County. In his quest for personal aggrandizement, Bishop’s actions,
and the support he garnered in his home county, gave the lie to the Union Party’s assertion that
the Guard was a bridge between disorder and civil law and illustrated the ease with which an
On the Guard’s raid of the Phoenix’s office, see Benjamin F. Currey to Wilson Lumpkin, August 26, 1835,
Cherokee Letters, 3: 604, as well as Benfamin F. Currey to Wilson Lumpkin, et al., September 9, 1835, ibid., 613-615.
Local lore has it that the Guard, rather than turn over the press to Watie, instead dumped it in the Chattahoochee
River, which explains why the press has never been located. See also Thomas C. Cochran, ed. New American State
Papers: Military Affairs (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1972), 10: 363-364.
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unchecked military force could gain power in a fragile republic. As winter descended upon the
borderlands, the new Union governor, William Schley, Lumpkin’s successor, learned troubling
news regarding the conduct of Bishop’s force. When the circuit court met in Murray County to
verify jury lists for the inferior and superior courts, the proceedings were interrupted by Bishop
“with nearly all, or the great part of his guard.” He demanded that the court accept his own list,
filled with the names of his supporters, instead. When the judges and the witnesses selected by
them refused to go along with the scheme, Bishop’s “guard all set to cursing . . . with threats &
menaces of the most violent character.” When the judges ordered Bishop and his men to desist, a
tense standoff ensued. Bishop was later reported to have said that if the deputy sheriff had tried to
arrest one of his men “he would have shot him through, as . . . he had his thumb upon the cock
of his Pistol & his finger on the Trigger.” One witness later learned that if he had attempted to
intervene on behalf of the court he would have had “many balls shot through my carcuss.”
Bishop had previously despaired over the prospects of civil authority in the county because of the
Indian Party. Now it suffered at his hands. “[T]he fact is the civil authority is put down by him in
this county . . . . [H]e pays no regard to the law unless it is to operate upon his enimies [sic], then
he rushes forward with his guard and takes it into his own hand.” Bishop’s authority had gone to
his head.53
Bishop used violence to cow political opponents. By doing so he circumvented civil
authority that the Guard had been designed to protect. Though a gross violation of his charge, it
was not altogether surprising given Bishop’s violent propensities. The same set of complaints
lodged with the new governor detailed further abuses by Bishop and the Rangers in Murray
County. The “tiranical movements” of the Guard targeted Bishop’s political enemies, or “every
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body that dose not subscribe to his universal views.” Maintaining the power of the Union Party
became his overriding concern. When any of his friends found themselves liable for charges in
court, Bishop and the Rangers “parades immediately and goes forward & brakes up the Court &
scares off the party & returns with their friend . . . in triumph.” After such spectacles, the Rangers
and their political allies could be found “lauding the commander, comparing him to General
Jackson” all because they had broken up a court’s proceedings and defeated “honest men.” Men
from the Troup Party claimed Bishop imprisoned them without a trial, and he had “whiped the
back of our whiteman to an awful extent & tourn asunder his garments.”54
Though its victims definitely suffered at the hands of the Rangers, the real victim,
according to some observers, was the republic itself. The man informing the governor of Bishop’s
actions, James Edmonson, feared for the fate of self-government if Bishop continued his antics.
The Ranger’s actions were “not consistant with well regulated government,” he complained. He
called Bishop a tyrant who oppressed anyone who opposed him, which made him a political
liability. At the last election, the Union Party candidate for the House had faired poorly precisely
because of Bishop’s threatening pose. During the campaign, Bishop had spread rumors that if
reelected, the Union Party establishment would rigidly follow Lumpkin’s use of the Guard. Even
new voters in the county could not stomach voting for a policy “that would keep the citizens of a
county so appressed [sic] by a set of irresponsible vagabonds.” The seemingly unrestrained power
granted to the Guard had been corrupted by a political partisan, a man who saw violence as a
viable option for the establishment of order in the backcountry.55
In spite of Edmonson’s fears regarding the fragility of civil authority in Murray County,
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Governor Schley did not remove or chastise Bishop. He did summon Bishop to Milledgeville in
November to the General Assembly’s meeting. While leaving the legislative chambers on Friday,
November 6, Bishop, “walking arm in arm with another gentleman,” was attacked from behind
by his old rival, Spencer Riley. Striking Bishop with a large walking stick that broke during the
scuffle, Riley had the advantage until Bishop produced a pistol and shot Riley in the chin. He
then rained down blows on Riley with the gun’s handle until witnesses separated the two
combatants. Covered in blood, both of the men produced a pistol and dirk, waiting for the other
to make a move. Finally, as tempers cooled, their friends pulled them away from each other;
neither man had suffered severe wounds, which shocked onlookers, who were in awe of the
“muscular power & desperate courage of the men.” The General Assembly stopped only briefly
when it heard the shot fired, but soon continued “with their business, as though nothing had
happened.” Even the legislature, it appears, had become inured to Bishop’s violent outbursts.56
The melee between Bishop and Riley, steeped in the honor-bound mentality of the
antebellum South, illustrated the violent measures Bishop employed to defeat his enemies.
Without official censure Bishop continued his ways. His downfall, though, was not long in
coming. After a failed series of negotiations led by Ross had been rejected by the Senate, the
Treaty Party began talks with federal negotiators in December in hopes of reaching a favorable
settlement for removal. When Benjamin F. Currey heard reports that John Howard Payne, a
northerner—and therefore, in his eyes, an abolitionist—was visiting Ross, he seized on the
opportunity to strike at the opponents of Georgia’s sovereignty. Currey ordered the Guard to
arrest John Ross and his guest. The only problem, of course, was that Ross lived in Tennessee,
well out of the Rangers’s jurisdiction. With Bishop still in Milledgeville, probably recovering from
his wounds, the job feel to the subcommander, Wilson R. Young, a resident of Murray County
56
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and an ardent Bishop man. Leading the Rangers across the Tennessee River to the home of the
Cherokee principal chief, Young’s command arrested Ross and Payne and took them back to
Georgia. Payne had also penned one of the most famous songs of the nineteenth century, “Home
Sweet Home,” and in a case of supreme irony, he overheard one of the Rangers humming the
tune on the ride back to Murray County. When pressed on why he had dispatched the Guard
into Tennessee, Currey justified his actions by claiming that Payne “is of the whig party and
rumor makes him an abolitionist.” In other words, Currey encouraged the Rangers to cross state
borders and conduct an illegal operation motivated by base party politics.57
The national press widely reviled the actions of the Guard. From Nashville, they were a
“party of desperadoes;” Connecticut papers wondered why a police force was required for the
“peace and good order of the Cherokee country.” Would the Guard next seek to abolish the
courts by threats to escape punishment? That would not happen, for Newton Cannon, the
governor of Tennessee, outraged that his state’s sovereignty had been violated, cried foul and
demanded an apology. He pointed out the irony of the state’s actions. Cannon could not fathom
how a state so devoted to the “cause of State rights, and State sovereignty” could impugn the
sovereignty of another state. Governor Schley came under intense pressure from the State’s
Rights Party to abolish the Guard. The legislature convened a select committee to investigate the
Rangers’s activity and concluded that when Governor Lumpkin had appointed Bishop his orders
he made it clear that “your military command is designed only to aid the civil authority in
carrying into effect the laws of the State.” So Lumpkin had used his authority to limit the Guard
and ensure its subservience to civil authority. The new governor had done no such thing, though

57 The Treaty of New Echota—after a small minority of Cherokee had approved it—soon thereafter went
to the Senate where it was ratified the following spring. See Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, The Cherokee
Nation and the Trail of Tears (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 102-115. Athens Southern Banner, December 17, 1835, 2.
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he did not come under fire. The problem, then, must have been the commander. The committee
agreed that the news out of Murray County made it seem that the Rangers had discharged their
duty “with pleasure to themselves.” Bishop did not learn of Ross’s and Payne’s arrest until he
arrived at Spring Place at the end of November. The question then became how to deal with
backlash created by the Rangers.58
By arresting Ross and Payne, the Rangers had put the legislature in a difficult quandary.
The state, beginning with Colonel Sanford, had long permitted the Guardto carry out federal
policy. In 1832 William W. Williamson and his men had even gone into land claimed by
Tennessee to protect a group of enrollees from armed militiamen from the Volunteer State. In
that instance, no one complained of the Guard’s actions. In this case, the Rangers deprived an
American citizen of his Fourth Amendment rights, which put the committee in a delicate
situation: if it declared that the Guard had the authority to storm into Ross’s home, the
committee would have inferred that Ross and Payne had no protection from illegal search and
seizure, which would have implied that he was the citizen of a foreign nation with its own
sovereignty. If that were the case, then the state had initiated an invasion of a foreign state, a
power not granted to it under the Constitution. Indeed, the state’s entire course of action since it
passed the extension law would have been unconstitutional. The select committee investigating
the arrests had to be a citizen of Tennessee entitled the protection of that state’s laws. Having
reaffirmed that Lumpkin and Schley had done their best to prevent corruption, the committee
laid the blame squarely at Bishop’s feet for inculcating a devil-may-care attitude among the
Rangers.

58 National Banner and Nashville Whig, December 7, 1835, 3; New London Connecticut Gazette, December 9,
1835, 2; Newton Cannon to William Schley, December 6, 1835, Cherokee Letters, 3:625; “The committee to whom
were referred the several communications of his excellency the Governor….” December 18, 1835, Acts of the General
Assembly (1835), 1: 336-343.
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That raised another problem, for it freely admitted that a well-known political partisan
and supporter of the Union Party, had overstepped his bounds and superseded civil authority.
The committee, in its report to the legislature, took a firm stance on the outrages committed by
the Bishop and his men: “Ours is a government founded upon opinion, and not force. Its laws
must be executed by the good order and discretion of the people, and not by the bayonet and the
sword.” Furthermore, the upcountry had been put on a path that would allow civil authority to
flourish. If an emergency did arise, then “our fellow citizens in that section of the country must
look to themselves, and to the aid which will most assuredly and speedily be rendered them by their
brethren in different sections of the State.” The state had set a course away from small, politically
motivated units to the widespread use of the militia.59
With the committee’s report, the legislature voted to abolish the Guard, though Bishop
had already disbanded it in mid-December. The weapons loaned to the Rangers from the state
arsenal remained stored at the Murray County courthouse, however, which proved too tempting
for Bishop to ignore. In February, Bishop won a landslide victory in Murray County to become
the next clerk of the superior court. Of the 170 votes cast, he received an astonishing 158. In a
little over three months in his post, new complaints arose of his abuse. One Murray citizen,
Thomas A. Harper, experienced Bishop’s “mischievous designs & miserable deeds of darkness”
firsthand when Bishop and his armed supporters removed him from his post as clerk of the
Inferior court. Harper once more worried over the viability of civil law when the “tirant [sic]
crouched at the head of his mobs” resisted state law with public weapons. Though Bishop never
was punished for his abuses, his actions against Harper only strengthened the prevailing view that
Bishop felt comfortable with violence and saw it as going hand in hand with both politics and the
59 “The committee to whom were referred the several communications of his excellency the Governor,” Acts
of the General Assembly (1835), 1:341-42.
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preservation of order.60
Between 1831 and 1835, the state of Georgia funded four distinctive military units called
the Georgia Guard. Though each unit contained no more than forty men, the cumulative effect
of the Guard reached not only into the backcountry but to the nation’s capital. Most notorious
for arresting Christian missionaries in 1831, the various iterations of the Guard not only
tormented men of the cloth, but intruders, and Cherokees. Their intent was twofold. First, the
Guard sought to “protect the gold mines” from any intruders or prospectors, Georgian or
Cherokee. Second, as Cherokee society splintered into two opposing factions regarding removal,
the Guard sought to sow discord among them and convince the opponents of removal that the
safety of their people and the viability of their nation were threatened in Georgia. Their two
motivations for using a large degree of force showed just how willing the state was to rid the
backcountry of whites who behaved lawlessly and to get rid of the Cherokee. In short, violence
proved a useful way to bring about the white republic, in which settlers could enjoy the privileges
of self-government.
Employing intimidation, violence, and imprisonment, the Guard used similar tactics to
realize a well-ordered society. After 1832, the state implemented a lottery for the scope of
Cherokee territory within the bounds of Georgia. Rather than chase off intruders, the Guard
shifted its overall focus to the Cherokee in order to deepen rifts within the Cherokee polity. Its
actions, especially in 1835, became problematic because the commander, William N. Bishop,
extended violence to political opponents in Murray County. Though no one within the state
complained when Bishop or the previous commanders used violence against the Cherokee, using
it against whites, especially for politically motivated purposes, proved too much for the state’s
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citizens to stomach. Drawing on the republican belief that military power corrupts a republic, the
state legislature eventually disbanded the Guard and resolved never to institute a new one. Using
small, politically motivated units to provide order to the backcountry was at an end, but not the
use of force to bring about the white republic. In 1836, settlers exhibited a great amount of
anxiety when reports surfaced that the Cherokee were on the cusp of launching an all-out assault
on whites. With the Guard gone, state leaders needed a new way to protect its citizens from
potential Indian reprisals and to make the last push to enforce the Treaty of New Echota.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: REMOVAL AS REGULATION
With the dissolution of the Rangers after its trespass into Tennessee, the Georgia
legislature signaled its unwillingness to continue a forceful regulation of the backcountry
population. Too much had gone awry. Further, regulation had moved away from punishing
unruly whites and towards the separation of the races as a way to create order. Whereas the
Guard had first been established in 1830 to control white intruders on Cherokee ground, it
quickly evolved into a force that actively intimidated natives. By 1835, politicians no longer
argued that disorderly whites caused social corruption on the frontier; instead, the Cherokee had
been cast in that role, especially after the Treaty of New Echota passed the Senate. After that
date, removal became the only acceptable solution for backcountry disorder. To implement that
program, the state and federal government mustered several thousand white males into militia
service, a process that began in 1836. Much like the Guard, the militia became a political issue
between the two state political parties. It became apparent that important members of the
backcountry Union Party longed for a more forceful reckoning, while their State’s Rights Party
counterparts cautioned against force. Though militia duty, long deemed a civic responsibility,
engendered opposition, by 1838 a large swath of men from the border counties enlisted and
participated in an operation to whitewash their republic. Cherokee Removal was regulation writ
large: a widespread use of violence that compelled a minority population to leave the state of
Georgia in order to create an idealized society based on white superiority.
In early 1836, Georgia’s backcountry citizens worked themselves into a panic. Rumors
circulated regarding an imminent Cherokee attack that would drive white settlers from native
ground. The source of the speculation, a small Indian girl, told whites that her people had been
stockpiling arms and planned on launching a surprise attack. Governor Schley, uncertain if any
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real threat existed, did not wait to find out. “Whether there be any real cause for alarm among
the people in the Cherokee country, is a question not to be determined now.” He refused to place
the blame for the rumors at the feet of panicky settlers and thought it prudent to strip the
Cherokee of personal arms. “Would it not be well . . . to all the Cherokees . . . until they are
removed?” Schley fretted that the Treaty of New Echota, ratified “not by the sanction of their
leaders,” would encourage natives to “make a desperate effort to obtain what they may consider
revenge on the white people.” Jackson did not approve of Schley’s plan. Not only would it leave
the Cherokee exposed to attacks by Georgians, but it also put federal forces in the awkward
position of having to defend the Indians. Such a plan would make it seem that Jackson intended
to uphold John Marshall’s Worcester decision.1
A few Cherokees were disarmed, though not by the federal government. In the summer
of 1836, a group of backcountry whites “slicked” a few Indians in possession of firearms and
powder. The reappearance of slicking as a punishment used against the Cherokee was important.
Previously, slicking was something done in conjunction between white settlers and their native
neighbors to impose community standards on intruders. In 1836 it showed just how wide the gulf
between white settlers and the Cherokee had become. Because of their growing numbers, white
settlers now maintained the balance of power and the community standards they imposed were
their own, not a negotiated agreement between two groups contending for power. The slicking
episode worried Schley, who did not want to provoke vengeful reprisals. Still, the fact that the

1 William Schley to Andrew Jackson, February 13, 1836, Roll 76, M234, RG 75, Letters Received by the
Office of Indian Affairs, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC; Lewis Cass to William
Schley, February 23, 1836, Georgia Military Affairs WPA Project no. 5993 (Atlanta: Georgia Archives, 1940), 7: 192A192B.
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Cherokee did possess arms worried the governor, ordered the militias “to be vigilant” but not to
engage in vigilantism.2
Before those militiamen were mustered, Georgians expressed discontent with the militia
system in general and the impositions it posed on time in particular. Georgians, by 1836, had a
long and storied militia history and took pride in the institution’s revolutionary heritage. After the
War of 1812, citizens felt less compelled to serve citing the onerous burdens on their time and the
impracticality of leaving their shops, farms, and families for long stretches at a time to drill and
parade. Drawing on the growing unease regarding the system, discussion regarding the militia
focused on the need to reform it. Nearly every legislative session sought to make some reforms,
though few offered substantive alterations to such an ancient tradition. When antagonisms
between Georgians and the Creek Indians flared in 1836, nonplussed citizens reacted more
strongly to a levée than to potential threats. In Augusta, one concerned citizen regretted to inform
the governor that the lack of enthusiasm for militia service from the city’s citizens. “[T]here
cannot be twenty men found amongst them . . . such is the material of which our corps is
formed.” The problem sprang from self-interest. Most of the male population, “principally made
of mercantile men who are not wiling to leave their stores & businesses—or their clerks,” simply
could not afford to leave work to traipse about the wilderness.3
Most resistance to the militia system resulted from the dedication required from
militiamen. For small farmers and shopkeepers, time spent going to company drills or regimental
maneuvers took time away from work. If everything went according to plan, a militia company
spent at least ten days out of the year in camp. Of those, between four and six musters occurred
2 William Schley to James Edmonson, et al., June 12, 1826, in Governor’s Letter Book, 1835-1840, Drawer 62,
Box 65, Georgia Division of Archives and History, Morrow, GA.
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at the company level in the local militia district. Each company consisted of sixty men. Such
gatherings were usually small and informal and imposed the least amount of travel time or nights
spent in camp. Each battalion, which consisted of five companies or 300 men, had to muster
once a year at the county courthouse. Two battalions formed a regiment of nearly 600 men, and
had to meet once a year to conduct regimental maneuvers. Finally, a brigade, containing two or
more regiments, met once a year at the state capital, where the entirety of the state’s militia
drilled. Though it appeared highly regimented, the militia system existed primarily on paper.
The problem, wrote “Orleans,” was that the current system of militia organization did nothing
that trained or enabled militiamen “to defend their country in the hour of danger.” Parades
smacked more of pomp and circumstance than practical military training. The advertisements
for the statewide militia muster confirmed the suspicions of Orleans. Not only did militiamen
have to pay seventy-five cents each day for room and board, but the atmosphere of the muster
represented a carnival more than a serious military encampment. On the last day of drills, one
advertisement read, “medals will be shot for.” The impression remained that militia service was
more about a rollicking good time than preparing for war. Some companies attempted to shed
the reputation by adopting stringent rules for their members. “[I]ff any of the Company appears
on parade,” one company’s incorporation declared, “in ill humor or Drunk or with Decenceion .
. . or miss behaves,” they “shall be fined at discreshion of the officers.”4
Even the militiamen’s weapons were more fit for the parade ground than active duty, if
they existed at all. The muskets of one company in Eatonton had lapsed into a condition “only fit
for show & not for fight;” the few “Rifles . . . Shot guns and Some muskets” found in Fayetteville
Decatur County cavalry muster roll and company governance, March 13, 1836, Georgia Military Affairs, 7:
225-226; Milledgeville Federal Union, October 30, 1830, 3; Athens Southern Banner, March 23, 1833, 3. This complaint
registered strongly not just in Jacksonian America, but has been passed down by historians. On the stereotypical
view of the militia, see Harry Laver, Citizens More than Soldiers: The Kentucky Militia and Society in the Early Republic
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 1-8. Laver rightly corrects the image of the militia and portrays it as
an institution with important social, gender, and political roles.
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did not fully supply the entire company. In Early County, the local company could find only
“one solitary musket that would bear inspection.” When the state did send the company arms,
the captain found them useless. [T]he arms sent us are refuse, worthless and entirely out of
repairs . . . .Out of the seventy, there were but thirty that had flints.” The state militia system had
in place an archaic system in order to arm its citizen-soldiers. The state requisitioned arms from
the federal government and also levied money during each legislative session to pay the state
arsenal to arm each of the companies. For example, in 1827 the federal government sent nearly
15,000 muskets to the states. Georgia received 477 of them. Six years later, the number of
muskets had only increased by three. By the fall of 1837, the federal government began to pump
arms into the state. When the Creek War commenced, a militia general expressed alarm at the
deplorable state of the militia. “The men here are badly armed, and very many without arms, at
all, ammunition is scarce, and the men called out are displeased in many instances.” In Carroll
County, a resident planter feared the results of an Indian attack because of the militia’s lack of
preparedness. The captain of the local company “says that not half his men have any but
Squirrell Guns & there is not a Keg of powder nor a Bag of Shot in the County.” In response, in
from December 1835 to December 1836, the federal arsenal sent an additional 1,000 muskets to
Georgia.5
When the state did have arms to dispense to its militias, local companies often had to raise
funds to pay for a bond that could replace lost or damaged weapons. “Any security which the
State may require for the faithful return of the arms will be given,” declared James A.
Muster roll of the Eatonton State Fencibles, January 21, 1836, J.E. Hays, ed., Georgia Military Affairs, 7: 27;
Young Mann to Bolling H. Robinson, January 27, 1832, ibid., 7:73; John Dill to William Schley, January 29, 1836,
ibid., 77-78. On the number of muskets apportioned to the states by federal arsenals, see “Message of the President
of the United States,” H. Doc. 2 (Serial Vol. 206, Session Vol .1) 21st Congress, 2nd Session, 1830, 145; “Message
from the President of the United States,” H. Doc 2 (Serial Vol 217, Session Vol 1) 23rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1833,
225; William H. Bell to Governor of Georgia, October 14, 1837, Georgia Military Affairs, 7:331b; Henry H. Lowe to
William Schley, May 18, 1836, ibid., 7: 308; William G. Springer to William Schley, May 22, 1836, ibid., 7:329.
5

230

Merriwether, a frustrated company commander in Eatonton. An infantry company in Hall
County evinced not a little frustration when they learned that the “hose company” had received
“pistols and sords.” The poor men who served on foot offered to “Give Bond and Good Security
at any time it is Required.” What the company of infantrymen wanted was equal treatment to
the cavalry or “hose company.” So even if the state wanted to depend on the militia to defend
citizens from Indian attacks, the militias would have been hard-pressed to do so because military
grade muskets did not exist, or those militiamen who did have a musket hesitated to use their
own weapons in the state’s service.6
If most animosity toward militia service came because of inefficiencies within the system,
the most passionate critics of service in the militia resisted because they saw the entire system as a
farce. Many saw the militia system not as a system that competently rewarded service, but as a
popularity contest lorded over by planter grandees in the country and rich merchants in the
cities. Fearing that the youngest generation cared little for militia service, authorities sought to
reform the system. Lacking proper opportunity for advancement, “young men of good
character” shied away from militia service. One possible solution, the exclusion of the “rank and
file” from advancing, would encourage men of better material to enlist and seek advancement.
Such a proposal, however, struck at the democratic nature of the militia, where common
enlistees voted on their officers not necessarily on military skill but on reputation. Others noted
the “repugnance on the part of the people throughout the State, to having anything to do with
Military employment,” which translated into a difficulty of “getting up volunteer companies.”
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Instead of eager and energetic citizenry, the militia system’s demands and pretentious supporters
“makes that ridiculous which aught to be the pride of every citizen.”7
Nowhere did citizens of Georgia express more outright contempt of the militia system
than in Macon. Citizens of the town banded together to resist the militia system by forming a
mock militia company called the “Fantasticals.” The idea of the Fantasticals did not originate in
Macon, but instead came from Philadelphia. There the Fantasticals paraded the streets during
the Christmas holiday. In 1833, Philadelphians in the “Bloody” 84th Regiment took to the streets
in support of a Colonel Peter Albright who had encouraged his men to reject the discipline (and
seriousness) of the state militia system. Escorted by a regiment of “Fantasticals” to his court
martial hearing, Albright watched sternly as men turned out in outrageous costume. Though
short lived, the movement spread to other locations in the United States, including Macon,
Georgia.8
On a cold February morning in 1835, Maconites mimicked the satirical display put on by
the Philadelphians when they mocked the militia system of Georgia. When the 564th Company of
the Georgia Militia formed for drill in Macon, they turned out “exactly as their humor directed.”
Led by “Colonel Pluck,” who wore “an enormous chapeau, and feather some six feet high; a
tremendous broadsword and spurs and whiskers to match,” the other men arrived at their muster
similarly attired. Another officer came adorned with a codfish for a knapsack, a stone jug in place
of a canteen, and a loaf of bread instead of a cartridge belt. One man dressed like Black Hawk—
7 Aaron W. Grier to George Gilmer, August 10, 1830, Georgia Military Affairs, 6: 36; J.W.A. Pettit to George
Gilmer, February 9, 1831, ibid., 6: 65.
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a possible dig at the disreputable conduct of the Illinois militia in that state’s conflict. Another
man filled his cartridge box with “segars,” the contents of which he handled with considerable
dexterity. Most of the men, however, used brooms in place of their muskets or had marked their
legs “right” and “left” to help them keep in step. The Fantasticals paraded through Macon’s busy
thoroughfares to the delight of all. One jested that many spectators “nearly dislocated their ribs”
from laughing with so much gusto. The bystanders, apparently, were in on the joke, for it was
“highly applauded” and “well humored.”9
What had begun as a yearly celebration in Pennsylvania had expanded into a
recognizeable use of public spectacle as a way of opposing the militia system. Through farce,
satire, and a healthy dose of street theatre, the Fantasticals highlighted their discontent with the
present state of the militia system as an institution that only deserved the people’s derision. By
making fun of the militia system and those who took it seriously, the Fantasticals ridiculed a
timeworn institution that was seen as synonymous with the health of the republic. Most
Americans in the 1830s assumed that it was the militia, and not the Continental army, that had
won the Revolutionary War. Poking fun at such a venerable—and many would argue,
necessary—institution, the Fantasticals expressed their contention with republican ideology that
stressed virtuous sacrifice and the fear of a standing army. For residents in Philadelphia to protest
the militia system was one thing. After all, Pennsylvania had long since quelled any native
inhabitants. The protests in Georgia were perhaps more surprising because the state still had
large numbers of Indians living within state borders.
Politicians who realized that the state’s defense rested on the militia’s shoulders sought to
quell the unrest demonstrated by the Fantasticals, especially as tensions between the state and its
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Indian inhabitants increased. Early in 1836, the Creek Nation rose up against removal and
commenced the Second Creek War. Aided by their Seminole allies, the Creek commenced a
series of effective raids that kept federal troops busy. Georgians felt surrounded by native enemies
and looked northwards with trepidation. Governor Schley’s aid wrote to former commander of
the Georgia Guard and now major general in the state militia, John W.A. Sanford, warning of a
three-pronged war. “The actual hostilities of the Seminole and Creek Indians, and the great
disaffection and restlessness manifested by the Cherokees . . . admonishes the authorities of
Georgia to lose no time in preparing for any emergency that may possibly arise out of our
present relations with these treacherous foes.” He informed the president that the Cherokee
actively sought ways to join up with the Creek and Seminoles. If the Cherokees “in a moment of
desperation . . . hope that they can escape punishment by flying to the Creeks and Seminoles,”
the people of Georgia would be faced with a formidable threat. If people refused to serve than
the state’s frontier residents would be left largely undefended. Their worries had credence; by the
end of the year the Fantastical movement had spread to Augusta and Savannah.10
In spite of the opposition posed by the Fantasticals, many Georgians saw military service
as a means to advancement. Not only did public drills allow the local community to see who
participated, but it also allowed militiamen to meet or command their peers and earn their
approbation. George R. Gilmer as well as Wilson Lumpkin, long before they served as governor,
used military service during the War of 1812 to launch their political careers. Lumpkin had
contemplated moving his family into land occupied by the Creek. Once war erupted, he enlisted,
he wrote, because “I felt it my duty, regardless of my private interest.” Though he deplored
10 Bolling H. Robinson to John W.A. Sanford, May 72, 1836, Governor’s Military Letters; William Schley to
Andrew Jackson, February 13, 1836, Roll 76, M234, RG 75, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs,
NARA; Gordon Burns Smith, History of the Georgia Militia, 1783-1861 (Milledgeville, GA: Boyd Publishing, 2000), 1:
43-44.
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“human slaughter” and did not want “military fame,” he used his service to run for the state
legislature immediately after the war. Lumpkin won the election and went on to serve in the state
capital on behalf of grateful citizens of Oglethorpe County. It should be noted, however, that
Lumpkin only served in the state militia because the state became embroiled in a war. He did not
participate in militia drills in peacetime.11
Gilmer had an altogether different, and livelier, experience—though he joined the regular
army and not the state militia. He received a commission in the U.S. Army as a second
lieutenant and marched twenty-two unarmed recruits to the Chattahoochee River where he was
supposed to construct a fort. For someone who openly admitted that the only soldiering he had
ever seen was a local militia muster, who had never fired a musket, nor drawn a sword in selfdefense, Gilmer remained confident that he and his men could follow their duties. At one point
during the fort’s construction, the sound of muskets firing alerted the work party to potential
danger. While Gilmer hastily organized the defense, an intrepid rider crossed the river to scout.
When he returned, he led a party of Cherokee warriors and their families into the camp. They
informed Gilmer that they had just returned from the Battle of Horseshoe Bend where they had
served with General Andrew Jackson. They showed off a score of scalps that proved their mettle.
That evening, the Cherokee danced around their trophies of war, but Gilmer did not attend. He
did, however, let his men cross the river and watch the dancing.12
Aside from building a fort, Gilmer also had the responsibility of enlisting new recruits. In
a scene that could have inspired the Fantasticals two decades later, Gilmer donned his finery and
soon found himself a show as he pleaded his case to “the very rudest people of the country
Wilson Lumpkin, The Removal of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia… (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company,
1907), 1: 20.
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towards the mountains.” At first uncertain of Gilmer, the frontiersmen soon approached the
uniformed man and handled his sword and epaulets, to say nothing of his red whiskers. Such
humiliation was too much for Gilmer to bear. It took all of his self-control “to bear up under such
an infliction.” Certain to find the story of a posh lowcountry planter surrounded by poor
frontiersmen who acted like they had never seen a soldier in one of Augustus Longstreet’s
“Georgia Scenes,” he finally had to admit to the humor inherent in his recruitment trip. If his
recruitment experience was a farce, it also spoke to the difficulty of raising men.13
Since Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provided Congress with the ability to
“provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,” it sought ways of making militia
service more amenable to the masses. In the first session of the Twenty-Fourth Congress, the
House debated a proposal to alleviate many of the complaints proffered by prospective
militiamen. Representatives identified six major complaints, including the vast number of
militiamen, the fact that minors, or those under the age of twenty-one, were asked to serve, and
the fact that arms and accouterments “are not generally fit for actual service.” Most weapons in
the possession of militiamen, worried not a few representatives, “would prove more fatal to the
possessor than to the enemy.” In spite of the militia’s deplorable condition, the United States
needed men to fight in 1836. The Creek rising showed the vulnerability of frontier settlements
and the inability of the United States Army to prevent bloodshed on its own.14
As Congress debated the merits of altering national militia laws, it also used its most
potent inducement to prod men into service. More than potential land bounties earned from
service the immediate offer of cash usually sent men flocking into service. Militiamen who
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volunteered for cavalry service could expect about twenty-four dollars per month, while an
infantryman collected only eight dollars every month. The same session of Congress that debated
the wisdom of the current militia laws also sought a way to reward those who did step forward for
public service. In a bill to draft state militia into federal service for the Creek War, Congress
allowed the president to “accept volunteers who may offer their services either as infantry or
cavalry not exceeding ten thousand men” to serve for either six or twelve month durations.
Cavalrymen had to furnish their own horses, though the bill made it known that the rest of those
mustered into federal service “shall be armed and equipped at the expense of the United States.”
In order to safeguard against the possibility of the president calling the militiamen into service to
provide federal monies to secure votes, the “said volunteers shall be liable to be called upon . . .
only in cases of Indian hostilities, or to repel invasions.” Because the volunteers would be
equipped and paid by the federal government, the states were relieved of a rather large burden
and potential expense. Congress also alleviated financial considerations on the states when it
resolved to provide wounded soldiers with a federally funded pension. To pay for the men about
to be mustered into federal service, Congress appropriated $300,000.15
The bill went to pay volunteers not only for service in the Creek country, but also for
those who began the Cherokee removal process. The bill expired after two years so the window
within which to call the militiamen into service was relatively brief. Before Congress was willing
to unleash several thousand militiamen into the backcountry to conduct removal, it first had to
station federal troops there. In 1836, it dispatched General John Ellis Wool to east Tennessee in
order to carry out removal as stipulated in the Treaty of New Echota and to protect settlers. This
time, whites living in the region had little issue with the federal troop buildup. Most realized that
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their presence meant the eventual expulsion of the Cherokee. Federal forces did not move at the
rapidity desired by white settlers. First, federal and state leaders wanted to avoid bloodshed, an
important requirement that federal forces would do their best to uphold. When General Wool
learned of the murder of a Cherokee by a white settler, he ordered his men to stay wary. “You
will, no doubt, recollect that most of our Indian wars . . . was brought on by similar conduct.”
Even many backcountry residents recognized that the font of violence began with the ways that
settlers treated natives. On man remarked that there remained no doubt that the Cherokee “are
incited to mischief by the inhuman treatment they received at the hands of our own people.” To
allay the tensions and to prevent white settlers from “pulling down all the troubles upon our
borders,” backcountry residents had to “treat them more like human beings . . . and less like
brute beasts as they appear to be now regarded by us.” The recognition that white settlers
precipitated most backcountry violence did little to change the minds of those who advocated
removal. Separation of the races would create a more peaceful social environment.16
Most settlers did not evince the empathy requested by their neighbor, especially if they
believed the Cherokees threatened their lives. When Governor Schley received instructions from
the president to begin a call for militiamen, the state had no problem filling its rosters, in spite of
the rampant protests. The opposition expressed by the Fantasticals, shopkeepers, and poor
farmers disappeared when the governor called for higher-paying cavalry companies. Georgia’s
farmers became particularly adept at signing up for the cavalry service and showing up with the
most decrepit plow horse they could find. If the horse died while its owner was in the federal
service, the cavalryman could apply for an exorbitant amount of compensation. “I would have it
publicly known,” declared Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett in 1838, “that no more than one
16 John E. Wool to Col. H. Simms, March 25, 1837, “Report from the Secretary of War,” S. Doc. 120
(Serial Vol. 315, Session Vol. 2) 25-2, 74; Wiley Williams to William Schley, December 28, 1835, Georgia Military
Affairs, 6: 298-299.
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hundred and twenty dollars will be allowed for any horse that may die or be lost in a manner to
give its owner a claim upon the government for its value.” One hundred twenty dollars for one
horse was indeed exorbitant. Even the finest stallions that the Cherokee lost only fetched a
hundred dollars, though one owner cared little for the money “in consequence of its being of
good blood stock.” In spite of the fact that Army officers knew Georgia’s militiamen fleeced the
federal government when it came to valuing their property, they usually went along with the
scheme and continued to discriminate against the Cherokee who constantly received lower
payments for horses stolen by American citizens. Cavalry also proved popular for more practical
reasons. It allowed militiamen in the mountainous upcountry to traverse rough terrain in a timely
manner. Infantry had difficulty in the steep terrain and succumbed to fatigue more readily than
mounted troops.17
Even before General Wool’s arrival and Congress’s call for the militia, Governor Schley
informed state militia officers to ready their individual companies for a potential muster. In early
1836, many responded; other militia districts began the process of forming companies anew.
Cavalry troopers from Forsyth proclaimed their readiness and their desire to protect their
“Country from emergencies of invasions from any quarter.” Another company in Carroll County
mustered into service but soon learned that the state did not require their service near home.
“Every one along the line would be much disappointed in being sent off while there might be
danger in our own neighborhood.” Schley’s preparedness paid dividends, for on May 25 he
received orders from the Secretary of War to “cause to be raised two thousand volunteers to be
placed immediately in the service of the United States.” From across the state, militia units
17 Joel R. Poinsett to Winfield Scott, June 1, 1838, Roll 1, M1475, RG 75, Correspondence of the Eastern
Division Pertaining to Cherokee Removal, April-December 1838, National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington DC; Claim of Kalonoshaskee, March 7, 1842 in Marybelle W. Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims,
Tahlequah District (Tulsa, OK: Marybelle W. Chase, 1989), 45.

239

offered their services to the governor. In Murray County, William N. Bishop’s brother, Absalom,
headed one company that formed for the express purpose “of going in to immediate action
against the hostile Cherokees and Creeks.”18
Absalom Bishop soon began working with the former subcommander of the Georgia
Guard, Charles H. Nelson, to get their men into action. In January, Nelson had written to Schley
inquiring if the state required “further force to quell the lawless Savages in Florida?” Schley
thanked Nelson for “this patriotic tender of services” and encouraged Nelson to get up a
company of sixty mounted men. Schley went further to encourage the service of backcountry
farmers. “The necessary expense of your company, until you report to the commanding officers
in Florida, will be paid by me. Let no man, therefore, be prevented from joining on the plea of
poverty.” It was not until June, however, when Nelson and Bishop called for recruits. By the end
of the month, 111 men had joined the ranks of the Highland Battalion. Part of the delay in
compiling the force probably came from the governor himself, who did not follow through on his
end of the bargain. When Nelson and Bishop needed to pay for supplies, they found state support
lacking. The aid promised by Schley did not arrive, so the governor encouraged Bishop to “do as
well as you can on the credit of the State.”19
When the Highlanders did finally muster into service, they did not go to Florida as
Nelson wished, but to Lashley’s Ferry on the Coosa River, about twenty miles south of Rome,
Georgia, on the Georgia-Alabama border. The role played by the Highland Battalion in the
Creek War was a small one, but it highlighted the efforts of state leaders who wished to punish or
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expel Indians, prevent racial mixing, and forestall a potential Creek-Cherokee alliance. Nelson
and his men were stationed at a key river crossing. Their strategy, predicated on “preventing the
Creek Indians from coming into Georgia,” sought to arrest any Creeks who tried to flee federal
removal agents in Alabama or to link up with the Cherokee. Schley declared the mere presence
of the Creek was an affront to state law. The legislature had prohibited Creek Indians living in
Alabama to step onto Georgia soil because of a “highly penal statue of this state, and therefore
the authorities of Georgia are bound to arrest them when they violate this statute.” While
stationed there, Bishop’s men from Murray County came into contact with federalized
militiamen from Tennessee. Perhaps animosity lingered from the fact that Bishop’s overeager
brother had invaded the Volunteer State and that state’s militia sought retaliation. Only vague
details exist, but apparently Bishop’s Company of the Highland Battalion engaged in a scuffle
with their compatriots from Tennessee. When Schley heard of the fight, he grew upset that
Bishop and Nelson had “acted improperly” towards the Tennesseans, but the evidence he had
did not warrant punishment. Another report suggested that the entire tenure of the Highlanders
had been plagued by problems, and the unit as a whole had “done more harm than good.”
Rather than have the legislature begin an investigation, and because it came so close to the
actions of Bishop’s Rangers, Schley wanted to disband the Highlanders altogether.20
Doing that proved more difficult than the governor imagined. No one knew, with any
degree of certainty, which branch of the government currently employed Nelson and Bishop.
General Wool sent an order to General Dunlap of the Tennessee volunteers telling him to
proceed immediately from his post in that state to New Echota so he could “prevent any
interference on the part of the Georgia troops with the Cherokee.” Further, he asked the general
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to “ascertain by whose authority they have been raised and stationed in that country.” If they
had been illegally raised, Dunlap should disband them immediately; if Georgia authorized the
Highlanders they had not been federalized, which needed to happen. No federal officer had
sworn in the Highlanders, though the state had stopped paying for the men once they reached
the ferry. If he still was an officer of the state, the governor maintained that no troops from
Tennessee, even federalized ones, could order them about, which had supposedly caused the late
unpleasantness between the two militia companies. On the other hand, if Bishop had been
federalized then his punishment rested with federal forces. In the end, the governor worked with
General Wool to recall the battalion, which deprived the militiamen of a year’s worth of federal
pay. After three months on the ground, the Highland Battalion had been sent packing.21
Even with the looming threat from a potential Creek uprising near the Cherokee
territory, the Georgia militiamen from Murray County found it impossible to cooperate with
volunteers from Tennessee. Part of the problem stemmed from the continuity between the
Rangers and the Highlanders. In Absalom Bishop’s Highlander company, seven noncommissioned officers had previously served with the Rangers, and another two were privates in
both outfits. That meant that nine of forty Rangers had enlisted with the Highlanders and had
gained the coveted rank of officers. One man, James Sample, held the position of first lieutenant
in both companies. Almost the entire leadership of the Highlanders—both lieutenants, 3 of 4
corporals, and 2 of 4 sergeants—had all their military careers with William N. Bishop in
Rangers. Though the legislature had disbanded the Ranges, the unit reformed, for all intents and
purposes, under a new name—albeit with a different Bishop in command. The high degree of
21 On the uncertain situation of the Highland Battalion, see John E. Wool to Brigadier General Dunlap,
August 4, 1836, American State Papers: Military Affairs, 7:550; William Schley to Brigadier General Richard Dunlap,
August 17, 1836, Governor’s Letter Book, GDAH. On the short duration of the Highlander’s enlistment, see "Index to
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in Organizations from the State of Georgia." M907, NARA.
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continuity between the two units made it likely that the Highlanders exhibited the aggressive
behavior that its members demonstrated when serving with the Rangers. Rather than defend the
actions of another bellicose Bishop brother, Schley found it easier to disband the unit.22
As the Highlanders headed home to Murray County, Schley could congratulate himself
on heading off a potentially volatile situation that would have done nothing to ameliorate
relations between the Georgians and Tennesseans. The Highlanders, though, were only the
beginning in what would amount to more than 2,800 militiamen enrolled between 1836 and
1838 to ensure that the Cherokee went along with the Treaty of New Echota as peacefully as
possible. The overwhelming show of force was a way to demonstrate American military power,
to convince the Cherokee of the futility of resistance, and to make removal occur as rapidly as
possible. After the Highland Battalion’s dissolution, the state had to wrangle a large number of
men for lengthy services. Learning from the fiasco caused by the Rangers and the Highlanders,
state and federal officers decided upon a strategy that they hoped would bring about removal
peacefully. Rather than take recruits from the Cherokee counties once removal started, the state
and federal leaders wanted to draw on militiamen from the border counties thinking that people
who did not live in the Cherokee counties would be less disposed to act violently.
Before removal could begin, federal forces stationed in the backcountry went to work to
prepare the natives for their forced migration west. General Wool, the commander of the force,
did not act with much decisiveness mostly because he pitied the Cherokee. His Whiggish
sensibilities made him resentful of Jacksonian Indian policy. Such a combination made it difficult
for him to carry out his orders, or at least it appeared that way. The governor of Alabama
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charged Wool with restoring the Cherokee to their homes and property taken from them by
white settlers. The governor continued his indictments when he accused Wool of “usurping the
powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama, disturbing the peace of the community, and trampling
on the rights of the people,” Wool had to go before a military tribunal to answer for his lackluster
leadership in July 1837. However, when it came time for the governor of Alabama to prove his
accusations, he could produce no evidence to do so. In spite of Wool’s displeasure with his task,
he ordered the dispossession of “a great number of Cherokee” from their lands, which were given
to white settlers. One officer interviewed during the course of the inquest sympathized with Wool
and his refusal to push the Cherokee off their land. When asked about the character of frontier
white settlers, Captain James Morrow of the Alabama militia agreed that “a portion of the
population is very respectable,” but noted with disdain the “unworthy” settlers “who are there for
the purpose of robbing and plundering the Indians, and have exercised every species of
oppression towards them.” The court found Wool guilty only of demonstrating caution and
following his orders. The court did not sanction the general; it had already relieved him of
command when the trial began, which it considered punishment enough.23
Wool’s replacement, Colonel William Lindsay, demonstrated none of the general’s
hesitancy or uncertainty. Lindsay, a much more energetic and forceful man, began his newfound
command with gusto. His first effort, in fact, was to bring more men into service to begin the
construction of “forts”—or stockades where Cherokees would be held after being taken from
their homes but before they began their forced migration. To do so, he issued a call for mounted
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volunteers. In the middle of 1837, Lindsay put out a call for mounted infantry volunteers from
Georgia and raised a regiment, nearly 1,000 men, who would serve for up to a year.24
Called Lindsay’s Mounted Militia, the men came from all across the Cherokee region. In
all, 981 men enlisted in Lindsay’s regiment, along with three women, called “matrons,” who
performed various chores around camp. The men went to work constructing a series of forts and
outbuildings designed to hold the Cherokee and keep the militiamen housed in relative comfort.
The Treaty of New Echota and further agreements between the Senate and the Cherokee
National Council stipulated that removal commence by May 24, 1838, about the time the
enlistments for the mounted infantry expired. Col. Lindsay knew that the men he called into
service would more than likely not be available for removal, but they could prove invaluable in
preparing for that process to begin.
In spite of the overwhelming presence of federalized militia within the Cherokee territory,
their operations proved entirely too peaceful for Charles H. Nelson. After the Highland Battalion
had been disbanded, he sought a way of continuing his fight against Indians. Not to be outdone
by Lindsay, Nelson raised nearly a thousand men and tendered their services to the governor.
Federal and state leaders had already decided upon the strategy of drawing militiamen from the
border counties so initially his regiment was turned away. Nelson, though, persisted in his desire
to fight Indians. Appropriately, Nelson and the Union Party made the payment of the militias an
election-year issue. In 1837, William Schley of the Union Party ran against the resurgent George
R. Gilmer from the State’s Right Party. At the May nominating convention of the State’s Rights
(or, disparagingly, the Nullifiers or Nullies) Gilmer had received overwhelming support for
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another term as governor. Once again, the Union Party used the specter of the States Rights
Party’s inherent elitism as a way to counteract them. In 1837, unlike 1831, it did not work.25
Hoping to remind its readers that Gilmer had once sought to deny access to the gold
mines, the Macon Telegraph argued that the contest revolved around aristocracy and democracy.
Gilmer and has supporters had openly declared that they “are the weaker in point of numbers,”
but still ran for elected office “on account of their superior wealth or smartness!” Fearing that
Gilmer would “do every thing in his power to promote the views of the aristocracy” and buttress
“privileged classes and orders” by placing burdens on “the shoulders of the poor,” The Union
Party sought to prevent his resurgence by using the familiar cry of elitism and his hesitancy to
enact removal. More importantly for the troubles within the Cherokee country, Gilmer’s enemies
declared that he sought “to exempt students at College from military duty.” To hammer home
the point that Gilmer fundamentally opposed a forceful removal of the Cherokee, Schley
suggested that the state should pay for Nelson’s regiment.26
When Schley called for Nelson’s force in early September, just a month before the
election, the message became clear: Schley and the Unionists would use force to expel the
Cherokee; Gilmer would not. When news of Nelson’s new force went public, John Ross warned
the Cherokee “to be prepared for the worst.” The governor’s supporters maintained that the
force was not for aggression, but “for the protection of . . . our unoffending and peaceful
citizens.” With images of “bloodshed and rapine” fresh in the minds of voters, Schley’s
supporters urged their fellow citizens to set aside party motivations “and look to the interest of his
country and to the cause of humanity” and support Schley for his “vigilance and patriotism.” In

25 Interestingly the name “State’s Rights Party” was still widely used within Georgia. However, newspapers
outside of the state had begun calling that group the Whig Party. See Portland (ME) Eastern Argus, May 30, 1837, 3.
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a letter widely published across the state, Nelson argued “that there is every reason for alarm.”
Citing historical precedent, Nelson declared violence and removal went hand in hand, at least on
the part of natives. Citizens in the Cherokee country needed to “prepare for sudden conflict” and
the state should aid them, for they lacked “organization or concert; arms or ammunition.” If the
legislature went along with Schley’s plan, Nelson felt that “a suitable force” could remove at least
half of the Cherokee well before the May 1838 deadline arrived.27
Nelson’s insistence on state forces preempting federal troops demonstrated his lack of
understanding on how removal would occur. Troops would not just kick the natives out of their
homes and send them on their way. Removal, instead, was a logistical nightmare for federal
officers who had to plan for river crossings, treacherous terrain, as well as the supply and
protection of the émigrés along the route. A state force could not simply expel the Cherokee and
expect them to make it to Indian Territory. Only federal forces had the wherewithal and
jurisdiction to operate independently within each state. Georgians eager to expel the Cherokee
cared little about the finer points of removal and expressed admiration for Nelson’s
aggressiveness. Though Union Party operators reminded voters of Gilmer’s past transgressions—
Indian testimony and state ownership of the mines—the issue in 1837 revolved around Nelson’s
force and the payment of the militia.
Gilmer left the management of his campaign to his supporters and returned to his
boyhood home in western Virginia. State’s Righters championed their candidate as “the soldier’s
friend” who would uphold the legislature’s desire to pay for Colonel Nelson’s force and not leave
exposed frontier settlers defenseless. The Athens Southern Banner warned voters that the Cherokee
“savage is sufficiently armed with the Rifle—the Tomahawk, and Scalping knife,” the latter it
27
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called the “proper symbol of their profession.” When Gilmer returned to Georgia just prior to
the election he made no mention of Nelson’s proposed force.28
It took nearly three weeks to determine the rightful winner of the election. With the final
tally made, George Gilmer narrowly won the gubernatorial office again by a margin of only a
few hundred votes. Voters in the border and Cherokee counties, however, judged him harshly.
There the threat to white superiority was greatest and the specter of Indian testimony loomed
large, as did Gilmer’s seeming hesitance to muster troops for their defense. In the six border
counties, Gilmer only polled at thirty-eight percent and received 1,779 votes to Schley’s 2,900. In
the eleven Cherokee counties, Gilmer fared even worse, gaining only eighteen percent of the
vote. In fact, in eight of those counties he did not receive a single vote. He could only muster
twenty-nine votes in the county named after him! In spite of his poor showing in the upcountry,
Gilmer took office and did his best to frustrate the aggressive and warlike stance of the upcountry
Unionists.29
The issue of paying Nelson’s regiment did not disappear when the governor took office.
Instead, Nelson saddled his entire force, nearly 1,400 men from the Cherokee counties, and rode
to the outskirts of Milledgeville ostensibly on their way to Florida. Gilmer immediately saw
through the charade. In a well-coordinated effort, Nelson’s Unionist allies in the state house
pushed through the legislature a special appropriation of $30,000 to pay the men for their service
up to that point and for their journey to Florida. It was believed that once they arrived in Florida
federal forces would take them into service and pay their salaries. Gilmer was a stickler for the
law and noted that the federal government had not a made a call for militiamen from the
Cherokee counties to travel to Florida. Gilmer also pointed out that Nelson’s force would leave
28
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the Cherokee counties bereft of men in the case of a Cherokee uprising. If Nelson and his men
truly wanted to protect their families, they should remain where they were rather than parade to
Florida. Furthermore, the cost associated with paying for 1,400 men did not amuse the governor.
When Gilmer made it public that he objected to signing the bill, two “very intimate friends”
hinted at “great personal violence” if he continued to refuse. Gilmer balked at being held hostage
by Nelson and his men and vetoed the legislation.30
In a sternly worded message accompanying his veto, Gilmer made it clear that the militia
would not dictate state policy to him. Because the offer made by the federal government to bring
in militia for the Seminole conflict had been withdrawn because federal forces had trouble
enough supplying the troops stationed there, Gilmer declared that Nelson acted not on behalf of
the state or the federal government. Instead of legitimate militiamen, Nelson’s force should be
seen “as so many individuals directing themselves according to their own wishes.” The
governor’s veto did little to deter Nelson, who urged his men onward to Florida. Before he left, a
Union majority in the legislature made him a major general of the militia and began calling his
unit the Georgia Brigade. To Gilmer’s annoyance, when Nelson arrived in Florida, General
Thomas Jesup accepted him into service and put the Brigade to work. One of the men in the
brigade, Ira R. Foster, informed Union Party papers that the brigade “is not only received, but
kindly, by General Jesup,” which he hoped would mortify their enemies. Moreover, the men now
drew rations, forage, and pay from the quartermaster stationed there. Foster informed readers
that several “Nullies” had joined the brigade and had since changed their allegiance.31

30 George R. Gilmer, Sketches of some of the First Settlers of Upper Georgia.... (Americus, GA: Americus Book
Company, 1926), 406.
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By the time Nelson’s men had worn out their welcome in Florida, they had seen combat
only a handful of times. Gilmer derisively noted in his memoir that Nelson’s troops “killed one
Indian squaw.” General Jesup reported to the president that the Georgia Brigade had in fact
engaged in “several skirmishes with the enemy” which resulted in the Georgia troops killing six
Seminoles and taking fourteen prisoners. By the end of their enlistments, the War Department
had to pay the Georgia Brigade $306,000, which Gilmer felt had been paid on account of
President Van Buren who anticipated those men to “vote esprit de corps” for Democratic
candidates. The overt political tone exhibited by Gilmer and Nelson in the squabble over paying
the militia showed just how fractured Georgia politics had become. With each party attempting
to upstage the other when it came to protecting citizens from potential attacks, Gilmer’s
cognomen “soldier’s friend” had come under attack.32
The governor seemed to care little and was not about to muster the militiamen from the
border counties in order to gain political favor, in spite of the urgings from the backcountry and
the attacks from the Union Party. Gilmer believed that the militiamen along the frontier desired
to enter service not to protect their farms and families, but to “enjoy the pleasures of camp and to
get pay for doing nothing.” The seeming wastefulness of Nelson’s brigade verified Gilmer’s
suspicions. Even federal quartermasters balked at the sheer amount of money the Georgia troops
applied for, one quartermaster called it “very large.” When the Georgia Brigade’s enlistments
expired in April 1838, the 1,400 soldiers had filed nearly 1,000 requisitions asking for back pay,
transportation costs, forage reimbursements, or the cost of dead horses.33
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By January 1838, four months before removal began, the pressure on Gilmer to call out
the militia in the border counties increased. However it seemed like whatever the governor
attempted to do regarding militiamen he came under the scrutiny of Georgians. Even though he
had opposed the creation of Nelson’s Brigade, citizens in Murray County complained that since
it had gone to Florida they had been left exposed. A group of citizens in that county believed that
“the time has arrived when it is indispensible to the safety of the people and property” for a
company of local militiamen to enter into service. From Gilmer County, many citizens “speake
of taking off their families if there is not more troops sent here;” while worried residents in Ellijay
noted the “bold saucy and stubborn” behavior of the Cherokee. The embattled governor waited
until he received the call from the federal government in early March.34
When the approval did arrive, Gilmer wasted no time alerting militia commanders. In a
dispatch to the border counties, the governor apprised them to the purpose of their presence—
and the pitfalls of straying from their orders. The primary design of the militias was ‘to give
security to our citizens; to overawe the revengeful spirit of the lawless portion of the Indians; to
prevent the people flying from their homes and the country upon every rumor of danger; to
protect your families, neighborhoods, and the people of each county.” However, the governor
made it clear that if the militiamen acted violently or unjustly towards the Cherokee, the entire
country would become embroiled in an Indian war. Furthermore, he reminded the militiamen
that their service stood to benefit the good of every citizen so soldiers should not seek profit from
their service. He had reports that some backcountry whites, “for their own selfish and lawless
purposes” sought to cause problems so they could grasp for land. He reiterated that the task of

34 Citizens of Murray County Petition, January 6, 1838, J.E. Hays, ed. Cherokee Indian Letters, Talks, and
Treaties (Atlanta: Georgia Archives), 3: 657; Samuel Tate to George R. Gilmer, February 21, 1838, ibid., 3:672; B.
Griffith to George Gilmer, February 27, 1838, ibid., 3:680.
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the militia, “preserving the peace of the country,” was a boon for the entire state and should not
be meddled with. The call in March, however, did not ask for a full-blown muster, but rather an
advance notice to company commanders that they and their sixty man companies needed to
prepare for service.35
Aside from wanting to follow the letter of the law—Gilmer often cited the Constitution
when explaining to militia captains that he did not have the authority to call them up—neither
did he wish to precipitate a bloodbath. He knew that thousands of armed men in in the
backcountry would only spark trouble especially if federal forces had not been properly placed to
prevent such an occurrence. Gilmer was advised that the bulk of Cherokees would wait on the
decision of John Ross. If he told them to resist they would. Gilmer implored Ross to choose
peace. On March 9, Gilmer wrote to John Ross requesting that the Cherokee principal chief
urge his people to accept removal peacefully. “It requires no strong invention to imagine,”
Gilmer cautioned, “the suffering and distress which must be inflicted upon your people, if hunted
up by an undisciplined soldiery, and forced from their homes.” Urging Ross to “save them from
the evils that threaten them” by moving west, Gilmer acknowledged the selfishness of the letter
but urged Ross to believe that his words were earnest. “It is my anxious desire that the Cherokees
should be treated with humanity.” Ross adamantly refused to take responsibility for the actions of
men who defended their families from forceful expulsion. “Should blood be spilt . . . the blame
can never rest on us.”36
By the following month, the slow-to-act federal government had begun to prepare for the
military aspects of removal. In April, the commanding general of the U.S. Army, Alexander
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Macomb, ordered General Winfield Scott to the Cherokee country to oversee removal. The
following day, he ordered four artillery regiments, part of the 2nd Dragoons, the entire 4th
Infantry, and a detachment of Marines to make haste for the Cherokee country. In all, that
placed over three thousand regular troops at Scott’s disposal and further reduced his dependence
on unpredictable militiamen. Even with so many federal troops, the vast Cherokee territory and
the number of inhabitants necessitated a vast military operation. The same day, the (acting)
Secretary of War Samuel Cooper notified Gilmer that Scott could call on Georgia to furnish
militiamen who would serve for a maximum of three months. On April 12, Gilmer received a
letter from Gen. Scott asking him to raise two companies of mounted infantry. Joining the nearly
2,000 militiamen from Georgia were another 1,000 volunteers from both North Carolina and
Tennessee. Former governor Wilson Lumpkin, now an enrolling agent stationed at New Echota,
applauded the steps taken by Scott, especially the “large & imposing” military force he had
assembled.37
By May, Georgia’s two regiments of militia mustered at New Echota in Murray County.
Not trusting that the governor’s plea for civility would register, Scott tried to drive home the
expected peaceful actions of the militia. He issued General Orders Number 25 on May 17. In it,
he laid out the prescribed boundaries for each militia force. The Cherokee country within
Georgia, now called the Middle District with a headquarters at New Echota, had the most
burdensome job. Of the nearly 18,000 eastern Cherokee, about half lived in Georgia so the
potential for violence appeared greater there. He ordered that every Cherokee man taken into
custody would have his rifle taken from him with the promise that it would be returned when the
37 Alexander Macomb to Winfield Scott, April 6, 1838, Correspondence of the Eastern Division Pertaining
to Cherokee Removal, April-December 1838, Roll 1, M1475, RG 75, NARA; Charleston Southern Patriot, April 16,
1838, 2; S. Cooper to George R. Gilmer, April 9, 1838, “Correspondence of the Eastern Division;” George R.
Gilmer to Winfield Scott, April 20, 1838, ibid; Wilson Lumpkin to Winfield Scott, April 7, 1838, ibid.

253

westward trek began. Such an action left Cherokee men open to violence, but stressed that the
militia needed to remember the shared humanity of the Cherokee and Americans. If “a
despicable individual should be found, capable of inflicting wanton injury or insult on any
Cherokee man, woman or child,” Scott made it the duty of the men to stop harshness and
cruelty. Scott’s orders also delineated residents of the Cherokee Nation into three categories. The
only Indians that the Army had the responsibility of moving were those who had not been
granted lifetime reservations by the states or intermarried whites, whom he called “Indian
countrymen.” Everyone else, meaning Indians who had not acculturated, had to go.38
Those militiamen from the border counties who enlisted were less wealthy and had
received less of the state’s bounty in the land and gold lotteries than the members of the Guard
who had previously set out to maintain order in the backcountry. Of the 600 men who enlisted
into federal service from Hall, Habersham, Carroll, Campbell, Gwinnett, or Rabun counties,
only 71 (or less than 12 percent) had won a gold lottery and only 55 (9 percent) won a land claim.
In the 1830 census, of the 114 verifiable men, 21 owned slaves. By 1840, that number had
increased to 32 slaveowners out of 197 men enumerated in the census. Some of the reduced
numbers were no doubt a function of the age of the militiamen. Married men or those with
dependents were not encouraged to enlist so those who did may have been too young to win a
land or gold claim in 1832 and were therefore not enumerated as the head of a household in
1830. Sanford’s Guard in 1830 seemed downright aristocratic in comparison. That small
company had 10 slaveholders out of 40 men, as well as 17 gold lottery winners. The border
county militiamen, mostly young, poor yeoman, perhaps sought to expel the Cherokee to create
space for themselves and their families. Others may have seen it as their duty as citizens in the
38 An original copy of General Order No. 25 can be found in the Benjamin T. Watkins Family Paper, Mss
717, OP 4, Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.
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republic. Certainly some saw it as an adventure that would cure their boredom and curiosity
about the wider world. 39
Having received their marching orders, the militia fanned out across the middle district to
the various posts constructed by Colonel Lindsay and his mounted militia over the previous
eighteen months. Gilmer noted that rather than conduct field operations, the best use of the
militia involved having them garrison those forts “to control the Indians and protect the people.”
This way, the only immediate contact the militiamen would have with the Cherokee would be at
the forts and not pursuing those Cherokee who resisted or fled. Scott had no problems, though,
sending the volunteers into the homes of Cherokee families to make them leave. In Washington
DC, a Cherokee delegation led by John Ross tried once more to forestall removal, and many
Georgians feared President Van Buren would cave in to the mounting pressure.40
When the May 23 deadline came and went and the negotiations still had not produced a
new agreement, Scott began the removal process. Gilmer appointed a seasoned general, Charles
Renatus Floyd, to lead the state militiamen, something he had great experience doing. He first
reported to the governor on May 27, a scant three days after he and his men began operating.
The goal of the militia was to remove as many Cherokee from their homes and into the forts.
From the forts, they would march to Ross’s Landing on a prescribed date to board steamships for
the Indian Territory in current-day Oklahoma. Problems surfaced immediately because most
Cherokee did not anticipate removal to commence and the Army lacked the supplies to feed
18,000 captives.
The compiled demographics of the border county militiamen have come from three different sources.
First, the “Index to the Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who Served During the Cherokee
Disturbances and Removal...” RG 94, M1475, NARA; second, from reprinted lists of the land and gold lottery
winners. S. Emmett Lucas, The 1832 Gold Lottery of Georgia: Containing a List of the Fortunate Drawers in Said Lottery (Easley,
SC: Southern Historical Press, 1988), as well as James F. Smith, The Cherokee Land Lottery in Georgia (1991; New York:
Harper & Bros., 1838). Last, from the county level returns for the 1820 U.S. Census and the 1830 U.S. Census.
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Though the Army had begun preparing for removal in 1836, their stockpiles could not
sustain thousands of civilians, let alone the 7,000 troops involved in the operation. On May 22,
before Scott officially launched the operation, an officer stationed in North Carolina noted the
lackluster state of supplies in the Cherokee country. The troops stationed at Franklin, North
Carolina “are almost entirely out of provision and none can be procured in the country, so that it
is impossible to remain . . . .The country is completely exhausted.” If the town of Franklin lacked
supplies for troops, many of the stockades for detaining the Cherokee proved just as bereft. The
most well-stocked fort, Fort Poinsett had more than 16,000 bushels of corn, while other forts,
including a camp near Spring Place and another in Paulding County lacked any rations
altogether. So the countryside may have been destitute of supplies, but the Army had them to
spare. It simply did not allocate the resources judiciously, which led to suffering when Cherokee
families wallowed in the internment camps.41
When troops did go out into the countryside to capture the Cherokee, they initially
reported little, if any, violence. Instead, the way most officers and militiamen wrote of their
actions, the entire process seemed rather mundane. The federal officer John Gray Bynum
nonchalantly noted “I collected yesterday about 80 Indians.” He expressed alarm regarding “a
great deal of sickness . . . prevailing amongst the children of Indians.” He boasted that he allowed
women to stay at home to nurse the sick children. Militiamen from Georgia expressed a similar
nonchalance towards their duty. The men in Daniel’s Company, 1st Regiment, did not reach
New Echota until May 28 and were immediately pressed into service, stopping only to prepare a
quick supper. They marched the entire afternoon and “traveled, taking Indians until midnight.”
That night, the men from Madison County camped in a road “with some Indians who we had
41 John Gray Bynum to G.A. Montgomery, May 22, 1838, Record Book of John Gray Bynum, William
Preston Bynum Papers #117, Series 3, Folder 35, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, NC.
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taken prisoner.” Other men in the company slept in a “House with the Red people.” In the
morning, the expedition continued. At each house, the company commander left a small guard
to watch over the prisoners. Henry P. Strickland, a private, sardonically noted that by the end of
the day the men “were all posted as guards” and no one could be spared to capture more
Indians. In three days, three companies had captured 927 prisoners. Strickland continued his
account, but it appeared that after tits initial foray into the backcountry, his company did more
guard duty than anything else. By the beginning of June he noted that the “great fatigue in
collecting & guarding the Indians” had not lived up to the expectations of the men.
“Volunteering have not proven unto them what it was cracked up to be.” He noted that he had
held up better than anticipated but admitted to missing home a great deal. 42
General Floyd made a much more official sounding report on May 27 when he reported
his initial successes. Crossing the Coosawattee River early the previous day, he sent out small
detachments of troops in multiple directions to prevent “the escape of the Indians.” He noted
that his men behaved in a “prompt and energetic manner” that complied with General Orders
No. 25. Floyd reported on the progress made by all of the Georgia militia companies and was
pleased to see that the speed of removal continued to proceed rapidly. By May 28, he noted that
the Georgia troops had rounded up 963 Indians from their homes and detained them; two days
later another 484 Indians had been corralled. By June 9, Floyd reported that 3,636 Indians had
been captured by the Georgia militia and had since been sent to Ross’s Landing for processing
and transportation. That number did not include another 400 still stationed at Rome waiting for
an armed guard. The operation to arrest, contain, and deport the Cherokee still living within
Georgia’s borders had taken only a few weeks to complete. The incredible efficiency of Floyd’s
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troops, had, by the first week of June, cleared the Georgia upcountry almost entirely of
Cherokee.43
In spite of the ease reported by Floyd, he still worried that acts of violence would go
unreported and escalate the tenuous situation. He noted to General Scott, “the Indians made no
resistance, but evinced generally a great reluctance to remove.” Still, he wanted his men to keep
him abreast of developments, especially if any “extraordinary event occur in collecting the
Indians.” The men were under great stress not only from physical exertion, but also from the
strain of removing Indians from their homes, and pressure exerted from the home front. One
petition requested that Private William Calhoun be released from service because his wife “got
into a deranged Condition” and had to be confined by her neighbors. Another volunteer, an
assistant surgeon, had received information “of a domestic nature” and sought to resign, though
he hesitated to ask for any “indulgence” because of “those honorable feelings” which forbade
officers from leaving the service. The exhaustion and growing resistance to removal expressed by
the Cherokee made some sort of violence inevitable.44
Rumors surfaced that militiamen enjoyed shooting at Cherokees who ran into the hills at
the first sight of the troops. Many Cherokee, resentful of confinement in internment camps,
attempted to escape. On May 28, Private F.M. Culbreath of Oglethrope County shot and killed
an Indian man trying to leave one of the stockades. Though horrified, Gen. Floyd said Culbreath
had acted rightly and did not censure him because the murdered Cherokee had expressed “some
43 General Floyd to Winfield Scott, May 27, 1838, Roll 1, Correspondence of the Eastern Division;
“Number of Indians in the possession of the Georgia Volunteers for emigration reported to Brig. Gen. Floyd up to
May 28 [1838]”; General Floyd to Lt. Colonel Worth, May 30, 1838; “Number of Indians sent to Ross’s Landing
and the Cherokee Agency from the different posts in Mid. Military District,” June 9, 1838 all located in Roll 1,
Correspondence of the Eastern Division, NARA.
44 General Floyd Orders No. 8, May 29, 1838, Roll 1, Correspondence of the Eastern Division, NARA;
Petition of Citizens for the Discharge of William Calhoun, May 30, 1838, ibid; General Floyd to Winfield Scott,
June 6, 1838, ibid.
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indications of hostility.” Still, he wanted to remind the volunteers that “we are not in a state of
war with the Cherokee Indians, that they have not committed any act of violence; that they are
moving peaceable out of the County.” To maintain their honor, the troops should let the
Cherokee leave without further bloodshed. He also wanted to inform the men that the actions of
Culbreath would not be used as precedent when deciding the fate of whites who shot Cherokees.
Other reports trickled in regarding the cruelty of the militia towards their captives. Captain
Derrick had to confess that one of his men, whom he considered “a very correct young man”
who would “do nothing wrong intentionally” had abused an Indian woman when taking her
prisoner. The private had knocked her down when the woman, who did not want to leave her
home, had struck at the soldier with a stick and then tried to take his gun from him. At Fort
Gilmer, the bailiff, “who lately beat and half hanged an Indian” had been arrested.45
The most prominent complaint offered by the Cherokee at the time, was not any rough
treatment—though expulsion from their homes was rough enough—but that they did not have
enough time to secure any property that would make life in the forts bearable. One woman,
Nancy Pheasant, was forced from her home by armed American troops. When she and her
detachment reached Calhoun, Tennessee, she had her horses, which she “never heard from
afterwards,” taken from her. Chowahuca “was forcibly removed . . . by authorities of the U.
States” and lost quite a bit of property in the process. When the militia forced her from her
property, she lost a loom and spinning wheel, a plow, several cows and sheep, and two horses.
Whites drove Tesahnehe from his home and took his gun away from him—though disarmament
became official policy with General Orders No. 25—and Tieeskih claimed he had “been torn”
45 For the rumors of troops shooting at fleeing Cherokee civilians, see Order No. 15, May 7, 1838, Box 1,
Folder 7, Benjamin Watkins Family Papers, Emory; General Floyd Order No. 16, June 1, 1838, Roll 1,
Correspondence of the Eastern Division, NARA; Captain William Derrick to Brigadier General Eustice, June 4,
1838, ibid; Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, June 2, 1838, ibid.
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from his home “by a force of armed men and dragged into camps and there kept.” Chenashse
“was rudely forced from her home by the soldiers” and had to leave all of her possessions
behind.46
The winter and spring of 1838 had been particularly dry, and by May temperatures in
the upcountry were unseasonably warm. The Cherokee could have used the nourishment
provided by stores of food or livestock, but the Army initially denied them their property. The
inhospitable forts left Cherokee prisoners exposed to the elements and caused rampant sickness.
The ill-managed supplies only compounded their suffering. After Culbreath murdered one
Cherokee, Scott changed his formerly stringent tone and allowed some Cherokees to obtain
passes so they could return to their homes and secure some property. This led to a great degree
of confusion. Some Cherokees with passes never returned to their forts and soldiers believed that
they escaped into the mountains. Others returned to their homes and sold what remained of their
belongings to white settlers. Some fort commanders even let groups of Cherokee conduct
themselves to Ross’s Landing without an armed guard. Such “indulgences” were calculated to
induce the natives to remove peaceably, though General Floyd suspected that such a lenient
attitude might result in “mischievous consequences” and frowned upon Scott’s generosity. Many
of his officers, while conducting prisoners to Ross’s Landing, allowed individual Indians to leave
the column to see to their property, or check on the homes of their friends, or simply to look on
their country one last time. This frustrated Floyd, who saw the leniency as an enticement for
Indians to reenter Georgia. Even the state offered other Cherokees permits to remain in Georgia
until September, a practice that further confounded Floyd. Soft Shell Turtle, for example, a

46 Claim of Nancy Pheasant, March 11, 1842, Marybelle W. Chase, ed. 1842 Cherokee Claims-Saline District
(Tulsa, OK: Marybelle W. Chase, 1988), 25; Claim of Chowahucah, March 14, 1842, ibid., 121; Claim of
Tesahnehe, March 15, 1842, ibid., 59; Claim of Tieeskih, March 15, 1842, ibid., 62; Claim of Chenahse, March 15,
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Cherokee “of considerable influence” who had actively opposed removal, had a small band of
followers who all had permits. Still, Floyd worried because the presence of Indians would likely
incite settlers to violence.47
If the militia had been called up to impose a strict racial order on the backcountry, they
did not necessarily help preserve the public peace. Some problems arose at smaller posts
commanded by unsupervised militia captains. At Fort Buffington and the camp at the Sixes, both
commanders were accused of cruelty towards the Cherokee. Combined, the two forts housed
1,100 prisoners who greatly suffered. At Fort Means, one of the Cherokee “without any
provocation” struck a soldier with a rock, so the captain of the fort immediately ordered his
arrest. Other problems arose, especially when soldiers and Indians gambled together. At Fort
Cumming, Captain Benjamin Watkins noted that one prisoner, Aaron Willman had lost $250 to
a white man, Thomas York, and the former wanted to stay until he had settled his debt. Another
captain refused to follow orders to turn over a fort to a different commander. Rather than face
whatever humiliation he imagined a change of command to bring, Captain Dorsey fled the
service and returned to his home in Hall County. His men followed his actions, and when a
federal officer turned up at the fort, he found “one half of the men” absent and the militia officers
could not “give any account of them.” The federal officer, Lt. Griffith termed what he
encountered “a complete mob,” a far cry from the strict discipline and order envisioned by
Georgians.48

47

Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, June 24, 1838, Roll 1, Correspondence of the Eastern Division, NARA.

48 Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, June 2, 1838, Roll 1, ibid.; Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, June 6,
1838, ibid.; Captain Benjamin T. Watkins to General Floyd, June 9, 1838, Box 1, Folder 4, Benjamin T. Watkins
Family Papers, Emory; Captain Derrick to J.H. Simpson, June 25, 1838, Correspondence of the Eastern Division,
NARA.
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Watkins encountered other cases of disorder, not from Cherokee prisoners, but from his
men. He placed Lewis W. Tredwell, a cavalry volunteer, under arrest for a litany of charges,
including drunkenness, “the act of rioting,” and “an attempt to commit murder.” Other soldiers
behaved in an unprofessional way and were likewise detained by officers. A.P. Bush, a private in
Cox’s company from Franklin County reported that his captain disgraced his rank. Not only did
the regiment move at a glacial pace while marching, but the captain absented himself from the
company much of the time and the men openly discussed his drunkenness. The men had little
respect for him. While stationed at Fort Buffington, he threatened to have one of the men
arrested when his comrades “presented their muskets at him,” and dissuaded the captain from
making such a poor decision. At Fort Hoskins, Floyd reported “one case of Mutiney,” and several
more of insubordination, which, he vowed, “shall not be suffered to pass unpunished.” Even
military discipline suffered as a result of removal.49
Floyd had been kept busier by the misbehavior of the militiaman than he had by any
actions on the part of the Cherokee and therefore he applauded Scott’s efforts to muster the
Georgia militia out of service promptly. Scott’s plan for removal had been predicated on getting
the Cherokee out of Georgia, the state most ardently opposed to their presence, as quickly as
possible. In fact, removal in North Carolina had not even begun its own removal efforts until the
operation in Georgia had terminated. With those Cherokee out of Georgia’s forts, Scott no
longer required the Georgia militia. On June 19, Floyd reported to Scott that his scouting parties
had scoured the countryside and could not find any traces that nearly 9,000 Cherokee used to
live in the territory. On June 25, Captain Derrick reported that he had sent off another eighty-

49 Captain Benjamin T. Watkins to General Floyd, June 9, 1838, Box 1, Folder 4, Benjamin T. Watkins
Family Papers, Emory; Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, July 1, 1838, Roll 1,Correspondence of the Eastern
Division, NARA; A.P. Bush to Col. Turk, June 3, 1838, ibid.; General Floyd to Winfield Scott, June 6, 1838, ibid.
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five Indians to Ross’s Landing, which put his total at 884. He remarked that those Cherokee
families who had fled to the mountains would soon come in because the white settlers “feel no
apprehension of danger from them,” a good sign that meant the residents no longer feared an
Indian uprising. By July 1, the two regiments of Georgia militia had been mustered out of service,
paid, and sent home. Beginning on May 26, the militia from Georgia had conducted an efficient
operation that had rounded up thousands of Cherokee civilians, placed them in detainment
camps, marched them to larger camps, and guarded them from white settlers. Though violence
did occur, the lack of killings by Georgia’s militias had to have pleased the governor and general,
both of whom revolted at the thought of a violent conflict and feared a scenario that would have
tarnished their reputations if it had turned out any other way.50
The two decades prior to Cherokee Removal were marked by an incredible amout of
violence. When state militiamen arrived in the Cherokee counties to expel the native inhabitants,
a surprising dearth of violence transpired. The historian Mary Young correctly posits that a
vibrant middle ground allowed for fruitful negotiations between Winfield Scott and John Ross,
which led to a more peaceful operation. Knowing that they had been swindled out of their land,
the Cherokee still chose not to resist. In spite of their forbearance, some violence did occur and
several Cherokee had been shot, beaten, or killed by troops. Even Scott had to order his men to
shoot some Cherokees. Credit is also due to General Scott and Governor Gilmer who set the
appropriate tone when removal began. Neither wanted bloodshed, and Ross, in particular,
opened up a fruitful channel of communication with General Scott that paid dividends and saved
lives. Young also argues that had Schley won the election of 1837, he more than likely would
have placed Nelson in the field. Such an action would have proved disastrous. His Georgia

Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, June 16, 1838, Roll 1, Correspondence of the Eastern Division; Captain
Derrick to J.H. Simpson, June 25, 1838, ibid; Charles Floyd to Winfield Scott, July 1, 1838, ibid.
50
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Brigade, composed of men who lived in the Cherokee counties, would have shown much less
restraint than the men raised by Gilmer. The militia also deserves some credit. They showed
restraint in a very difficult and stressful situation, though the fact that the men who served did not
live in the Cherokee counties probably accounted for the generally humane treatment.51
That does not mean, however, that Cherokee Removal was a peaceful operation.
Uprooting and expelling thousands of people who did not look like a typical Georgia yeoman
was a terrible act of violence committed by the state and federal governments. Though the
process of being uprooted was in itself an act of violence, it was probably the most benign aspect
of Cherokee Removal. When those Cherokee who had been expelled from Georgia arrived at
Ross’s Landing in Tennessee, one expedition of about 300 émigrés departed but the extreme
heat made the going difficult. Ross pleaded with the general to delay removal until temperatures
cooled and to put Cherokee, rather than Army officers, in charge of operations. Scott agreed and
it seemed like a crisis had been averted. In the meanwhile, real suffering broke out in the camps
as fresh water became increasingly scarce and sickness weakened the prisoners. Not until January
1839 did those expeditions leave Tennessee, bound for Indian Territory, never to return.
Though no exact count exists, scholars put the death toll as low as 2,000 and as high as 4,000.
Up to 1,0000 Cherokee perished in the internment camps that awaited them after they had been
forced from their homes. More recently, Russell Thornton’s careful demographic study puts the
death toll as high as 8,000 because of low population estimates. Many now believe that at least
2,000 Cherokee perished as a result of lengthy imprisonment in the internment camps.52

Mary E. Young, “Conflict Resolution on the Indian Frontier,” Journal of the Early Republic 16 (Spring
1996): 15-17.
51

52 A figure of 4,000 deaths as a result of removal has long been accepted, though uncritically, by historians.
See Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1984), 241, n.58. For a correction, see Russell Thornton, “The Demography of the Trail of Tears
Period: A New Estimate of Cherokee Population Losses,” in William L. Anderson, ed., Cherokee Removal: Before and
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For nearly two decades, Georgians had tried to use the extension of state civil law as a
tool to remove the Cherokee Indians from within the state’s boundaries. By passing laws, creating
new counties, and subjecting the natives to discriminatory statutes, state leaders had shown the
Cherokee that Georgia was a white man’s country and that its government would go to great
ends to effect their displacement. However much Georgians wanted the process to seem like an
orderly, legal proceeding, events did not turn out that way. Instead, Georgians used military
force—some of it sponsored by the state, other sanctioned by the federal government—to
intimidate, corral, and remove the minority population. Removal was another form of regulation
designed to create order. Even during removal itself, military force trumped civil law. When a
sheriff and two deputies interfered with the military’s operations, Floyd had them arrested and
detained. Major Pope rescued a white citizen from arrest by civil authorities, though he had no
authority to do so. The message was clear: civil authority proved useful when dealing with
everyday affairs in settled areas; military force and violence were necessary to maintain order and
the essential aspects of the white republic when the burgeoning American empire encountered
groups opposed to its expansion.53

After (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), especially 83-93.
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Map 2. Northern Georgia in 1839, part of Thomas Gamaliel Bradford, “Georgia.” (Boston:
C.D. Strong, 1839). Courtesy of the Birmingham Public Cartography Collection, Birmingham,
AL.
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CONCLUSION
With removal a reality, Georgia’s leaders could look to the backcountry as an extension of
the white republic. Their task had not been an easy one. The borderlands had always been close
to a large-scale eruption of violence, a scenario state politicians dreaded. The Cherokee, instead,
had passed into the west, endured hardship and misery, but had eventually succumbed to two
decades of continual violence that had destabilized their foothold on the world. When the
Cherokee agreed to a land cession in 1819, they did not know that a decade later thousands of
intruders, whose ceaseless quest to find gold, would bedevil their national existence. The
harmonious Cherokee worldview came under siege from other directions as well. As an
acculturated elite gained economic power, they codified republican thinking, and not the
traditional ethic of harmony, in the Cherokee Constitution of 1827.
Georgians who clamored after Cherokee land had the full backing of their state
government, though issues about sovereignty arose, which made it difficult for the state to claim
native ground laying within state boundaries as its own. The emboldened Cherokee constitution,
a series of federal laws, and the growing importance of southern radicalism and state rights, all
coalesced in the struggle for sovereignty over native ground. In 1828 and 1830, the state
legislature passed a series of laws designed to extend state sovereignty over the Cherokee Nation,
and then announced its own supremacy when the second law outlawed the any native institutions
from convening. Furthermore, it outlawed anyone form digging for gold, and prevented whites
from residing beyond the state’s northern border. The state, however, was stymied in its efforts to
extend its sovereignty mostly because of the presence of white intruders who continually defied
state dictates.
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Claiming that it had to create and maintain order in the borderlands, the state went
about that task violently. Order, a cluster of ideas that defined the ideal society, had three
interrelated and reinforcing ideas. First, state leaders saw order as a social system in which white
planters held power and authority, buttressed by the support of the yeomanry, and built upon the
labor and legally binding condition of slavery prescribed for blacks. Second, order signified a
political system defined by its adherence to the common good and virtuous self-sacrifice that, by
the 1830s, encompassed egalitarianism and white male equality. Finally, order reflected a society
devoid of crime, lawlessness, and violence. The binary racial system that in part defined the wellordered society had little place in it for Native Americans, or, for that matter, whites who
continually and willfully broke the law.
To quell the rising lawlessness, state leaders pronounced that civil institutions should
create order. To settlers living in the backcountry who had to deal with the intruders firsthand,
such declarations smacked of a disconnected political elite who had no understanding of
conditions on the ground. When a group of backcountry thieves infiltrated the Carroll County
government, the hope for a peaceful extension of state and local civil authority waned. White
residents and their Cherokee neighbors took up arms together in a vigilante movement that
sought to rid the county of white vagabonds. The vigilantes, who called themselves Regulators or
Slicks, took to regulating the backcountry as way of creating order. Regulation, or the use of
violence to impose social control, was one way for the state to bring into being their idealized,
well-ordered society. It was a lesson not lost on Governor George R. Gilmer.
In early 1830, Gilmer asked for the help of federal troops as a way to regulate the social
landscape of the borderlands. Though it obfuscated the state’s stance on sovereignty, the help
proved welcome for a short time. When the federal troops did arrive, they upheld federal law
rather than state dictates, which meant they expelled white Georgians and allowed the Cherokee
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to dig for gold. Frontier Georgians howled at the slight and claimed that the federal government
had created a hierarchy with whites at the bottom. The political pressure mounted on Gilmer,
mostly from his own State’s Right Party, and he requested President Jackson to recall the troops.
When withdrawal occurred later in 1830, the state legislature authorized the creation of a small
force to police the gold mines. The Georgia Guard spent its time equally divided between halting
intruders through force and intimidating the Cherokee. When the Guard’s use of violence against
whites became politically unpopular, the Union Party and Wilson Lumpkin swept into office in
October 1831.
Lumpkin had campaigned on what he called the “white man’s chance,” which entailed
individual ownership of the gold mines and the distribution of native farmland to potential white
settlers in the form of a lottery. The power of racialized politics swept Lumpkin into office,
especially after Gilmer recommended that state courts permit Indian testimony in court. Whites
moving into the borderlands, no longer deemed intruders, needed space to live without the
continued presence of the Cherokee. To protect further the political and legal privileges of whites
in the borderlands, Lumpkin also focused on a more active attempt to widen political fissures
within the Cherokee polity. A federal policy of “voluntary” removal rested on the hope of
enticing Indians into departing for Arkansas territory and employed the Georgia Guard to
enforce it. Lumpkin encouraged the state-federal cooperation because it helped promote state
sovereignty. Though “voluntary” removal was anything but that for many émigrés, the new
federal policy widened a political schism that pitted anti- and pro-removal forces within the
Cherokee Nation against one another.
The Guard, however, could never escape its political nature, especially in the winter of
1835-1836, when it crossed the state line and travelled to Tennessee, where it arrested John Ross,
the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation. Georgia had long-espoused a strong states’ rights
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position, though this time it had gone too far. By intruding upon the sovereignty of another state,
the Guard caused a political showdown that ended the use of state-sanctioned force as a means of
regulating the backcountry.
The Cherokee, however, still remained. To push them out of the state permanently,
federal negotiators hammered out the Treaty of New Echota with the pro-removal faction of
Cherokee. To go about removing the Cherokee, state militiamen combined with federal troops
prepared the way. Though the use of militiamen and federal troops to uproot thousands of
Cherokee was an inherently violent act, very little interpersonal violence resulted from the
operation. To be sure, flashes of violence occurred, but federal officers and state elected officials
cautioned the militiamen that the United States did not want to instigate the massacre of the
Cherokee, only accomplish their relocation. In spite of that caution, state leaders could not
prevent the death of at least 1,000 Cherokee who were forced to linger in deportation camps as
supplies dwindled and diseases spread. By 1839, only a handful of Cherokee remained in
Georgia. For state leaders, regulation as a way to create order had worked. State and federal
leaders found violence easy to justify as long as it was directed towards a minority population and
for the purpose of extending the white republic.
In 1840, the legislature sought to remove those few Cherokee who remained in Georgia
when, surprisingly, it granted them the privileges of citizenship. Those who remained, a small
group of highly acculturated Cherokee families had, for all intents and purposes, stopped being
Cherokee long before the legislature’s pronouncement. The act “removed all legal disabilities
heretofore imposed” on those acculturated Cherokee who remained in Georgia. It granted to the
designated families “the rights and privileges of citizenship,” and allowed them to sit on juries,
sue in white courts (provided they agreed not to sue the state for any land taken from them before
removal), and serve in the militia. The whitewashing of the republic worked differently for
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different people. At the same session of the legislature, the General Assembly created a legal way
to determine the amount of African blood present in some of its heretofore white citizens.
Anyone charged with having an impure heritage that was at least “one-eight Negro or African
blood in his or her veins” was liable to have the privileges of citizenship stripped.1
When viewed as the termination to a long, violent history that plagued the CherokeeGeorgia borderlands for nearly two decades, Cherokee Removal looks different. Rather than a
rather sudden departure from federal Indian policy, President Jackson’s call for removal did not
come as a surprise. Instead, state and federal leaders deliberated on their course over a period of
decades. Removal was also a way for Jackson to let his views on the nature of the Union play out
at the state level, especially when he allowed the state of Georgia to nullify federal treaties with
the extension and supremacy acts. When he withdrew federal troops in the 1831, he also handed
over responsibility of Indian policy, and therefore sovereignty over the Cherokee country, to the
state.
The devolution of authority away from Washington had important consequences on state
politics, consequences that also drove removal. The development of the Second Party System in
Georgia led politicians to cater to the baser urges of their constituents. Whites who clamored
after Cherokee land or gold expressed concern over their rights, and the state responded
accordingly. The election of 1831 turned on the question of white superiority and voters
vehemently rejected Gilmer’s call for granting a native minority rights enjoyed by white citizens.
State politicians, furthermore, grew much more comfortable with the application of violence
directed at the Cherokee as a way to remove them. Violence applied by the Georgia Guard
“An act to grant the rights and privileges of citizenship to certain persons, and their descendants….”
December 22, 1840, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, 31-32, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgibin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte=1 9746651&lawcnt=1&filt=doc (Accessed January 12, 2012);
“An act to point out the tribunal and mode for the trial of questions of citizenship….” December 19, 1840, Ibid., 3233,http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/legis-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=law&byte=19748770&lawcnt
=2&filt=doc (Accessed January 12, 2012).
1
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became a wedge that further drove apart the two political factions within the Cherokee Nation.
This deliberate attempt to weaken the Cherokee Nation through violence underscored
Georgian’s familiarity with factionalism, and highlighted their views on the threats posed by
political parties. That did not prevent them, however, from creating political parties of their own.
Removal, then, was not just the culmination of political events in Washington, but also the
consequence of political factionalism within the Cherokee Nation and the state of Georgia.
Removal also resulted because of the blurred society that had formed along the frontier.
In the borderlands, the increasing degree of acculturation, and the acceptability of negotiation,
went against the notions of order and white superiority espoused by state and federal politicians.
Even if competition for space and resources did occur in the two decades before removal, state
leaders argued that removing the Cherokee population had become a necessity because the
Cherokee population tempted whites to behave in disorderly ways.
Those same political leaders saw removal as one choice on a continuum of options at
their disposal. Georgians espoused their desire to create order peacefully by employing one end
of the spectrum, civil institutions. That did not prove possible because of the chaotic borderlands
society. Further along that spectrum, individuals engaged in varying degrees of violence to
regulate the unruly backcountry population, including disorderly whites and other criminals. At
the far end of the spectrum, state-sponsored violence designed to remove a supposedly inferior
population, though it differed in scope and tone from vigilantism, was another option at the
disposal of those who espoused order. The irony, of course, was the fact that state leaders desired
a lawful society and used violence to bring about that world.
The legacy of removal left other marks on the thinking of the expanding republic. As
backcountry settlers adjusted to life without the presence of natives, a Cherokee legacy persisted.
Streams, roads, ferry crossings, and towns still bore the names of the native inhabitants who had
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resided there for centuries. Using violence to subdue and expel this rapidly changing population
signaled the white polity’s unwillingness to accept acculturated “others” into their republic or
grant the majority of them an equal footing, unless that group had acculturated to some degree
and then rejected its cultural heritage. Proximity to a seemingly dangerous population that
threatened the expansion of the white republic taught Georgians that violence was an acceptable
way to exert control over a population that did not conform. Those families who did achieve
some measure of acceptance still had to pay a terrible price. They had been separated from their
cultural heritage, from their native tongue, and from a belief system that spoke to the
harmonious interactions of all humanity. In exchange, they had property, some legal protections,
and their lives. For most Cherokee, it was a price too high to consider paying, but it was the price
required for a well-ordered society.
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1835-1836

Removal
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1838

40

44

600

17
(42.5%)

12
(27.27%)

71
(11.83%)

8
(27.27%)

55
(9.17%)

2/10

21/114

7/21

32/197

Land Lottery
8
Winners
(20%)
1830
7/16
Slaveowners*
1840
10/20
Slaveowners*

Figure 6: Lottery Winners, Slave Ownership, and Military Service

*The figures for the 1830 and 1840 slave ownership have been compiled from the census
schedules for those years. However, census enumerators did not count every militiaman who
served. Only the heads of households were enumerated so far fewer guardsmen and militiamen
were counted than who served. A highly mobile population did not make the job of the
enumerators any easier. The total numbers of potential slaveholders, therefore, is lower than the
total number of men in each militia category. The fractions for those two categories represent the
number of slaveholders who could be verified in the census. For example, in 1830, 7 men in the
Georgia Guard owned slaves, out of a total of 16 that could be verified in the census. For the
Removal militias, I used the data from companies that mustered in the border counties. Three
companies mustered from Habersham, two from Hall, and one each from Campbell, DeKalb,
and Gwinnett.
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